ILSA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW
NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY
SHEPARD BROAD LAW CENTER
INTERNATIONAL PRACTITIONER'S NOTEBOOK EDITION

Volume 9

Spring 2003

Number 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
2002 INTERNATIONAL LAW WEEKEND PROCEEDINGS
Issues in Teaching International Law
Teaching International Law to
Undergraduates and Other Non-Legal
Audiences: Practical Suggestions
for Pedagogical Approaches ............................... Howard S. Schiffman
Dissecting the Lawfulness of United States
Foreign Policy: Classroom Debates as
Pedagogical Devices ..........................................

321

Christopher C. Joyner 331

Teaching International Law: Beyond
the Law School Experience ..............................................

Charlotte Ku

345

The Holocaust as Catalyst for International Justice
Summary of Extemporaneous Remarks ............... Benjamin B. Ferencz

349

Panelist Remarks ..................................................

Abraham B. Krieger 353

A Brief Overview of the War on Terrorism
and the United States' Right to Use Force in Response
to the Attacks of September 11
A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition
of Terrorism ..............................................................
Susan Tiefenbrun

357

INTERNATIONAL LAW WEEKEND PROCEEDINGS, CONTINUED

The Faultines of Legitimacy in International Law
Taxonomies of International Peacekeeping:
An alternative Narrative ...................................................
Ralph W ilde

391

Interplay Between National Security and International Law
in the 2 1St Century: Conflict or Cooperation?
How Can We Really Protect
International Security? .......................... .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . Curtis F. Doebbler

399

The International Criminal Court,
National Security and Compliance
with International Law ...............................................

James C. Kraska

407

The International Criminal Court: The Way Ahead
ICC Pretrial Proceedings:
Avoiding Gridlock ........................................................
David Stoelting

413

International Governance of Territory
The Skewed Responsibility Narrative of the
"Failed States" Concept ....................................................
Ralph Wilde

425

International Trade Law and Development
A New Liberal Trade Policy Foundation ........................... Hal Shapiro

431

Child Labor and International Law
A Deep Structure Connection: Child Labor
and the World Trade Organization ............................. Sara Ann Dillon

443

NOTES & COMMENTS
The Legality of the United States' War on Terror:
Is Article 51 a Legitimate Vehicle for the
War in Afghanistan or Just a Blanket
to Cover-Up International War Crimes ................. Matthew Scott King 457
The Impact of September 11 on Terrorism
Insurance: Comparing Senate Bill 2600,
House of Representatives Bill 3210, and
the United Kingdom's Pool Re ..............................

Andrew S. Neuwelt

473

TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW TO
UNDERGRADUATES AND OTHER NON-LEGAL
AUDIENCES: PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR
PEDAGOGICAL APPROACHES
Howard S. Schiffinan*

I.
II.

INTRODUCTION ...........................................
AN ACADEMICALLY DIVERSE STUDENT BODY ..................

321
322

I1. WHERE TO START? .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ........ .......... 323
A. Develop the Idea that InternationalLaw Matters ..........
323
B. Choose an Excellent Textbook .........................
325
IV. DIDACTIC APPROACHES: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS ............
326
A. Experiment with Problem-BasedLearning ...............
326
B. Devote at Least One Class Session to Research Methods .... 326
C. ClassAssignments and Assessments Should Address
as Many Skills as Possible ............................
327
1. Exam s ........................................
328
2. Term Papers ...................................
328
3. Class Participation: Socrates or Aristotle? . . . . . . . . . . . . 328
V. INSTILL A LIFELONG INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT ................
329
VI. CONCLUSIONS ............................................ 330
I. INTRODUCTION

Unquestionably, there is growing interest in the subject of international law
at several educational levels and among a broad constituency of students. This
is due to a variety of factors. Not the least of which is a widespread desire to
better understand the events of September 11, 2001 and the international
response to terrorism. In addition, as the world becomes more interdependent,
the importance of the field continues to expand. This phenomenon is hardly
surprising when one considers that matters, which have always constituted a
focus of international law, such as terrorism, trade, human rights and global
environmental protection resonate through a number of different disciplines
today. Accordingly, there is a visible demand for courses in the subject at many
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Howard S. Schiffman, J.D., LL.M., Adjunct Assistant Professor, New York University School

of Continuing and Professional Studies. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the American Branch
of the International Law Association, International Law Weekend, October 2002, New York, NY, United
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graduate schools, business schools, undergraduate political science, and
continuing education programs.
Over the last several years, I have had the honor and the responsibility of
teaching courses in public international law, international dispute settlement and
international environmental law to student bodies with little or no formal
background in the study of law. This undertaking is most enjoyable as I
consider it a privilege to give students an introduction to a discipline I value so
highly. At the same time, teaching international law to undergraduates and
other non-legally trained audiences carries with it unique challenges that need
to be addressed by the conscientious educator. This paper highlights a few such
challenges and offers suggestions and observations on how best to address them
in the academic environments in which they are experienced.

H.

AN ACADEMICALLY DIVERSE STUDENT BODY

Indeed, one cannot refer to "undergraduates and other non-legal audiences"
pursuing courses in international law as a homogeneous educational class. On
the contrary, this population typically presents far greater diversity of
educational background and skills than are observed in international law classes
at the law school level. This is because law school entrance requirements and
uniformity of law school curricula generate students with a certain predictable
level of knowledge and skills at the various stages of their legal education. At
the undergraduate level, however, a student might be law school bound, taking
a course in international law as part of her major field of study. In this case, the
student might express a great interest in, and curiosity for, the study of
international law. On the other hand, an undergraduate student might be
majoring in a completely unrelated field and choose the class because it fits an
open time-slot on his course schedule. Both types of students, and many others
with diverse interests, are found in undergraduate international law courses; the
thoughtful instructor must take their respective needs and aspirations into
account.
In graduate programs, such as international affairs, where courses in
international law are often an important, if not required, part of the course of
study,' students are often very familiar with the underlying issues and political
disputes that are addressed by international law, but at the same time may be
quite unfamiliar with the legal instruments and institutions by which they are
addressed. In continuing education programs, perhaps the most challenging
venue of all, an instructor is likely to find a dizzying variety of students ranging
I. Degree requirements and fields of specialization of key graduate programs in international
affairs may be accessed on the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA) website,
at http://www.apsia.org. Id. APSIA is a non-profit association and information source for two-year master's
degree programs. Id. APSIA presently has 23 member institutions and 15 affiliated institutions.
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from undergraduates to those simply curious about the subject, to United
Nations diplomats and experienced professionals with advanced graduate
degrees. 2
As international lawyers we can probably agree that broader and deeper
appreciation for our field across many disciplines is a very healthy sign.
Admittedly, our subject is difficult and not widely understood. To those who
are not lawyers, indeed to many who are, an introduction to international law is
often met with skepticism and resisted with biases. For example, "international
law isn't really law because there is no enforcement" and "what good is a world
court if states need to consent to its jurisdiction?" In my experience, these
comments more often than not reflect unfamiliarity with the subject as opposed
to deeply held convictions. The job of the good international law teacher is to
give the student the tools and the knowledge to test these beliefs in a rational
and well-informed manner.
III. WHERE TO START?

As a teacher of international law I proceed from the assumption that my
subject matters, that it has a role to play in world affairs and that it offers
potentially effective, yet admittedly imperfect, mechanisms to address serious
global problems. Making the case that the study of international law is a
worthwhile endeavor is a good place to start.
A. Develop the Idea that InternationalLaw Matters
The primary actors of public international law may be nation-states, but
ultimately it is about real people. There is a tendency among students new to
the discipline to think of international law as an esoteric discipline that is only
of concern to diplomats and law professors. To the surprise of many students,
this misconception is one of the easiest to disabuse. For most instructors, one
of the first cases we teach in any introductory course is the Paquete Habana.3
This U.S. Supreme Court opinion, so often used to demonstrate the role of
opinio juris as an element of customary international law, can also be used to
demonstrate the applicability and availability of public international law to
individuals. In that case the owners of fishing boats wrongfully seized during
the Spanish-American War successfully availed themselves of a principle of

2.
In my experience teaching at the New York University School of Continuing and Professional
Studies, such academic diversity is the norm in a typical international law course.
3.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (holding that as a matter of customary international
law, fishing vessels peacefully practicing their trade are exempt from capture as prize of war).
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international law in the federal courts of the United States.4 Similarly, the classic
cases of Nottebohm5 and Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions6 to name just a
few examples, offer excellent opportunities to humanize the study of
international law.
In other words, international law is about real people with real problems.
The field of human rights arose from the very real experiences of the Holocaust
and other abominations. The legal framework through which we address the
threat of global terrorism is so dramatically influenced by the events of
September 11, and continues to evolve with world events. When this is pointed
out, the most skeptical student needs to acknowledge the genuineness and
importance of the subject.
At the same time we are demonstrating the importance of international law,
it is useful to say something about its acceptance and appreciation within the
community of nation-states. Do states abide by international law? How often?
Why? As we can all agree, these questions are the subject of much
philosophical, doctrinal and contextual debate. The need to raise them in the
context of an introductory course, however, should be beyond question. To a
new student, an introductory course in international law is often about shifting,
or at least expanding, their existing paradigms of what "law" is. A student's
pre-conceived notion of law, as derived from her likely point of reference - a
domestic legal system - should be challenged to assimilate the new concept of
international law.
A deliberate dialogue with the class early in the semester, developing the
reasons why states participate in the international legal system, will lay the
foundation for much of what will follow. If assisted to do so, in their own time,
students will appreciate that international law is predicated on state consent, that
reciprocity of obligations is a driving force and that most states want to be
perceived by other states as stable and responsible actors in world affairs. The
fact that international law is not followed in a great many highly visible
examples need not be fatal to the enterprise. Are all laws followed in domestic
legal systems? Does this diminish the significance of all international legal
objectives in the first instance?
If a discussion of the importance and applicability of the subject precedes
more substantive aspects of the study of international law, an instructor will find
4.

Id. This case was actually two appeals from decrees of the United States district court for the

southern district of Florida condemning two vessels and their cargo as prizes of war taken during the SpanishAmerican War.

5.
Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 6) (holding that only an
individual's state of "real and effective" nationality may exercise diplomatic protection on his behalf).
6.
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction) (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 2, at I I (Aug. 30) (holding that a state may espouse the claim of one of its nationals in an international
tribunal thereby converting a private dispute into a matter of public international law).
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students more receptive to material built upon that foundation. With that as a
point of departure, other pedagogical considerations fall into place more easily.
B. Choose an Excellent Textbook
One of the most important decisions the teacher of a legally oriented course
needs to make is the decision of what textbook to adopt. While classic
casebooks at the law school level allow for more authentic review of actual
international legal cases, there is no shortage of textbooks that are specifically
geared to the needs of international law courses offered in venues other than
traditional law schools. Some utilize a modified case-method of instruction
while some proceed from a policy-oriented or political science framework. Still
others simply aim to present the reader with the basic factual and conceptual
elements of the subject. The most useful texts are those that convey the
necessary information while permitting the instructor the flexibility to adapt to
the particular focus of the academic program in which the course is offered.
Some of the better texts that are available are:
Peter Malanczuk (ed.), MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th
Rev. ed.), Routledge (1997) (8th edition due in early 2003);
Valerie Epps, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR UNDERGRADUATES, Carolina
Academic Press (1998);
Martin Dixon, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, Blackstone Press Ltd.
(1996);
William Slomanson, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
(3d ed.), West (2000);
James H. Wolfe, MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF NATIONS, Prentice Hall (2002).

Whatever textbook is chosen it is useful to give students some exposure to
the case method of study. This is not only because some, or perhaps many, of
the students found in undergraduate or continuing education international law
courses are law school bound, but also because exposure to the methods of the
discipline should be part of introductory study. Of the textbooks enumerated
above, only Epps features cases in sufficient form to facilitate case study.
Slomanson, however, offers edited and abbreviated cases in highlighted boxes
that give students the key aspects of important international law cases. The
other textbooks listed above all refer to and discuss major cases in international
law as part of the textual explication of topics and issues.
Where the instructor chooses a textbook without cases, it might be
advisable to assemble some of the key international legal cases in a separate
reader. Most university bookstores can arrange copyright compliance on
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supplemental course materials requested by the professor. Integrating case
study with classic college learning paradigms allows students to gain a flavor
for law school-style case study.
Because of the subtle aspects of some topics and the fact that most students
*are being exposed to the subject for the very first time, it is advisable to require
that reading assignments be completed in advance of class discussions. While
advanced reading is certainly necessary for the case method of study to be
effective, it is recommended under any circumstance to sensitize students to the
substance and direction of class discussions. If the instructor does not specify
this, there may be a tendency to treat the chapter on human rights, for example,
as "homework" to be completed after the lecture on human rights. The goal of
reading assignments should be to maximize preparedness for classroom
learning.
IV. DIDACTIC APPROACHES: SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS
A. Experiment with Problem-BasedLearning
Many students indicate that the study of a new subject becomes more
meaningful for them when they have some opportunity, however limited, to
apply what they are learning. Accordingly, at least once during a semester it
can be helpful to introduce a hypothetical dispute or problem that the students
can work on either as a class or in smaller groups.
This type of exercise can be a hypothetical territorial dispute where the
students are asked to negotiate a settlement. Similarly, they could be asked to
negotiate the terms of a compromis to create an arbitral tribunal or a special
agreement to confer jurisdiction on the International Court of Justice. To
suggest another possibility, it could be a "use of force" problem where students
are asked to play the role of a head of state that needs to make decisions about
military action based on an evolving set of facts (i.e., "When is force justified
under international law?"). Such hypothetical exercises allow students the
opportunity to work with and apply what they have learned, but in a very
controlled way.
B. Devote at Least One Class Session to Research Methods
At some point in the semester, but well before any writing assignments are
due, an instructor should devote some class time to the tools and techniques of
researching international legal issues. While adequate research skills, such as
the use of LEXIS-NEXIS, can be presumed at the graduate and law school
levels, undergraduate and continuing education instructors need to help their
students develop these skills. As every international lawyer knows, the ability
to access treaty databases, acts, and resolutions of international organizations,
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major yearbooks, and key professional journals are among the most important
skills of the profession. Giving students an elementary exposure to available
resources allows them to take their first real steps as scholars in their own right.
At most colleges and universities, library personnel are ready and able to
orient students to the resources available at the school. This typically includes
electronic databases, journals, and reference materials for designated subjects.
This may also include access to law libraries where students can conduct more
traditional legal research and avail themselves of law reviews and professional
journals.
In conjunction with a library orientation, it is important that students
receive some instruction in Internet resources in international law. There is no
shortage of websites containing excellent resources in both public and private
international law, including intergovernmental organizations (IGOs),
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), professional associations and those
maintained by academic institutions and practicing attorneys. The websites of
United Nations, 7 Multilaterals Project of the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy at Tufts University 8 and the World Trade Organization (WTO)9 are
among the very best and contain lots of information that students can use for
research purposes and to better understand coursework. It is even helpful to
provide them with a list of websites as part of the course syllabus.
C. Class Assignments and Assessments Should Address as Many Skills as
Possible
To determine students' performance and assign grades it is both useful and
fair to rely on a variety of factors. As with most academic learning this may
include one or more exams, a writing assignment and class participation.
Basing grades on several components will allow students to demonstrate their
skills across a spectrum of those necessary to achieve some mastery of the
discipline. This includes not only knowledge of key concepts and terminology
but also analytical thinking, persuasive writing and the ability to articulate
subtle ideas. It also affords those who are deficient in one area an opportunity
to balance it with others.

7.

United Nations website, at http://www.un.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2003).

8.

Multilaterals

Project

of the

http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multilaterals.html.

Fletcher

School

of Law

and

Diplomacy

website,

at

The Multilaterals Project contains an excellent searchable treaty

database.
9.

World Trade Organization (wTO) website, at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2003).
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1. Exams

There are several ways an instructor can design an exam for an
introductory course in international law. While it may be appropriate in some
courses to adopt the traditional law school hypothetical format, it is important
for lawyers to remember that most non-law school exams do not test students'
knowledge in this way. Therefore the skills of "issue-spotting" which become
second nature to law students would need to be explained and taught in other
academic milieus. Multiple-choice examinations are useful to determine, for
example, definitional knowledge of key principles or the structure and
objectives of international organizations, but this format undervalues the
nuances of many international legal concepts. It is probably wiser to utilize
essay-type questions that can be drafted to adapt to the level and needs of a
particular course. Essays can test course content at definitional, conceptual and
theoretical levels. In addition, this style of exam is generally familiar to
undergraduates and others.
2. Term Papers
Term papers are excellent tools to introduce students to the research
techniques and information resources of the field. Researching and writing a
paper for an international law course should require a student to discover,
analyze and integrate facts, law and scholarly commentary. These skills,
necessary for many other fields of study as well, form the cornerstone of
international legal scholarship. I strongly recommend that students have the
broadest possible latitude in the selection of their term paper topic. This is
because it is important for them to be engaged in the process; allowing them to
pursue what interests them will help keep them engaged. Requiring students to
submit their paper topics for pre-approval, along with a brief outline and partial
bibliography will help insure that their intended focus is appropriate and
productive.
3. Class Participation: Socrates or Aristotle?
To the extent an instructor bases a grade on class participation it should
represent not only the level of preparation and knowledge of the student, but
also his or her willingness and ability to articulate that knowledge. Expressing
oneself in the unfamiliar tongue of international legal discourse is not easy for
many. Credit should be given to those who try hard to master it and share their
thoughts with others.
Styles for classroom discussions will certainly vary among instructors (not
to mention the group dynamics of each individual classroom), but one of the
biggest questions facing new instructors is the extent they should utilize the
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"Socratic" method of teaching that has tested the intellect of every American
law student since time immemorial. To offer just one perspective, the classic
Socratic method is probably not so constructive a didactic tool in non-law
school environments. If it is utilized at all, it should probably be used only
occasionally.
There are several reasons to disfavor the Socratic method. First, the
Socratic method, as it is commonly practiced in American law schools, may be
seen as intimidating and confrontational to students unfamiliar with its spirit and
purpose. Second, to the extent the goal of class-time is to clarify principles
from reading assignments, convey information and promote a general
understanding of the subject matter, traditional university lecturing may be a
more practical and effective way of achieving those objectives. This can be
contrasted with the domain of legal education where the objective is to produce
lawyers with finely honed analytical skills sufficient for professional practice.
Finally, a Socratic exchange between teacher and student may stifle other
types of discussion of course content where a diversity of opinions and
perspectives should be encouraged. For example, classroom debate on political
and legal issues can be initiated more easily when students feel comfortable
expressing their own ideas as opposed to simply responding to the professor's
questions. It is widely understood that students learn a great deal from each
other.' ° Vigorous and open classroom discourse is consistent with the best
traditions of liberal arts education. On the other hand, there is no real harm in
giving students a taste of the Socratic method as part of an overall strategy of
teaching international law.
V. INSTILL A LIFELONG INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT

It is almost axiomatic in education to assert that a teacher who creates
passion for a subject among her students will be more effective." Motivation is
a key to better learning.' 2 One way for an instructor to do this is to explain why
they themselves are passionate about the subject and why they entered the field.
Another is to encourage the students to reflect on the importance of the subject
of international law at the end of a semester as compared with their ideas about
it when the semester began. Before the end of a semester ask students to read a
morning newspaper and find international law issues even where they are not
expressly presented as such. In so doing, students will realize that what they
have learned allows them to read the same news stories as they had before but
10.

See James B. Levy, The Cobbler Wears No Shoes: A Lesson for Research Instruction, 51 J.

LEGAL EDUC. 39,50 (2001).

11.

See Deborah Maranville, Infusing Passion and Context into the Traditional Law Curriculum

Through Experiential Learning, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 51 (2001).
12.

See Levy, supra note 10, at 41-45.
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with greater insight and understanding as to the legal context and consequences
of world affairs. The framework of international law addresses, for example,
military conflicts, trade disputes, territorial disputes and environmental disasters
- in other words, important world events. When students understand this they
may be interested in keeping up-to-date in the field or in pursuing it with further
education.
If students are interested in keeping current with the subject, a good way
for them to do so is with membership in a professional organization like the
American Society of International Law (ASIL). 13 Membership in a key
professional association not only provides access to valuable educational
resources but also an opportunity to demonstrate commitment to an area of
study on their curriculum vitae. Some students may even choose to pursue
international law at the law school or graduate level and then perhaps as a
career. There are few moments so satisfying for an educator as when they hear
they were responsible for introducing a student to their life's work.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

Interest in international law at various educational levels is a developing
phenomenon that will likely continue for some time. Teachers of the subject
need to be responsive to the particular needs of individual student constituencies
and appreciate the differences between legal education at the law school level
and other academic venues. Students should be encouraged to challenge their
initial assumptions about the subject of international law and be allowed to
express their ideas in vigorous classroom debate. Conscientious instructors
should seek to instill some passion and fascination for the subject that will allow
students to make informed and reasoned choices about further study and career
paths. Whatever professional fields students ultimately pursue, they should go
forward with a meaningful, albeit introductory, understanding of the subject of
international law and the important global problems it addresses.

13.

Membership applications for the American Society of International Law (ASIL) are available

on the American Society of International Law website, at http://www.asil.org/member.htm (last visited Mar.

9, 2003). The ASIL is a premier professional organization with many useful resources for students and
scholars. It welcomes as members all who are interested in the subject. Annual membership includes six

issues of the ASIL Newsletter and a one-year subscription to the American Journal of International Law. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Simulations can be used as educational exercises that enable students in the
classroom to appreciate better the difficulties and nuances of legal issues
affecting international relations. The simulations discussed in this paper are
constructed as debates, which are used as role-playing games that compel
students to act as advocates on the lawfulness of various United States policy
positions on international issues. The students marshal evidence in support of
their respective positions, attempt to persuade other class members of the
correctness of their views, and defend their positions against an opposing team.
In this classroom, simulated debates are intended to represent real-world politics
in operation.
These debates are part of an upper-level undergraduate course,
International Law and United States Foreign Policy, taught at
Georgetown University. The course covers various roles played by
international law in the formation and implementation of United
States foreign policy. Understanding the constraints that international
law places on American actions, as well as the ways in which
international law is used by the United States (and other states) to
legitimize andjustify actions taken in the national interest, are central
to the course objectives.
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Confronting international law in practice is critical to achievement of the
course objectives, and is greatly facilitated through a series of debates on the
legal aspects of key United States foreign policy issues. Students try to "win"
the games by attracting support from the rest of the class based on the merits
and persuasion of their legal arguments, although past experience indicates that
clear winners are not often produced. The success of these debates rests on two
key factors: First, the willingness of students to assume their adopted roles with
enthusiasm, and second, the extent to which student debate participants can
learn and communicate how, where, and why international law is integrated into
the United States foreign policy decision-making process. To this end, they
must also be able to demonstrate the tensions between national security
considerations and international legal constraints in the formulation of United
States foreign policy. Taken in tandem, these two ingredients produce a
successful and unique learning experience that fosters a deeper understanding
of the subject matter and the relevance of international law than would likely be
attained through a lecture-format course. They also allow for insights into the
theoretical implications of international law and the nuances presented for
policy-making.
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

International law constitutes a set of binding rules that seeks to regulate the
behavior of international actors by conferring on them specific rights and
duties.' These rules are the products of various processes of international normcreation, usually accomplished through customary state practice or international
agreements. Traditionally, three principal sources for the rules of contemporary
international law are acknowledged: international conventions and treaties;
international custom; and general principles of law recognized by "civilized"
nations. Judicial decisions and the writings of publicists is a fourth, subsidiary
source and albeit serves mainly as means for interpretation of the rules of law.'
While international relations professors often refer to the "state" as the
focal actor in international relations, states themselves do not in fact act
internationally. Nor do "states" actually make foreign policy or international
law. Rather, it is the decision-making officials in the national governments of
states who make policy and determine the course of action for states.'
I.
See generally Christopher C. Joyner, International Law In The 21st Century: Legal Rules For
Global Governance (2003).
2.
See International Court of Justice, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI.
3.
See generally Eugene Wittkopf et al., American Foreign Policy: Pattern And Process (6th ed.
2003); James M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy And Process (3rd ed. 1998); Glenn P. Hastedt,
American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future (4th ed. 2000). It is interesting to note that in these textbook
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Accordingly, it falls to these same officials to recognize, interpret, and apply
relevant international law to a policy situation.
Although often portrayed as a collection of bureaucratic offices and
agencies, the United States government is actually operated by individual
persons. People, not anthropomorphic polities, make policy. United States
foreign policy is assessed, designed, and determined by decision-makers in the
United States government. International law is negotiated, drafted, and agreed
through the diplomatic interactions of these same government officials. And it
is those same government officials who ultimately decide whether, when, how
much, and under what particular circumstances the United States will or will not
obey a certain rule of international law. How legal norms affect United States
foreign policy thus becomes an important question for practitioners and students
alike.
Perception is critical to policy-making.
Perception (and
misperception) by United States decision-makers shape national
approaches to international reality. The political ideology of those
persons who are decision-makers in the United States government
will determine the way in which that government perceives
international affairs, and those perceptions are the main ingredients
for the United States' policy options and action choices. In a real
sense, what American decision-makers perceive internationally
results in United States foreign policy. And these perceptions, of
course, are greatly influenced by the political values, social mores,
and ideological norms of the political culture in American society. A
realist, power-focused view of foreign policy is not inconsistent with
this picture. What is true of persons is also true of states. Young and
old see the world through different eyes, as do great powers and
lesser powers. National capability can influence world perspectives,
affect international politics, and shape foreign policies. In these
ways, power can govern the American policy-maker's perception of
the world and the United States role in it. In this sense, policy makers
may accept the realist paradigm of international relations in
interpreting the world, without even giving it a second thought.
A host of other factors combine to influence United States governmental
decision-makers' perceptions of the world and their government's role in it: the
United States' economic needs and geographic position; the perceived military
threats to the United States and the historical sense of security and insecurity;
memories of earlier threats, past wars and previous political persecutions; the

treatments of the American foreign policy process, the term "international law" does not appear in the index,
albeit "diplomacy" does.
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country's relative conditions of development and access to natural resources; the
United States' controlling political ideology and its pervasive economic
conditions; and its national character and national morale. All these factors and
others go into shaping and shading the political perceptions of decision-makers
that determine United States foreign policy.
It is critical to appreciate that perceptual differences exist between
decision-makers of all governments, including the United States. The tendency
of the United States government to move toward lawful or unlawful behavior
can be affected by these perceptions. It is largely in the shaping of such
perceptions that international legal rules become relevant.
III. THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Is international law really as irrelevant in the foreign policy-making
process as realist international relations theorists would have us believe? After
examining how officials proceed in discussing decisions that determine the
foreign policy of the United States government, is it accurate to conclude that
the rules of international law have little or no impact on those decisions? When
analyzed within the context of the actual process of policy-making, rather than
through hypothesis and theoretical conjecture, it becomes clear that United
States government officials cannot help but be mindful of international law's
real-world effects. International law promotes stability and regularity in the
conduct of international relations.
For United States decision-makers,
international law thus creates expectations about the behavior of other actors in
the international system.4 Similarly, if United States decision-makers know
what the law is, then they can fashion policy to conform to the expectations of
other governments. In this manner, international rules facilitate regularity in
international behavior and promote cooperation over conflict, yielding greater
stability in interstate relations.
American foreign policy-makers cannot escape the fact that international
law shapes the international system in several ways: first, international law
embraces and legitimizes the concept of sovereignty. Sovereignty is the
paramount political feature of the state. A sovereign state is independent from
any authority superior to its own, cannot be bound to a rule without its consent,
and enjoys juridical equality among other states. The state is politically
independent, with equal legal status in the international community. While the
exercised sovereignty of a state may fluctuate, the concept still constitutes a
fundamental operating principle of international relations. International

4.
See Christopher C. Joyner, The Reality And Relevance Of International Law In The Post-Cold
War Era, In The Global Agenda: Issues And Perspectives 241 (6th ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. & Eugene R.
Wittkopf, eds., 2001).
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relations theorists sometimes overlook sovereignty as a cardinal principle of
international law as well.5
A second way that international law shapes the international system is by
determining the rules for membership and participation in the international
community. International legal rules set standards for one government's
recognition of the lawful existence of another state.6 This means that
international law determines the ground rules for a state's legitimacy in the
international system. Furthermore, international law also sets out the rights and
duties of states. These general rights and duties are guidelines for foreign policy
7
makers as to what actions are permissible in international intercourse.
Third, international law provides the language of interstate diplomacy for
national foreign policy makers. When the United States government
communicates with another state, it usually does so through international legal
channels, using the discourse of international law. When foreign policy makers
in the United States criticize another government for its actions, some reference
to the other state's failure to abide by international legal precepts is made in
virtually every case. When a dispute or confrontation breaks out between the
United States and another government, legal principles nearly always become
pivotal considerations in the international negotiations that usually ensue.
No less important for American foreign policy-makers is that international
legal rules enable normative judgments of actions and assertions by made the
United States government. International legal rules serve as indicators or
guidelines for policy-makers regarding the procedures or actions to be pursued
in order for some particular policy to be considered internationally legitimate.
United States foreign policy makers might decide to disregard those guidelines
because they are not compatible with United States national interests or specific
foreign policy objectives. Even so, that does not obviate the fact that those
officials are aware of those rules' existence, legal meaning, and policy
implications, and do realize when those rules have been breached.
The point here is clear: American foreign policy decision-makers nearly
always will seek to determine what international legal implications are posed by
a particular course of action. While they might opt not to comply with the law,
United States decision-makers want to know the relevance that law holds for the
policy in question. Otherwise, they would be blind to the rules of the road for
international intercourse, and would invite unintentional and unnecessary

5.
See generally Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis O-f International Society (1986);
Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law And Foreign Policy (1979).

6.
See Gerhard Von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction To Public International Law 6690 (7th ed. 1996); William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives On International Law, at 64-73 (4th ed.
2002).
7.
See Von Glahn, supra note 6, at 123-200.
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collisions with other governments. Obviously this can complicate relations
between the United States and other governments.
It is apparent that international law is expressly relevant for American
foreign policy. While academics are right to recognize and highlight theoretical
deficiencies of international law, it is essential to realize that the United States
government does not deem those international rules to be irrelevant in
formulating real world foreign policy choices. Without question, the United
States government formally and officially attaches considerable importance to
international rules, and American decision-makers expend much energy and
effort contending over issues concerning their interpretation and evolution.
Clearly, American policy-making officials strive to fashion, revise, and interpret
international'law so that the outcome best serves their purposes and advances
United States national interests. This is evident from the functional role
assigned to legal advisers throughout the United States government's foreign
policy apparatus.
The rules of international law are interpreted by American decision-makers
to serve United States national interests. When international law is viewed
away from the academic realm (where it is regarded as weak, debilitated
idealism), its role becomes elevated to the dimension of practical policy utility.
International legal considerations remain salient and significant for policy
choices for United States government officials. The classroom debate exercises
described and analyzed below strive to illustrate how international legal rules
influence United States foreign policy-making.
IV. WHY DEBATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY?

Simulations generally, and debates more specifically, are well-recognized
tools for education in the social sciences.8 The American Educators'
Encyclopedia notes as an advantage of debate that it "serves to crystallize an
issue, presents both sides objectively, and stimulates interest." 9 Debates,
sometimes in the form of "moot courts," are often used to teach principles of
United States domestic law, especially constitutional law.' 0 Role-playing more
8.
As one work on the subject points out, "the function of social science is, of course, to formulate
theories that explain and predict human behavior. Simulation is a very useful device for this exploration of
verbal theories and the testing of hypotheses, for the reason that it is often impossible to subject an actual
group of human beings to experiments. By successfully simulating the significant variables, it is possible to
explore such phenomena by experimenting with the simulated system." Fannie R. Shaftel & George Shaftel,
Role-Playing For Social Values: Decision-Making In The Social Studies 10 (1967).
9.
Dejnozka & Dapel, American Educators Encyclopedia, at 149.
10.
See Gerald P. Long, Understanding Religious Freedom through Courtroom Simulation, 5 OAH
Magazine Of History 1990, at 31-34.; Eileen H. Tamura, Should the Minimum Drinking Age Be Changed?

2003]

Joyner

generally is often used to teach international issues, where students can take the
part of a particular country in treaty negotiations, interstate conflicts, or UN
discussions." Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students
understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a certain
perspective as their own. But unlike other simulation games, debates do not
require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the
game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the
consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates
present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before
a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as "jury" helps each
student develop a well-considered opinion on the issue by providing contrasting
facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each
debating team.
The debates in this course invite students to examine the international legal
implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks
are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine its relevance to United
States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and
conclude how the policy squares with relevant principles of international law.
The debates compel students to consult the vast literature of international law,
especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law
journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an
incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United
States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects.
Most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, but are largely
unknown to the political science community specializing in international
relations, much less to the average undergraduate.
By assessing the role of international law in United States policy making,
students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to
international legal expectations. At times, international legal rules are
compromised or short-circuited for the sake of perceived national interests.
Concepts and principles of international law, like in domestic law, can be
interpreted, manipulated, and twisted in order to justify United States policy in
various circumstances. In these ways, the debate format gives students the
benefits ascribed to simulations and other "action learning" techniques, in that
it "requires that students be actively engaged with their subjects, and not be

A Simulation on the Legislative Process, 83 Soc. Stud. J. 201-206 (1992); Karen E. Cope, Teaching the
Constitution by Simulation, 18 Soc. Stud. J. 10 (1989).
1I. See Mary Louise Williams & George Mowry, Global Responses To Potential Climate Change:
A Simulation (1995); Joe Regenbogen, A Mock U.N. Game: Teaching Global Awareness, 15 La. Soc. Stud.
J. 20-21 (1988).
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mere passive consumers. Students should be seen as cultural participants,
observing, reacting to, and structuring their world."' 2
The debate exercises carry several more specific educational objectives.
First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that
compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting
the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal
dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members
of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing
international legal rules and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United
States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former
or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, the simulations familiarize
students with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda,
and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these
policies.' 3 The debate simulation provides an excellent vehicle for pushing
students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy
analysis, political critique, and legal defense.
A debate simulation is particularly suited to an examination of United
States foreign policy, which in American political science courses is usually
studied from a theoretical, often heavily realist, perspective. In such courses,
international legal considerations are usually given short shrift, if discussed at
all. As a result, students may come to believe that international law plays no
role in United States foreign policy making. In fact, serious consideration is
usually paid by government officials to international law in the formulation of
United States policy, albeit sometimes ex postfacto to justify policy, rather than
as a bonafide prior constraint on consideration of policy options. In addition,
lawyers serve as prominent advisers at many levels of the foreign-policymaking process. Many students in the class are in Georgetown's School of
Foreign Service, and intend to pursue careers in diplomatic service or in law.
This course aims to make students appreciate the relevance of law for past and
current United States actions (e.g., the invasion of Grenada and the refusal to
sign the land mines convention), as well as for hypothetical United States policy
options (e.g. hunting down and arresting war criminals in Bosnia or
assassinating Saddam Hussein).

12.
George Mehaffy, et al., Action Learning In Social Studies, in Eightieth Yearbook Of The
National Society For The Study Of Education, Pt. 11191 (Howard D. Melinger and O.L. Davis, Jr. eds., 1981).
13.
The choice of issues for debate reflects this objective: each debate topic is a concern widely
discussed in the news media, and often in Congressional hearings and debates. In addition, each subject tests
the lawfulness of United States policy vis-A-vis current treaties, principles, and norms of international law to
which the United States is formally committed.
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V. PREPARATION

A key problem in designing the simulation is deciding which United States
policy decisions should be examined in the debates. Three key criteria are used:
1. The issue must be highly salient for contemporary United States
foreign policy and be (or have been) prominent in the news. In this
way, students can gain a better appreciation for the relevance of
international law to the real world of international relations.
2. The issue must involve tensions in defining the United States
national interest, often including tensions between international legal
requirements and United States national security interests. By
examining the propriety assassination or the destruction of chemical
or biological weapons factories in Iraq, students become aware that
the United States might not have the lawful right to act unilaterally,
irrespective of national security implications. By considering the
United States attitude toward the Kyoto Protocol on global warming,
students learn that varying views on interdependence among
Washington policy makers can lead to opposing definitions of the
national interest and opposing policy proposals.
3. The events chosen for assessment must be conducive to lively
debate in that there is no clearly correct legal analysis of the issue,
and the analyses in contemporary political and legal literature might
be clouded by political or economic considerations..
To aid in generating possible topics, several colleagues are asked to
suggest what three events, over the past two years seem most important for
contemporary United States foreign policy. From this list of responses, eleven
topics are selected which best illustrate various facets of international law and
its relationship to United States foreign policy. (NB: Each year the list of
topics varies according to which topics are newsworthy and the implications
they present for United States foreign policy.) For each topic, debate
propositions are then formulated to highlight the international law context (e.g.,
"Resolved: that the United States should refuse to pay its UN dues until reform
of that organization is successfully completed").
Students are permitted to choose which of the available topics they want
to debate and which position (affirming or negating the stated proposition) they
prefer to defend. This is done by circulating a schedule for the debates with
blanks for students to fill in their names as team members under each topic. In
the past, nearly all students were pleased with the choices available to them. In
some cases, however, where students were forced by circumstance (i.e., the
position they wanted was taken when the sign-up sheet reached them) to take
a position opposite to their true opinion or to take on a topic with which they
were unfamiliar, they generally took on the challenge with zeal. In particular,
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Georgetown's large population of foreign students helps to ensure that some
might be called upon to defend the lawfulness of United States policy positions
that they might find distasteful, while many United States nationals must
assume the role of legal critics of the United States.
The desired format for the debates is then explained to the students.
Students are also encouraged to meet as a team and make arrangements to visit
the professor together during office hours, in order to receive guidance on
researching their respective positions and on what essential policy and/or legal
issues should be addressed in their presentations. These office visits, brief
though they usually are, also serve two practical purposes: First, they bring each
team together and compel the students to work together toward a mutual goal;
second, they reveal to the professor how the work is being distributed among the
team members so that their individual efforts can be fairly evaluated in grading
their performances. Students are directed to conduct research on the legal
arguments surrounding their topic, even including those arguments that support
the opposing team's position.
Students are made aware on the first day of class that the debates carry
considerable weight as an academic requirement. Preparation for and
participation in the debate count as 20 percent of the student's final grade. The
course syllabus includes an example of the form on which debaters will be
evaluated, so that on the very first day, students can have a clear idea of what
is expected. Mandatory attendance for the entire class is declared for the debate
sessions, and substantive materials covered during the debates are included on
both the mid-term and final examinations. Special reading assignments for each
debate are included on the syllabus for the class as a whole to provide them with
background on the topics and legal principles that will be addressed. Class
discussion and questioning of the debate teams are central parts of each day's
debate, and both the teams and audience learn to prepare accordingly.
VI. THE EVENT

14

The debates follow a well-defined structure and strict time allotment. Each
team of two to three members is given, in turn, 15 minutes to make an initial
presentation, in which they provide some historical background for the issue and
describe the legal underpinnings of their positions. (Usually the team members
split this time among them, so that two students each present 7.5 minutes of the
argument). Each team is then given 10 minutes to rebut the arguments of the
opposing side. The teams are instructed to prepare a detailed "brief' outlining
their view of the issue and the legal rationale for the policy position they

14.
The course syllabus, attached as an appendix to this paper, lays out the debate format as
explained to the students.
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support, and they are encouraged to exchange their briefs with the opposing
team the night before the debate. This "trading" strategy ensures more
effective, well-thought-out rejoinders, and keeps the event focused more on the
legal arguments at stake rather than on the rhetorical skills of the students. The
briefs are also distributed to the rest of the class, providing them with study
guides and a substantive outline of their debate points. Following the formal
presentations and the rebuttals, the professor or teaching assistant sums up the
important course themes that emerge from the presentations, and invites the rest
of the class to question the teams. Class questions and moderated discussion
occupy the remainder of the class period.
Several aspects of the debate format enhance its effectiveness as a roleplaying exercise. The professor or teaching assistant opens each debate as a
formal event, welcoming the audience, stating the "proposition" at issue that
day, and introducing each team's members by name. The introduction lends an
air of ceremony to the proceedings that encourages students to take the event
seriously. Students are encouraged to show respect for the opposition, as if they
were in a court of law (with the professor as judge, the graduate teaching
assistant as bailiff, and the remainder of the class serving as a jury of peers).
The sense of formality extends to the preparation of the "briefs" and even to the
dress students chose for their presentations: Most wear coats and ties, suits, or
dresses, and refer to each other in a formal manner (i.e., by last name or as "my
colleagues" or "the opposition").
It is worth noting that the enrollment in this course is usually around 50
students, with a large cohort of seniors and juniors. With this class size, a
whole-class simulation exercise might be unwieldy, while a lecture format
would risk leaving more passive students disengaged from the subject matter.
Structured debates, each including four to six students, place the spotlight in
turn on each student individually while simultaneously promoting team spirit
and team effort. This format appears to succeed in motivating all but the most
lackadaisical learners. The requirement that students confront an audience in
a debate format also contributes to the students' rhetorical ability, as well as
their ability to address perspectives with which they might not be familiar or
sympathetic.
Unlike many simulations, the objective of the debate format is not to teach
bargaining techniques or to produce a negotiated outcome. Rather, the main
aim in this class is to make students aware that United States policy, like the
policies of all states, is predicated on international legal constraints, and that, at
times, those constraints are compromised by the pressures of interests (often
couched in terms of "national security") perceived by policy makers to have a
higher priority.
Students are encouraged to be highly assertive during the debates. Players
are not merely to stand and read a position paper. Rather, they are to argue
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forcefully the legal merits of their cases, and in the process refute the
contentions of the other side. The drama of the debates tends to catch the
attention of the class as a whole, and the more lackluster presentations seem to
spark resolve among the other students to do better themselves when their turn
comes, in order to provide a good show for the class. Some teams have been
very creative: For example, one debater shook a handful of coins at the
audience, telling them that the measly amount she held in her hand represented
the cost per day per capita to the United States taxpayer of supporting the
United Nations.
VII. GRADING
In this simulation, each student must participate actively and demonstrate
his or her own competence and mastery of the material. Each student is
evaluated on his or her performance only. No team grade is assigned. Rather,
students are graded on how well they as individuals argue their portion of the
case and on what they contribute to the team's briefing paper.
No "winner" is formally declared at the end of a debate session, although
in many instances it becomes clear which team presented the most compelling
legal argument and facts to support its case. In other instances, though, the class
discussion mirrors the real-world policy debate in that it reflects genuine
tensions between the requirement to comply with international legal dictates and
the imperative to pursue the best interests of the United States.

VIII. EVALUATION
Generally, the debate simulations have proven very successful and elicited
high praise from the students. They enjoy the opportunity to play the role of
legal advocates and to try to persuade the class of the merits of their positions.
Students also appreciated the chance to respond directly (in questions and
discussion) to the performances of their peers, and they seem to enjoy delving
into the politics of how international law and national interests mesh (or clash)
in the formulation of United States foreign policy.
The students take their debating roles to a surprisingly serious degree,
engaging in animated discussions that have sometimes continued after class
with joint appeals to the professor to serve as referee. The spectator often has
the sense he is watching the proceedings of the UN Security Council or
sometimes the United States Congress, and that stakes no less than the prestige
and national interests of the United States are at risk. As might be expected,
those students who read the assigned materials and listen carefully to the teams'
presentations become most caught up in the issues, participate most actively in
the discussions, and demonstrate in their written examinations the best
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understanding of the ways in which international law serves as a restraint on,
and an instrument of, United States policy.
Certain problems are notable, however. In a few instances, individual
students have been less than cooperative in meeting with their team members
to divide labor and prepare the briefs. This places an undue burden on their
teammates. A second problem has been the tendency of some students to read
their brief (perhaps with some annotations) as their oral presentation. This
creates a less than exhilarating experience for the audience, which sometimes
tunes out or merely follows along in rote-reading the text, rather than engaged
in thinking about the legal issues being raised. Third, during the past three
years, there has been the problem of students having to journey across the city
to Georgetown's law library in order to secure the materials they needed to
research their positions. That has proven at times to be frustrating. Since
Georgetown undergraduates cannot check out books or periodicals from the
Georgetown law library, all research has had to be done on the premises unless
students were willing to invest considerably in photocopying. Since 2001,
increased access for students to Lexis/Nexus on line has greatly alleviated this
problem.
Essential to the success of the simulation as a learning tool is the
question/discussion period that follows each debate. This period, which usually
runs the last 25 minutes of a 75-minute class, enables the audience to present
challenges to or ask for clarifications of points made in the debaters' formal
presentations. While the discussion tends to be ad hoc, it often generates minispin-off debates of its own on particular points of law or on the implications of
particular United States policies. Debaters who are underprepared faced
questions they cannot answer well, illustrating the incentive they face to prepare
thoroughly and to have more facts and arguments at their disposal than they
present in their prepared statements. The discussion also helps to highlight the
legal principles at issue and the recurring themes of the course that are
illustrated in the debate topics. The professor and teaching assistant interject
comments and pose queries to aid in spotlighting issues for the class to consider.
Past experience suggests two types of students who seem to gain the most
from the debate experience. First are those students who start out by signing up
for a debate topic because they already hold a firm, relatively dogmatic or
simplistic view of a given issue. One semester, for example, the class included
several students from Gulf Arab states who wanted to argue for the lawfulness
of the United States-led war against Iraq, but one Arab woman was forced by
circumstance to join the team that opposed the United States action. She took
on the assignment and was a credit to her team, demonstrating that she had
reflected on the issue in a way she would otherwise have been unlikely to do.
Likewise, last year's class included a student who saw no reason for
international law to stand in the way of United States security interests
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regarding the proposed landmine ban treaty. But the debate experience helped
him see how banning landmines was congruent not only with humanitarian
values, but also with international humanitarian law to which the United States
was already bound by convention and customary practice.
The second group of students who benefit most from the debate format are
those students who would typically sit passively (though perhaps attentively)
through a lecture course without being particularly engaged by the material and
without interacting significantly with the professor. The debate format prompts
these students to take a firm stance on an issue, play a role, and develop a level
of expertise on a specific issue. Moreover, it gives them the opportunity to
display their expertise by educating the rest of the class on how to view their
topic.
IX. CONCLUSION

This debate simulation provides students with deeper insights into and an
appreciation of the complexities of integrating international law into the United
States foreign policy making process. The success of any given debate depends
upon the quality of the team members' efforts to research and present a topic,
and on their ability to relate concepts and principles of international law to the
ways in which United States foreign policy objectives are formulated and
achieved. The exercise is not intended to train international lawyers or to
promote forensics as a skill. Rather the intention is to give students a greater
sense of the real-world process by which United States foreign policy is made
and implemented, and of the place international legal considerations are given
in that process.
The lasting impact of the debates on the class as a whole is reflected in the
fact that many issues first raised in the debate carry over into serious exchanges
after class and into subsequent class lectures and discussions. In this way, the
knowledge gained from the debates accumulates over the semester and
contributes to the achievement of the course objectives.

TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE
LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
CharlotteKu*
As teachers, it is perhaps natural for us to think about teaching in the
classroom context, although this panel is demonstrating the teaching
opportunities that may exist outside of a single course or courses in international
law. I would like to address the teaching opportunities (and needs) that exist
beyond the classroom and beyond the law school experience. I would like to
throw this into the discussion not only because this is what I have been working
on at the American Society of International Law (ASIL), but also because of the
pace and volume of change now taking place in international law. Even for
those who may have taken a course, more is constantly being generated and
sometimes now coming from sources not previously thought of as an actor in
the international legal system.
In April 2000, ASIL President Arthur Rovine appointed Roy Lee (Chair),
James Apple and John Gamble' to a working group to consider possible ASIL
initiatives for teaching outside of the classroom. In his letter setting up the
working group, President Rovine wrote:
As I have reflected on the ASILs strengths prior to assuming the
presidency, I concluded that one of the Society's major assets is its
many world-renowned teachers. It further occurred to me that the
Society would do itself and international law some good if we could
find ways to tap these individuals to teach-not in a university
classroom which is the primary occupation of many of our members,
but to teach more broadly.
Audiences I have in mind are legal officers in government ministries
and international organizations, including people from developing
countries, who may need time to reflect on their work or may profit
from an opportunity to learn from experts. I further have in mind the
staff of courts and attorneys in the early years of their practice as they
begin to develop a specific professional focus. This is teaching
beyond the traditional classroom years, and is exposure to the best our
field (and Society) has to offer worldwide.
*

American Society of International Law. cku@asil.org.

I.
Roy Lee is formerly of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs in New York, James Apple
is President of the International Judicial Academy in Washington, DC and John Gamble is Professor of
Political Science and International Law at Pennsylvania State University in Erie, Pa.
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ASILs interest in teaching originates with a mandate in its charter. As
early as 1907, Elihu Root, ASILs founder and first President, had already noted
that international law should be the centerpiece of an educated citizenry. Given
career and legal developments today, learning in international law cannot end
with the classroom particularly since many entering the legal profession may not
have had any exposure to international law during their formal training.2
Furthermore, the ASILs worldwide academic membership is one of its strongest
assets.
ASIL believes that international law is more central today than ever, but
recognizes that it has to compete with many more subjects for the attention of
students, practitioners, government officials and even academics. Teaching in
international law is something that one increasingly hears a need for whether
through continuing legal education, law reform, or encouraging the rule of law.
The Working Group adopted a broad definition of the teaching of
international law outside the classroom and developed a list of possible
audiences. These include:
a) Judges and law clerks;
b) Practicing lawyers;
c) Undergraduate and law students;
d) Members of the media;
e) Diplomats, including UN diplomats;
f) Legislators, legislative staff;
g) Corporate executives;
h) High school students;
i) Military;
j)
General public;
k) Law professors.
Recent ASIL outreach activities share several common features:
a) They identify audiences that are important for the effective
practice and development of international law and provide them with
the information and network resources to enable them to play their
role (e.g., the judicial and media programs);
b) They select and filter information to make it accessible to the
target audiences (e.g., hard copy print materials, e-mail distributed
materials, and web-based resources);
c) They seek to create a network of international law specialists by
joining the ASIL membership and their associates with the outreach
audiences (e.g., the ASILForum web-based discussion group);
2.
See Hans Corell, UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and The Legal Counsel, An
Appeal to the Deans of Law Schools Worldwide, available at http://www.un.orgllaw/counsel/info.htm (last
visited Jan. 31, 2003).
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d) They convene interested and important groups in international
affairs to address specific problems or needs (e.g. formation of task
forces on issues like those related to terrorism and the ASIL Annual
Meeting).
These features were developed based on several assumptions:
a) That the nature of the audience is either that these are busy
people who do not need more to do or who may feel a need for
information, but may not know how to get it;
b) That the target audience can provide valuable insight into how
most effectively to reach members of a target group. Working from
within a group is important not only to give teaching the subject
matter credibility, but also to ensure its relevance and meaning to the
audience. It engages and creates "stakeholders;"
c)
That listening may be as important as teaching to the organizing
of effective programs and that each contact provides an opportunity
for further understanding of the practice and development of
contemporary international law.
We have learned that for our judicial program, for example, texts need to
be concise, but yet well documented to provide authority as well as to provide
reference for further research. We have also learned that a preliminary
introduction often needs to be followed up with a longer treatment of a daylong
course or even short course. So, credibility within the target audience, drawing
from the target audience for program development, multiple opportunities to
learn, and follow up materials are key elements of effective teaching outside the
school setting.
Techniques that we have used or are developing to accomplish these
purposes include:
a) Briefings by individual experts or panels of experts with or
without supporting material;
b) Supporting or regular information resources - ASIL Insights
and International Law In Brief. Making known the availability of the
other information resources like the AJIL, ILM;
c)
Short courses - seminars of one day, weekend to two weeks for
appropriate audiences;
d) Providing opportunities to address issues - list serves and
columns in publications;
e) Touring seminars and collaboration with existing short courses
to add international law as it relates to a particular topic - UNITAR
programs, for example;
f) Web-based teaching - nothing that ASIL has done yet, but
seems to have potential. Or combining web-based and in-person
teaching seems a possibility;

348

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 9:345
g) Enrichment programs for legal professionals - CLE programs
in association with law firms or organized off site;
h) Business and government roundtables to focus on a specific
policy area.

Where academia is relevant to the above is that the trainers or resources for
these approaches are often professors. Teaching material largely derives from
materials developed originally for classroom use. The development of
supporting materials is 6ften done by academics. So, it may be teaching beyond
the classroom, but it is teaching as part of a professional's working life, which
means that the classes are in fact brought to where the target audience works.
Technology provides unprecedented opportunities for storing and disseminating
information as well as putting together virtual classrooms.
It takes
infrastructure - staff to organize meetings and equipment; it takes information
- individuals who can shape the issues to create a meaningful teaching and
learning experience; and those who will contribute to the program.
If we think more expansively about the teaching opportunities that exist
throughout our professional lives, perhaps the challenge of making the legal
profession and broader public aware of international law will appear less
daunting because it increases the number of teaching opportunities and venues.
The effectiveness of such continuing education, however, is based on an
assumption of a sound foundation to build on. And so, I would end by inviting
both professorate and practitioner to identify the core components of law and
international law that would make future teaching more effective. Will the
University of Michigan's required course on Transnational Law accomplish
this? Time will tell.
More generally, there seems an opportunity for international lawyers to
reflect on the core principles on which international law is based and to
emphasize those in traditional law school teaching. The question for the formal
legal curriculum might then be one of how to equip students most broadly for
substantive growth and development in international law throughout their
professional lives. This would seem a question worth pursuing in a fast
changing professional environment.

INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION PANEL
DISCUSSION ON "THE HOLOCAUST AS
CATALYST FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE":
SUMMARY OF EXTEMPORANEOUS REMARKS
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I. THE DREAM
After more than 40 million persons had been killed in war, there was an
overwhelming determination to prevent the recurrence of such tragedies. The
slaughter of six million Jews and millions of others, such as the Roma and
others perceived as enemies of the Reich, certainly served as a sharp catalyst for
the creation of a more humane world order. The United Nations was created "to
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" by serving as the forum
for peaceful resolution of disputes. The principles of international criminal law
that emerged from the International Military Tribunal and the twelve subsequent
war crimes trials at Nuremberg was to serve as the foundation cornerstone for
a new rule of international criminal law designed to deter future aggression,
genocide and other crimes against humanity. That was the dream.
II. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE DREAM?

An unfair veto power had to be written into the United Nations Charter to
win the needed consent by two-thirds of the United States Senators; as required
by our constitution. It took 40 years to ratify even the genocide convention that
we sponsored. The cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States
blocked effective action in the United Nations. Charter provisions calling for
universal disarmament and the creation of an international military force were
simply ignored. The Security Council, instead of acting as the arm to maintain
peace on behalf of all nations, became a political instrument to uphold the
interests of its privileged Permanent Members. Many provisions of the Charter
*

Ben Ferencz, a former Nuremberg war crimes prosecutor served as a soldier in the army of

General Patton and participated in the liberation of many concentration camps at the end of World War II.
He focused his remarks around three themes: 1) the dream of world peace that emerged after that war 2) the
obstacles that arose and 3) the conclusions that could be drawn for international justice.
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were never given a chance. General Assembly mandates for the creation of an
international criminal court were referred to United Nations committees that
were unable to reach any consensus. The world went back to killing as usual.
The dream of hope was replaced by a nightmare.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, competing nationalisms erupted in
violent strife. When it was reliably reported that more than 10,000 women had
been raped in the former Yugoslavia as part of a program of "ethnic cleansing",
major powers could no longer remain indifferent. The Security Council created
a special International Criminal Tribunal to try the leading perpetrators of
crimes committed in that territory since 1991. Shortly thereafter, rival ethnic
tribes in Rwanda butchered 800,000 innocent people. World leaders were aware
of danger but did little or nothing to prevent the murder. It will remain the
everlasting shame of this century that such atrocities could be allowed to occur.
President William Clinton and United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan
went to Rwanda to apologize to the survivors. Perhaps it was better than
nothing, but it was certainly not enough. This new holocaust became the
catalyst for the creation of yet another ad hoc tribunal by the Security Council
to deal with the atrocities committed in Rwanda.
With similar crimes being committed elsewhere all over the globe, it soon
became apparent to many that a permanent international criminal court was
needed. An assortment of retroactive courts, created a la carte after the crimes
were committed, left much to be desired. United Nations committees went back
to work and, after much wrangling and many compromises, a statute for a Permanent international criminal court was finally adopted in Rome in July 1998
by overwhelming vote. The minimum of 60 ratifications needed to put the
treaty into effect was reached on July 1, 2002 and had passed 80 ratifications a
few months later. A truly international criminal court-the first since Nuremberg-became a reality.
II.

CONCLUSIONS:

What lessons can be drawn from this brief scan of history? It is clear that
progress toward the rule of law cannot be quickly or easily obtained. But it is
also clear that the progress is real - even though there are many steps still to be
taken. It is a sad irony that the United States that had inspired the world at
Nuremberg, by its insistence upon rules of universal law. was not ready to
accept the new criminal court. It justified its opposition by completely
unfounded fears about political persecutions by uncontrolled prosecutors. It
ignored the many safeguards against such risks and the priority given to all
national courts so that the ICC could never intervene if the defendant's national
courts were willing and able to provide a fair trial to the wrongdoer.
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The new court has very limited jurisdiction. Only crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole can even be considered and there is no
retroactivity. Even war itself-the crime of aggression, condemned at
Nuremberg as "the supreme international crime"-cannot be considered by the
court until there is an agreed definition and other safeguards to assure that the
role of the Security Council is not diminished. The Court statute provides that
victims of crimes against humanity shall be entitled to "restitution,
compensation, and rehabilitation." How these farsighted principles will be
implemented will depend upon the member states.
We see therefore that misguided opposition by the current United States
administration is a hurdle yet to be overcome. Before it can move closer to
universality, the court will have to prove that it is a fair and effective
instrumentality to help curb major international crimes and to bring to justice
those who threaten the peace and security of humankind. The American Bar
Association and leading American jurists as well as the Secretary General of the
United Nations and the entire European community have hailed this new legal
institution as the missing link in the world's legal order. I am convinced that
when the American public recognizes the truth they will agree that the most
effective way to prevent future holocausts and to secure the tranquility of
humankind is through the rule of law. The International Criminal Court
deserves the full support of all nations.

INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION PANEL
DISCUSSION ON "THE HOLOCAUST AS
CATALYST FOR INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE"
Abraham B. Krieger
I first wish to thank Prof. Nunes, Director of the Institute on the Holocaust
and the Law and Moderator of this panel, for the opportunity to serve on this
distinguished panel. I serve as General Counsel of the American Gathering of
Jewish Holocaust Survivors. Benjamin Mead, its Chairman, was originally to
have served on this panel, but was unable to because of a conflict. I represent
an extraordinary group of people - Survivors of the Holocaust. They have two
imperatives, one to bear witness and the other to preserve memory.
The murder of an individual is, of course, a crime. The murder of a people
under the euphemisms of "Final Solution" or "ethnic cleansing" should elicit
broader accountability, prosecution and punishment. Survivors, more than
others, recognize that while the murder of an individual is a crime against
family and state, the murder of a people is, what we have come to refer to as, a
"crime against humanity." If the Final Solution was not sufficiently
unfathomable, at the end of the war, Survivors, trying to return to their homes,
continued to be killed by the thousands. The "final" solution was not quite that
final, while the suffering and losses continued.
Prof. Peter Longerich of the Holocaust Educational Trust in London
suggests that "a dispute over the genesis of the Final Solution involves finding
answers, not only to questions of when and where, but also ultimately, why?"
These questions are integral to the judicial process. But they are questions that
the survivors alone live with each and every day of their lives. What likewise
comes to mind is Eichman's statement, also expressed by Josef Stalin, that "the
death of an individual is a tragedy - the death of a million ...a statistic." Add
that to Hitler's statement in the early 30's that "after all, who now speaks of the
Armenians?" and the Final Solution and later genocides become more
0
foreseeable.
As lawyers, we recognize the importance of "choice of forum" decisions.
Forum played a determinative role in the outcome of post-World War II
prosecutions, involving military tribunals, courts in East and West Germany and
trials in other countries, the most important of which remains the Eichman trial
addressing crimes against humanity, later serving as a model for the Rwanda
trials and International Criminal Court.
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The results in each forum are telling. The Nuremberg trials in particular,
on which my co-panelist, Benjamin Ferenz, will speak in greater detail and with
pre-eminent knowledge, were compelling and cathartic. Tragically however,
there were too few convictions due to lack of prosecutors, judges, facilities and
funding.
Statistics involving post-war prosecutions by East and West Germany are
distressing. Fully 80% of the judges in post-war Germany were former
members of the Nazi party. Their appointments originated in the late 1800's
under the authoritarian Bismark government. They retained their civil service
positions through the liberal Weimar Democratic Republic and subsequent Nazi
regime which benefited from a supportive judiciary already in place. This,
among other reasons, contributed to the relative ease and speed with whiich the
legal and legislative systems collapsed. Judges, lawyers and legislators, who
should otherwise have served as a buffer, simply folded, permitting the Final
Solution to proceed for the most part unopposed.
Between 1963 and 1967, approximately 300 war crimes cases were
pending in the Berlin prosecutor's office. Almost every one was eventually
dismissed on statute of limitations defenses.
Every survivor bears witness. But bearing witness in a prosecution is
different from personally remembering, which carries with it a different
responsibility. How many war crime prosecutions failed to lead to convictions
because the survivor/witness was simply unable to recount and relive that which
remains unthinkable?
Immediately after World War I1, many were arrested, fewer were
prosecuted, fewer yet were found guilty and even fewer were actually punished.
After punishment, more often than not, those convicted had their sentences
reduced or commuted - a process, as we know, tragically continuing to this very
day. How unimaginable that must be to the survivors who committed no crime
and continue to suffer in part for the remainder of their lives, with no prospect
of their suffering being commuted? Abe Foxman of the Anti-Defamation
League suggests that the best an international tribunal can hope for is "symbolic
justice" since actual justice in the face of any genocide, is arguably
unachievable. Survivors are often asked about the subject of forgiveness. Most
express a much stronger preference for justice, recognizing at the same time the
impossibility of it ever being fully or even substantially realized, especially at
this late date.
In closing, Prof. Yehuda Bauer, a renowned Israeli Holocaust scholar
suggests that, in the Post-Holocaust era, three commandments should be added
to the original ten: (1) Thou shalt not be a perpetrator; (2) Thou shalt not be a
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victim; and finally and perhaps most importantly - (3) Thou shalt not be a
bystander.
Abraham B. Krieger
Oct. 25, 2002
International Law Association
Panel Discussion on
"The Holocaust as Catalyst for International Justice"
Association of the Bar of the
City of New York

A SEMIOTIC APPROACH TO A LEGAL
DEFINITION OF TERRORISM
Susan Tiefenbrun*
INTRODUCTION .....................................
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF TERRORISM ................
THE MANY DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM .................
A. United States' Definitions of Terrorism .............
1. United States 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act's
Definition of Terrorism ......................
2. The 2001 United and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (United States.
Patriot Act) ................................
3. The International Money Laundering Abatement
and Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 ........

I.
II.

1Il.

4.

FBI's Definition of Terrorism .................

364

365
366

367

5.

B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

*

United States State Department's Definition of
Terrorism .................................
6. United States State Department's Definition of
International Terrorism .......................
English Definition of Terrorism ....................
French Definition of Terrorism ...................
EuropeanNations' Definition of Terrorism ...........
CanadianDefinition of Terrorism ..................
United Nations' Definitionsof Terrorism .............
Scholars'Attempts at Definition of Terrorism: ........

358
360
363
363

367
368
368
370
373
373
375
379

Associate Professor of Law at Thomas Jefferson School of Law.

I would like to thank Professors Aaron Schwabach and Richard Scott of Thomas Jefferson School of
Law and Professor Malvina Halberstam of Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law for reading earlier drafts of
this Article. I delivered a shorter version of this Article for a War, Crimes, and Terrorism Conference: The
Role of International Courts and Tribunals which I organized at the University of Nice School of Law in
France on July 17,2002. The Conference included Judge Claude Jorda of the International Criminal Tribunal
of the Former Yugoslavia, Judge Lucius Caflisch of the European Court of Human Rights, and Judge Rosalyn
Higgins of the International Court of Justice, as well as leading scholars in the field such as Professors
Catharine MacKinnon, Malvina Halberstam, William Ginsberg, and Norman Silber. A different version of
this Article was also delivered at the American Branch of the International Law Association on October 24,
2002 in New York for a panel devoted to September I th and the War on Terrorism.

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 9:357

358
IV.

WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND

DOMESTIC TERRORISM?

V.

. . .. .. ... . .. .. ... . ... . .........

382

TERRORISM IS NOT ONLY A CRIME BUT A METHOD TO

ACHIEVE SELF-DETERMINATION ........................

VI.

383

INTERNATIONAL CRIMES ARE ALSO METHODS OF

COMMITTING TERRORISM ............................... 385

VII.

IF TERRORISM IS NOT ONLY A CRIME, BUT A METHOD OR AN
ACT OF WAR, THEN WHAT COURT SHOULD TRY
. .. .
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS? . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VIII.

THE PARADOXES INHERENT IN THE MEANING OF TERRORISM..

IX.

CONCLUSION .......................................

386
387
388

I. INTRODUCTION

It is hard to believe that a word like "terrorism," which is used so
frequently these days in different contexts and in casual, colloquial, political,
and legal discourses, does not have a universally-accepted definition.' It is not
enough to say, as United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart once said
of pornography, "we know it when we see it."2 Terrorism must be4
deconstructed 3 to distinguish between domestic and international terrorism,
state-sponsored and non-state sponsored terrorism, and terrorism per se and
legal revolutionary violence5 that falls within the laws of war.6 Semiotics is the
1.

M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONALTERRORISM; MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS (1937-2001)

14, n.48 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2001) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI]. See also Kevin J. Greene, Terrorism
as ImpermissiblePoliticalViolence: An InternationalLaw Framework, 16 VT. L. REV. 461 (1992) ("Terrorism
has 'no precise or widely accepted definition."').
2.
See Stephen Yagman, Defining the Weapon of Terrorism: FrustratedPeople Without Another
Method Resort to 'Politico-Military'Violence Instead, L.A. DAILY J., 6 Mar. 12, 2002.
See Susan Tiefenbrun, Legal Semiotics, 5, 1 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 89-156 (1986)
3.
(discussing the application of semiotics to the law and the meaning of "deconstruction").
4.
In the US Antiterrorism Act of 1990, the United States defines the term "international terrorism"
to mean activities that: (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within
the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect
the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their
perpetrators operate or seek asylum. (US Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Publ L. No. 101-519, 104 St. 2250
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (Supp. 1991), cited in U.S. FEDERAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
74-75(Yonah Alexander and Edgar H. Brenner, eds., Transnational Publishers 2002).
5.

YONAH ALEXANDER, MICHAEL S. SWETNAM AND HERBERT M. LEVINE, ETA: PROFILE OF A

TERRORIST GROUP 4 (Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2001). "The ETA proclaims the right of the Basque
people to self-rule and the use of the most appropriate means to achieve its goal." Id. at 4.
CHRISTOPHER L BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROTECTION
6.
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science of signs 7. A semiotic approach to the meaning of the term "terrorism"
includes an investigation of its hidden meanings, its connotations as well as
denotations, in order to expose the deep structure of the term and to unravel its
complexities. A semiotic approach is designed to uncover the basic structural
elements of the meaning of a term, and each element acts as a sign for the
identification of a terrorist act. The elements of the definition are either
necessary or sufficient for the act to be deemed a terrorist act.
There are two major obstacles to overcome in order to arrive at a
universally-accepted definition of the term. First, it is necessary to distinguish
between three different conceptions of terrorism: terrorism as a crime in itself,
terrorism as a method to perpetrate other crimes, and terrorism as an act of war.
When terrorism is conceived of as a crime, its elements and defenses can be
identified and analyzed. When terrorism is conceived of as a method to
perpetrate other crimes, terrorism will sometimes overlap with other crimes like
crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, rape, etc. When terrorism is
conceived of as an act of war, the laws of war will cover the legal responses to
terrorism. State responses to terrorism require the balancing of a state's right
to defend itself proportionally against threats or the illegal use of force or acts
of aggression, as included under the United Nations Charter norms.8

OF HUMAN LIBERTY 17, 20 (1922).

Blakesley defines terrorism as violence aimed at innocents (or noncombatants) to gain an edge over, or to coerce, a third party. This is different from justifiable and legal
revolutionary violence, which seeks liberation from oppression or restriction on one's own sovereignty
(assuming such acts of revolutionary violence fall within the law of war) (cited in DOUGLAS J. DAVIDS,
NARCO-TERRORISM: A UNIFIED STRATEGY TO FIGHT A GROWING TERRORIST MENACE 2 (Transnational
Publishers, Inc. 2002)). Louis Rene Beres, Article: The Legal Meaning of Terrorism for the Military
Commander, CONN. J. INT'L. L. 9 (1995). (Beres argues that the failure of insurgents to comply with the laws
of war does not convert these military forces into terrorists but it does make them guilty of war crimes and
possibly even crimes against humanity). Cherif Bassiouni argues convincingly that terrorist methods can
occur during armed conflict and, therefore, terrorism can be included under war crimes. I maintain that
terrorism can be included under war crimes only if the five elements of the definition of terrorism are present.
7.
Any attempt here at a definition of semiotics is at best preliminary and partial. See Tiefenbrun,
supra note 3, for a history of semiotics as it applies to the law. See also COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES
SANDERS PEIRCE 335 (Charles Harshone & Paul Weiss eds., The Belknap Press of Harvard University 1960).
By semiotics or semiosis Peirce means the interplay of three subjects: a sign, its object, and its interpretant.
See also UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS 7 (Indiana University Press 1976), citing Ferdinand de
Saussure's definition of semiotics: "a science that studies the life of signs at the heart of society."
8.
See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4: "All members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,"
available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapterl.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
See U.N. CHARTER art. 51: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security," available
at http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapter7.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
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The second obstacle to overcome in an attempt to arrive at a universallyaccepted definition of the term is the necessity to resolve its underlying
paradoxes. Terrorism is a phenomenon steeped in varying and oftentimes
conflicting political and ideological beliefs. Given that states have a
fundamental right to self-defense and the right to self-determination, is terrorism
legitimate if it is perpetrated in self-defense or in an attempt to achieve selfdetermination?
The Article will uncover five basic elements of the crime of terrorism that
are deeply embedded in each of the many definitions of terrorism proposed by
the United States in its laws, and by many other nations, scholars, and
organizations like the United Nations. This Article will attempt to show that
under certain circumstances requiring the presence of the basic five elements of
the crime, terrorism can be included in other specifically defined international
crimes like war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The Article will
also look comparatively at United States, English, French, European, and
Canadian definitions of terrorism. It will look closely at the United Nations'
attempt to define terrorism in its seventeen multilateral conventions. It will also
examine different definitions proposed by leading scholars in the field of
international law and the law of terrorism.
This Article will distinguish between international and domestic terrorism
and will uncover the existence of three different conceptions of terrorism that
have profound implications for the adjudication of terrorist acts. Terrorism is
conceived of as a crime, as a method, and as an act of war. These different
conceptions of terrorism lead one to question which tribunal would be
appropriate to try international terrorists. Finally, the Article will focus on the
paradoxes inherent in the concept of terrorism. The paradoxical nature of
terrorism complicates the establishment of a universally-accepted definition of
the term.
1I. ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF TERRORISM

Black's law dictionary defines terrorism as: "the use or threat of violence
to intimidate or cause panic, esp. as a means of affecting political conduct."9
Scholars have attempted to further define the term,'0 resulting in many different
definitions of terrorism" that can all be reduced to five basic structural
elements: 2
9.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1484 (7th ed. 1999).

10.
DAVIDS, supra note 6, at 2.
11.
See infra Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Between the Right
of a Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights, 6 U.C.L.A. J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 89
(2001).
12.
See Id. "It is difficult to classify the term "terrorism" or provide it with a clear definition or
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1) The perpetration of violence by whatever means;
2) The targeting of innocent civilians;
3) With the intent to cause violence or with wanton disregard for
its consequences;
4) For the purpose of causing fear, coercing or intimidating an
enemy;
5)
In order to achieve some political, military, ethnic, ideological,
or religious goal.' 3

Normally the violence associated with terrorism is perpetrated without
justification or without excuse in an aim to gain publicity for the cause.' 4 In this
sense terrorism is similar to extreme forms of civil disobedience 15 in which the
perpetrators resort to violence in order to gain publicity for a cause that is
presumably an unjust law or societal oppression. Normally state-sponsored
terrorists do not seek publicity whereas individual terrorists thrive on publicity
for their cause.' 6 State responses to acts of civil disobedience have sometimes
resulted in the use of force. Similarly, the peacetime use of terrorism by a state
against passive resistance is arguably justified in order to maximize compliance
to a new state policy. 17 This Article will attempt to show that terrorism in any
form and for whatever reason is unjustified.
The structural elements of the definition of terrorism need further analysis.
What actually constitutes "violence?" The dictionary definition of violence
includes unjust or unwarranted use of force, usually accompanied by fury,
vehemence, or outrage; physical force unlawfully exercised with the intent to
harm.'" But there is a broad spectrum to the definition of "violence." Some
interpretation ...Nonetheless, the majority of the definitions have a common basis-terrorism is the use of
violence and the imposition of fear to achieve a particular purpose, generally entailing the aspiration to
overthrow an existing regime, or fight it, and where the persons forming the group organize in a tightly
controlled structure ...
need to determine whether the activities of the particular group are morally supported
by the state."
13.
These basic five elements are a variation of Blakesley's elements. BLAKELSEY, supra note 6,
at 37. Blakesley's five elements include "conducting the above acts without justification or excuse" and do
not include "ethnic or ideological" goals (termed "benefits" in Blakesley's listing). Blakesley's elements do
not include the word "fear" which is key to the definition of the term "terrorism".
14.. See Walter Laqueur, Reflections on Terrorism, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 65 (1986) at 86-88 (cited in
DAVIDS, supra note 6, at 2).
15.
See Susan W. Tiefenbrun, Classic GreekThemes in ContemporaryLaw: On Civil Disobedience,
Jurisprudence,Feminism and the Law in the Antigones of Sophocles and Anouilh, I I CARDOZO STUD. L. &
LIT. 35 (1999), and Susan Tiefenbrun, Semiotics and Martin Luther King's "Letterfrom Birmingham Jail,"
2 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 255-87 (1992).

16.
17.
18.

BASSIOUNI, supra note 1,at 29.
Id. at 32.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9, at 1564.
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courts have held that violence is not limited to physical contact or injury, but
may include picketing in a labor dispute conducted with misleading signs, false19
statements, erroneous publicity, and veiled threats by words and acts.
Violence has many forms and degrees of severity. However, an act is violent
only if it causes harm to persons and things.2" Violence in any form can inspire
terror in its victims and in those indirectly affected by the violence.
What is an "innocent civilian?" There is no agreement as to who is
actually included in this category, 21 but one is tempted to say "we know an
innocent civilian when we see one." If only one innocent civilian is killed or
seriously injured during an act of war motivated by self-defense, will this be
enough to call it a "terrorist" act? What are the legitimate defenses of the
unintentional killing of an innocent civilian during wartime? Is collateral
damage of the use of force during wartime a legitimate defense to killing
innocent civilians? These are only some of the questions that the element of
violence against "innocent civilians" raises in proposing a universally-accepted
definition of terrorism.
The element of intent or wanton disregard is less troublesome because of
established definitions used by the courts to determine the mental state of an
accused. What is more troublesome is the element of "fear" which is not a legal
term but a psychological phenomenon that is manifested by various signs and
symptoms such as trembling, shaking, sweaty palms, etc. Intimidation, which
was established as a tort in England as early as 1964,22 is unlawful coercion that
produces harm.
The manifold purposes of terrorism include the accomplishment of a
political, military, ethnic, ideological, or religious cause. The overriding
purpose is a necessary element of the definition. Political, ethnic, ideological
and religious goals are not troublesome within the definition of terrorism.
However, the accomplishment of a "military goal" is controversial. If a military
goal is added to the definition of terrorism, this inclusion places a burden on
combatants never to use terrorism during wartime. Individuals, small groups,
and states have been known to commit terrorist acts in the context of wars of
national liberation. 3

19.

Id.

20.

BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 8.

21.

Id. at 15.

22.

Rookes v. Barnard, I Lloyd's Rep 28 (H.L. 1964).

23.

BASSIOUNI, supra note I, at 19. See also Jordan Paust, Use ofArmed ForceAgainst Terrorists

in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 533 (2002).
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THE MANY DEFINITIONS OF TERRORISM

Even though there are many definitions of terrorism 24 available for
legislative purposes, "terrorism" per se has never been explicitly defined in any
of the seventeen existing multilateral anti-terrorism conventions.25 Moreover,
the multilateral conventions are not applicable to state-sponsored terrorism.
They apply only to terrorism committed by individual actors. The absence of
a universally-accepted definition of terrorism and the inapplicability of
multilateral anti-terrorism legislation to state-sponsored terrorism reflect the
deeply political nature of the term terrorism and the absence among nations of
commonly shared values26 about the rule of law, the legitimacy of goals, and the
means to achieve these goals. For example, the international community cannot
agree on whether "innocent civilian" is a necessary or simply a sufficient
element of the definition. It also cannot agree on who should be included in the
category of "innocent civilians" or "diplomats" or "civilian installations" or
"legitimate targets."27 The international community cannot agree on whether
terrorism is illegal under all situations or whether it is sometimes permissible in
order to achieve a legitimate goal. Some international organizations proclaim
that the right to self-rule legitimizes the use of the most appropriate means,
including terrorism, to achieve the goals of liberation and independence.2 8
A. United States' Definitions of Terrorism
In the United States there is a general confusion about what constitutes
terrorism." The United States has shifted its conception of terrorism as a

24.
Id. at 15. Bassiouni provides a long list of scholarly articles that attempt to define the term
"terrorism." See also John F. Murphy, The Future of Multilateralism and Efforts to Combat International
Terrorism, 25 COL. J. TRANS'L L. 35 (1986) and Thomas M. Franck & Bert B. Lockwood, Preliminary
Thoughts Towards an International Convention on Terrorism, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 69, 70-72 (1974).
25.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 1,at xxvi. In the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism, Article 2.1(b), U.N. Doc. A/54/109 (9 De. 1999), there is an indirect definition of terrorism
proposed: "Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person
not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its
nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization
to do or to abstain from doing any act." Id.
26.
id. at 15.
27.
Id.
28.
ALEXANDER, SWETNAM, & LEVINE, supra note 5, at 4: ("Between 1963 and 1965 the terrorist
organization adopted the principles of revolutionary war because it was influenced by the successes of the
independence war in Algeria and the Cuban revolution. Marxist theory was predominant in its ideology.
ETA's purpose was to change the state through an uprising of the people, the destruction of the oppressor
state, and finally, the assault to power." Id. at 6.
29.
TERRORISM AND THE LAw 3 (Yonah Alexander and Edgar H. Brenner, eds., Transnational
Publishers, Inc. 2001).
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"crime" to terrorism as an "act of war."3 In the past, the United States
classified international terrorism as a crime and applied legal means as the
primary tool to fight it." More recently, however, the United States has moved
away from reactive counter-terrorism law enforcement methods towards more
proactive techniques to fight international terrorism. This shift has occurred
because the United States now perceives terrorist acts as acts of war.32 In its war
against terrorism, the United States now uses expanded law enforcement and
intelligence agencies like the FBI and the CIA to fight terrorism, and these
agencies have their own definitions of terrorism.
In the United States federal system, each state determines what constitutes
an offense under its domestic criminal or penal code. States define terrorism
generically as a crime. For example, the Arkansas Criminal Code provides that
"a person commits the offense of terroristic[sic] threatening if, with the purpose
of terrorizing another person, he threatens to cause death or serious physical
injury or substantial property damage to another person. 33
The United States Congress has not been able to reach a consensus on a
working definition of terrorism. 34 The executive branch has also not developed
a coordinated position on the meaning of the term.3 ' The absence of a
generally-accepted definition of terrorism in the United States allows the
government to craft variant or vague definitions which can result in an erosion
of civil rights and the possible abuse of power by the state in the name of
fighting terrorism and protecting national security.
1. United States 1996 Anti-Terrorism Act's Definition of Terrorism
In the 1996 United States Antiterrorism Act and Effective Death Penalty
United States defines international terrorism as:

Act, 36 the

30.

Malvina Halberstam, The US Right to Use Force in Response to the Attacks on the Pentagon

and the World Trade Center, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 101 (2001), "Terrorism is a form of war,

probably the most serious form of war used against the United States since World War II, if not ever." See also
Malvina Halberstam, TerroristActs Against and on BoardShips, 331 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. (1987); Malvina
Halberstam, Terrorismon the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime
Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269 (1988); Malvina Halberstam, The Evolution of the UnitedNations Position on
Terrorism: From Exempting National LiberationMovements to Criminalizing Terrorism Whenever and By
Whomever Committed (COLUMBIA J. ON TRANSNATIONAL LAw, forthcoming 2003).

31.
Tyler Raimo, Notes and Comments, Winning at the Expense of Law: The Ramifications of
Expanding Counter-TerrorismLaw Enforcement JurisdictionOverseas, 14 AM. U. INT'L. L. REV. 1473, 74
(1999) [hereinafter Raimo].
32.
Id.
33.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-13-301 (Michie 2002).
34.
Raimo, supra note 31, at 4.
35.
Id.
36.
Jason Binimow & Amy Bunk, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of "Foreign
TerroristOrganization" Provision ofAnti-Terrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct (AEDPA), 8 U.S.C.A.
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the unlawful use of violence against the United States, citizens of the
United States or any other nation, outside the boundaries of the
United States, apparently intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population, influence government policy, or to affect the conduct of
a government for political or social objectives. 7
This definition includes the five basic elements outlined above, but does
not list specific terrorist acts that can be classified as criminal.3 8 The advantage
of not listing specific acts as "terrorist acts" is that as new forms of technology
are created, new forms of terrorist acts are likely to develop, and this law will
still cover these news modalities. The disadvantage of not listing specific acts
as "terrorist acts" is that the decision will be left up to policy makers to
determine who is and who is not committing "terrorist acts." A subjective
definition leaves too much room for political bias to affect the decision.
Despite the presence of a definition of terrorism in the United States 1996
Antiterrorism Act, some civil libertarians have attacked this law, basing their
objection on a dubious claim that the Act does not contain a definition of
terrorism. A more valid claim might be that the United States Antiterrorism Act
of 1996 does not explicitly designate specific acts that constitute terrorism.
Civil libertarians have expressed a legitimate fear that the alleged absence of a
definition will have the following deleterious result: " 'Terrorism' is whatever
the Secretary of States decides it is ...
the Secretary of State may designate a
foreign group as a terrorist organization if the Secretary of State finds that the
group 'engages in terrorist activity' that threatens the security of United States
nationals or the national security of the United States."39 The absence of a
universally-accepted definition of terrorism and the failure to list specific acts
as terrorist acts could cause this bad result to happen in other countries besides
the United States.
2. The 2001 United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (United States
Patriot Act) 4°
The President of the United States has defined terrorism in a recent antiterrorism act known as the United States Patriot Act. The definition is as
§ 1189, 178 A.L.R. FED. 535 (2002). See also U.S. Antiterrorism Act of 1990, 18U.S.C. § 2331 (1991).
37.
RAIMO, supra note 31, at 4.
38.
id. at n. 46.
39.
JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM & THE CONSTITUTION: SACRIFICING CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 119 (First Amendment Foundation 1999) [hereinafter
DEMPSEY]. See also Binimow & Bunk, supra note 36.
40.
USA Patriot Act, Pub.L.No. 107-56, 115Stat. 296-342 (2001).
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follows: "For crimes to be defined as 'terrorist acts' the government must show
that they were calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by
intimidation or coercion or to retaliate against government conduct."
This definition requires insight into the mental state of the perpetrator, does
not specifically identify the necessary element of violence, and reduces the
purpose clause to achieving political goals (i.e., influencing government
conduct).
Some civil libertarians have objected to the erosion of civil liberties in the
2001 United States Patriot Act because it authorizes executive detention on the
mere suspicion that an immigrant has at some point engaged in a violent crime
or provided humanitarian aid to a proscribed organization. This provision
authorizes guilt by association and gives the government the power to deny
entry to aliens for reasons that are arguably "pure speech" acts. 4'
3. The International Money Laundering Abatement and
Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001
The United States Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, which is the
counterpart of the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism (1999),42 was signed into law on October 26,
2001, as Title III of the United States Patriot Act. This statute requires the
Secretary of the Treasury to implement numerous changes under a strict
timetable in order to follow the trail of those who finance terrorism. Due
diligence measures require the identification of beneficial owners of bank
accounts.43
The United States has designated a variation on the domestic form of
"terrorism" called "global terrorism." For example, President Bush signed
Executive Order 13244 on September 23, 2001, requiring United States persons
to block the assets of a new category of sanctioned parties, known as "specially
designated global terrorists (SDGTS)." This category includes individuals,
organizations, charities, and business entities. It includes United States persons,
United States citizens and permanent residents, United States corporations, and
their non-United States branches. The Office of Foreign Assets Control of the
United States Department of the Treasury will implement the executive order.
The President has threatened to freeze assets and transactions of banks and other
financial institutions that refuse to share information about terrorists.44 An
41.
DEMPSEY, supra note 39.
42.
See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999,
39 I.L.M. 270 (2000).
43.
Edward J. Krauland and Stephane Lagonico, The New Counter-Money Laundering and AntiTerrorist FinancingLaw, INT'L L. NEWS 1 (2002).
44.
Executive Order on Terrorist Financing, availableathttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
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action to freeze assets was also taken by the United Nations Security Council
in Resolution 1267 on October 15, 1999, under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter. Similar actions were taken against Osama bin Laden on December 19,
2000 pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1333. 45
4. FBI's Definition of Terrorism
Since 1980, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has defined terrorism
as: "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment
46
thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives.,
The FBI's definition does not include the basic five elements because it
omits the necessary element of intent and limits the purpose to the achievement
of "political or social objectives." Moreover, the definition does not specifically
include or exclude state-sponsored terrorism. If the definition of terrorism does
not include the element of intent to coerce or intimidate, then any criminal, like
the Son of Sam, who kills just for the sake of bloodthirsty violence, could be
deemed a terrorist.
5. United States State Department's Definition of Terrorism
The United States Department of State defines the term "terrorism" as:
"premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by sub-national47 groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to
influence an audience.,
This definition includes all five elements and the requisite intent, but it
limits the purpose to "politically motivated" goals. The United States State
Department's definition arguably excludes terrorism committed by a state
because it lists only "sub-national groups or clandestine agents." However, if
the term "agents" refers to "agents of the state," then state-sponsored terrorism
is included in this definition.

2001/09/20010924-1.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2003).
45.
Peter D. Trooboff, Antiterrorism Measures, THE NAT'L L.J. A19 (2001).
46.
United States Department of Justice, FBI, Terrorism in the United States, 1988 (Terrorist
Research and Analytical Center, Counter-terrorism Section, Criminal Investigative Division, December 31,
1988), at 34, cited in TERRORISM AND THE LAW, supra note 29, at 4, n 7.
47.
22 U.S.C. Section 2656f(d), cited in TERRORISM AND THE LAW, supra note 29, at 4.
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6. United States State Department Definition of International Terrorism
The United States Department of State defines the term "international
terrorism" as: "terrorism involving citizens of the territory of more than one
country."48
The requirement of more than one country in the United States State
Department definition refers to both perpetrators and victims. The State
Department also defines the term "terrorist group" to mean "any group
practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice international
terrorism."4 Since international terrorism refers back to "terrorism," which
includes only sub-national groups or clandestine agents, arguably the United
States State Department definition of international terrorism does not cover
state-sponsored terrorist acts, unless the term "agents" refers to the state.
B. English Definition of Terrorism
The United Kingdom has undergone an evolutionary process in the
definition of terrorism. The English defined terrorism in the English Prevention
of Terrorism (Temporary Provision) Act of 198450 and in the English Prevention
of Terrorism (Temporary Provision) Act of 1989" : "Terrorism means the use
of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence for the purpose
of putting the public or any section of the public in fear."
This definition is overly broad, does not include the element of intent,
expansively includes "civilians" in the category of "any section of the
public"(which could include combatants), and limits the goal to "political"
benefit. The perpetration of violence without a requirement of intent could
produce odd results. For example, demonstrators for a political cause that end
up in a brawl might be deemed "terrorists." An accidental killing by the police
or by the army, which is hardly an act of terror, might fall within this definition
of terrorism.52
In 1996 Lord Lloyd defined terrorism as: "The use of serious violence
against persons or property or the threat to use such violence, to intimidate or
coerce a government, the public, or any section of the public, in order to
promote political, social, or ideological objectives.""
48.

Id.

49.
Id. See 17 YONAH ALEXANDER & DONALD J. MUSCH, TERRORISM DOCUMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL, 170-71 (Oceana Publications, Inc. 1999).

50.
English Prevention of Terrorism (Temiporary Provision) Act of 1984, Section 14(l).
51.
English Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1989, Section 20(1).
available at
http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1989lUkpga_19890004_en_6.htm (last visited Feb. 1,2003). See Gross,
supra note II at fn. 20.
52.
See Gross, supra note I1,at n. 20.
53.
See Lord Lloyd, Inquiry into Legislation Against Terrorism, H.L., March 1996 (cited in
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This definition remedies the earlier one that placed limitations on goals,
modifies the act of violence by describing it as "serious violence," maintains the
element of "civilians" in the broad category of "any section of the public" but
still falls short of including an element of intent.
In the 1999 Prevention of Terrorism Bill, the British government defined
terrorism even more broadly to include expressions of extremism by groups
such as the Animal Liberation Front that had only one issue as its cause.
The more recent United Kingdom Terrorism Act of 2000"4 defines terrorism in
Section 1(1):
Terrorism means the use or threat of action where the action falls
within subsection (2)(i.e. violence, serious damage, endangering life,
etc.) and (b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government
or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (c) the use
or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or
ideological cause.
Terrorist action is further defined in Section 1(2) as:
Acts involving serious violence against a person, serious damage to
property, acts that endanger a person's life, other than that of the
person committing the action; acts that create a serious risk to the
health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or acts
designed seriously to interfere with or disrupt an electronic system."
Thus, English law continues to omit the element of intent in its definition
of terrorism. United Kingdom law specifically lists certain acts that are terrorist
acts, like environmental terrorism, biological terrorism, and even computer
hacking. English law on terrorism is extraterritorial and covers terrorist actions
outside the United Kingdom and committed by governments of a country
6
outside the United Kingdom.1
As a matter of comparative law, United States law and United Kingdom
law are quite different with regard to the definition of terrorism. The United
Kingdom Terrorism Act of 2000 provides a broad definition of the criminal act
of terrorism ("serious violence against a person, serious damage to property,
acts that endanger a person's life") and also specifically names certain terrorist
acts ("acts that create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public ...or
disrupt an electronic system"). In contrast, the United States 1996 Antiterrorism
TERRORISM AND THE LAW, supra note 29, at 4-5).
54.

United Kingdom Terrorism Act of 2000, Ch. I I § 1(1) (July 20, 2000).

55.

TERRORISM AND THE LAW, supra note 29, at 4-5.

56.

Id at 6.
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Act includes the element of intent but softens the requirement by adding the
adverb "apparently" to the element of intent ("apparently intended to intimidate
or coerce a civilian population...."). The United States law on terrorism does
not specifically list the acts that constitute terrorist criminal acts.
The English approach to terrorism may have odd but beneficial results. If
Greenpeace were to threaten to disrupt a government computer system (e.g. in
order to put pressure on Iraq for dealing with its Kurd population in an
inhumane manner), the Greenpeace movement would be committing an act of
terrorism. 57 As odd as this result may seem given its laudable purpose, in my
view the identification of the Greenpeace organization's act as a terrorist act
would be correct in this instance because terrorist acts are not justified, even if
they are committed for humanitarian purposes.
C. French Definition of Terrorism
The French coined the term "terrorism" during the French revolution,5 8 in
the period that followed the fall of Robespierre in 1793-1794, under the infamous
Reign of Terror.59 The French define terrorism in the dictionary as "violence
committed by an organization in order to create a climate of insecurity or in
order to overthrow the established government. ' 60 This definition eliminates the
elements of intent and harm to innocent civilians and limits the purpose to the
achievement of political goals. In France the term terrorism is also included
under the definition of crimes against humanity. As a result of the famous
Klaus Barbie case, 61 a new law defining crimes against humanity had to be
adopted in the French Criminal Code. The term "terrorism" is also specifically
62
defined in the French Criminal Code:
57.

Id.

58.

David B. Kopel and Joseph Olson, Preventinga Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties Implications

of Terrorism Legislation; 21 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 247, 251 (1996). The term "terrorism" was conceived
during the French Revolution when the government created a reign of terror to execute political opponents,
requisition their property, and impose terror over the remainder of the population until they yielded to the

government.
59.

Le Petit Larousse (1991 ed.) and Le Petit Robert (1972 ed.).

60.

Id.

61.

See Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretationof the Nuremberg Principles by the French Court

of Cassation:From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289 (1994). As a result

of the French court decision in the Barbie case, the court found that to be guilty of a crime against humanity
one had to intend to take part in carrying out a common plan by systematically committing inhumane acts and
illegal persecutions in the name of a state practicing a hegemonic political ideology. Since Vichy, France
could not be considered a hegemonic state, Touvier could not, as a matter of law, have committed a crime

against humanity. Sadat points out that there is no requirement to prove a "hegemonic state." As a result of
this case, a new French Criminal Code defining crimes against humanity was adopted. However, nowhere
in this definition is "terrorism" specifically mentioned.

62.

French Criminal Code, Article 421-1 (Loi No. 96-647 du 22 juillet 1996 art. I Journal Officiel
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"Acts are terrorist acts when they are intentionally committed by an
individual entity or by a collective entity in order to seriously disturb law and
63
order by intimidation or by terror.,
Unlike the United States law, which does not list particular acts as terrorist
acts, the French law specifically names and describes the acts that constitute
terrorism. Article 421-1 of the French Criminal Code lists the following acts as
terrorist acts:
Attempted murder, assault, kidnapping, hostage-taking on airplanes,
ships, all means of transport, theft, extortion, destructions, and crimes
committed during group combat, the production or ownership of
weapons of destruction and explosives including the production, sale,
import and export of explosives, the acquisition, ownership, transport
of illegal explosive substances, the production, ownership, storage, or
acquisition of biological or chemical weapons, and money laundering.
Article 421-2 of the French Criminal Code' continues the list of terrorist
acts to include environmental terrorism: "...Placing in the air, on the ground,
under the ground and in the water (including territorial water) any substance that
would put the health of man and animals or the environment in danger."
Article 421-2-1 of the French Criminal Code 65 makes it illegal to belong
to or participate in a group that is formed for the purpose of planning one of the
terrorist acts named above.
Article 421-2-2 of the French Criminal Code6 6 makes it illegal for anyone
to finance a terrorist organization by intentionally providing funds, collecting
funds, or managing funds of any value whatsoever, or by giving advice for the
purpose of financing terrorism, if that person knows that these funds are going
to be used fully or partially for the purpose of committing terrorist acts, and
whether or not the terrorist act actually occurs.

du 23 juillet 1996) (Loi No.98-467 du 17 juin 1998 art. 84 Journal Officiel du 18juin 1998) (Loi No. 2001-1062
du 15 novembre 2001 art. 33 Journal Officiel du 16 novembre 2001). See http://222.legifrance.gouv.fr/htm/
framecodes L.htm.
63.

Translations of Article 421-1 and other pertinent Articles of the French Criminal Code are

provided by Susan Tiefenbrun. The term "ordre public" refers to "public policy" or to "law and order."
64.

Article 421-2 of the French Criminal Code (Loi No 96-647 du 22 juillet 1996 art. 2 Journal

Officiel du 23 juillet 1996).
65.
Article 421-2-1 of the French Criminal Code (Loi No. 96-647 du 22 juillet 1996 art. 3 Journal
Officiel du 23 juillet 1996).
66.

Article 421-2-2 of the French Criminal Code (Loi No 2001-1062 du 15 novembre 2001 art. 33

Journal Officiel du 16 novembre 2001).
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Article 421-3 of the French Criminal Code6 7 sets forth penalties ranging
from six years to life imprisonment for the commission of a terrorist act. Article
421-4 of the French Criminal Code68 adds monetary penalties to the prison
sentence. For example, if the terrorist is convicted to fifteen years of
imprisonment, he or she might also be required to pay a monetary penalty of
225,000 Euros. If an alleged terrorist is convicted of killing one or several
people, he or she would be sentenced to imprisonment for life and would be
required to pay a penalty of 750,000 Euros. Article 421-5 of the French
Criminal Code69 provides that an alleged terrorist who is convicted for ten years
of imprisonment must also pay a penalty of 225,000 Euros.
Article 422-1 of the French Criminal Code70 provides an exemption for
informants. Anyone who had attempted to commit a terrorist act and who,
having informed the administrative and judicial authorities in advance of the
commission of the act, facilitated the avoidance of the terrorist act and the
identification of the other guilty parties will be immune from imprisonment and
penalties.
Article 422-2 of the French Criminal Code permits the reduction of a
prison sentence by half for anyone who committed a terrorist act or aided in a
terrorist act if that person, by warning or informing the administrative or
judiciary authorities, enabled the terrorist act to be avoided, or enabled anyone's
death or permanent injury to be avoided, or provided the names of the other
guilty parties. A life sentence will be reduced to twenty years for such
assistance.
Article 422-5 of the French Criminal Code expressly requires that
corporations ("personnes morales") engaging in terrorist activities pay monetary
penalties. Article 422-6 of the French Criminal Code7' includes confiscation of
property as a penalty for any person or corporation engaging in terrorist activity.
Article 422-7 of the French Criminal Code72 provides that any financial
penalties imposed on the terrorists will be given to the victims' funds.

67.
Article 421-3 of the French Criminal Code (Loi No 96-647 du 22 juillet 1996 art. 4 Journal
Officiel du 23 juillet 1996).
68.
Article 421-4 of the French Criminal Code (Ordonnance No. 2000-916 du 19 septembre 2000
art. 3 Journal Officiel du 22 septembre 2000 en vigueur le Ier janvier 2002).
69.
Article 421-5 of the French Criminal Code (Loi No. 96-647 du 22 juillet 1996 art. 5 Journal
Officiel du 23 juillet 1996)(Loi No. 2001-1062 du 15novembre 2001 art. 33 Journal Officiel du 16 novembre
2001)(Ordonnance No 2000-916 du 19 septembre 2000 art. 3 Journal Officiel du 22 septembre 2000 en
vigueurle ler janvier 2002).
Article 422-1 of the French Criminal Code.
70.
71.
Article 422-6 of the French Criminal Code (Loi No. 2001-1062 du 15novembre 2001 art. 33
Journal Officiel du 16 novembre 2001).
Article 422-7 (Loi No. 2001-1062 du 15 novembre 2001 art. 33 Journal Officiel du 16 novembre
72.
2001).
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Article 434-2 of the French Criminal Code73 imposes five years of
imprisonment and a fine of 75,000 Euros on anyone attempting to harm the
fundamental interests of the nation by a terrorist act.
Article 434-6 of the French Criminal Code74 imposes a penalty of three
years imprisonment and 45,000 Euros for anyone aiding a terrorist convicted of
ten years of imprisonment. Aiding and abetting may be simply offering a
terrorist lodging, subsidies, means of subsistence or any other form of
assistance. The penalty for aiding and abetting can be increased to five years
of imprisonment and 75,000 Euros. However, relatives of the terrorist (parents,
brothers, sisters and their spouse) and the spouse of the terrorist or the person
with whom the terrorist is living are not included in the list of aiders and
abetters.
D. European Nations' Definition of Terrorism
The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism75 was signed
by 17 out of 19 member states of the Council of Europe in January 1977.
According to this treaty, all states must treat assassination, hostage taking, bomb
attacks, and hijacking (major terrorist offenses), as "common crimes" and can
not refuse extradition. However, an escape clause was inserted into the
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism permitting the contacting
state to reserve the right to regard a certain offense as a political one. This
escape clause would enable that state to withhold extradition. The member
states of the European Union strengthened this provision by the European
Convention on Extradition.h
E. CanadianDefinition of Terrorism
Canada has recently made strong legislative proposals in an attempt to
combat terrorism. The Canadian Anti-terrorism Act takes aim at terrorist
groups, but also seeks to strike an appropriate balance between respecting
Canadian values of fairness and respect for human rights while protecting
Canadians and the global community from terrorism. This balance is

73.
Article 434-2 (Ordonnance No. 2000-916 du 19septembre 2000 art. 3 Journal Officiel du 22
septembre 2000 en vigueur le ler janvier 2002).
74.
Article 434-6 (Loi No. 96-647 du 22 juillet 1996 art. 7 Journal Officiel du 23 juillet 1996)
(Ordonnance No. 200-916 du 19 septembre 2000 art. 3 Journal Officiel du 22 septembre 2000 en vigueur le
Ier janvier 2002).
75.
European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (Jan. 27, 1977), available at
http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbrO0/video/cbr_ctd/cbr_ctd_39.html (last visited Feb. i, 2003).
76.

PAUL WILKINSON, TERRORISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY:

(Frank Cass 2001).
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accomplished by providing what the Canadian Department of Justice refers to
as checks and balances in the form of "clear definitions '77 of terrorism.
Terrorist activities in Canada have always been treated as criminal
offenses. Under the Canadian Criminal Code terrorists can be prosecuted for
hijacking, murder, and other acts of violence. The Government of Canada has
signed all 12 United Nations Conventions and Protocols 78 related to terrorism
and has ratified 10, including those that protect against harming aircraft, civil
aviation and airports, international shipping, internationally protected persons
and diplomats, the safety of nuclear material, and the prevention of the taking
of hostages and terrorist bombings. According to the Justice Department,
Canada plans to ratify the remaining two United Nations counter-terrorism
conventions dealing with the suppression of terrorist financing and the
suppression of terrorist bombings. Canada also expects to ratify the Convention
on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel Convention (1994),
ensuring the safety of United Nations personnel, including peacekeepers, from
attacks against their person, official premises, private accommodation and
modes of transport. Canada proposes to amend its Criminal Code to implement
these United Nations Conventions and to establish provisions aimed at disabling
and dismantling the activities of terrorist groups and those who support them.
Canadian law defines a "terrorist activity" in the Criminal Code as an
action that takes place either within or outside of Canada that "is an offense
under one of the ten United Nations anti-terrorism conventions and protocols;
or is an action": "taken or threatened for political, religious, or ideological
purposes and threatens the public or national security by killing, seriously
harming or endangering a person, substantial property damage that is likely to
seriously harm people or by interfering with or disrupting an essential service,
facility or system."
This Canadian definition of terrorism does not explicitly include the words
"violence," but it is implied in the descriptive term "seriously harming or
endangering." While the element of "innocent civilians" is not designated with
particularity, the broad term "a person" and "people" implies civilians.
The element of intent is also not specified but merely implied vaguely in
the words "an action is taken." Some insight into the element of intent implied
in these words can be gleaned by looking at the list of specific acts of terrorism
which Canadian law provides. Unlike the terrorism definition in United States
law, the Canadian law lists specific terrorist acts, including the disruption of an

77.
See Report from Department of Justice, October 15, 2001, on "Highlights of Anti-Terrorism Act"
from the Minister of Justice of Canada, available at http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/
doc_27787.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).

78.
See infra Part III
(F) for discussion of UN Definitions of Terrorism in Conventions, Protocols,
and Resolutions.
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essential service, facility or system. It is interesting to note that in an effort to
balance civil rights with the protection of national security, Canadian law does
not include under the definition of a terrorist act the disruption of an essential
service during a lawful protest or a work strike, if the action does not intend to
cause serious harm to persons. Therefore, the emphasis on intent as a condition
of terrorist activity in this context strongly supports the view that the element
of intent is implied in the definition of terrorism under Canadian law. The,
element of "fear, coercion or intimidation" is not specified explicitly but implied
in the term "threatens." The Canadian definition specifically designates the
purpose of the terrorist action as political, religious, or ideological and omits
"military" and "ethnic."
Canadian law permits the designation of groups as "terrorist groups" if
their activities meet the definition of terrorist activity.
The Canadian Criminal Code makes it a crime to knowingly collect or
provide funds, either directly or indirectly, in order to carry out terrorist crimes.
The maximum sentence for this offense would be ten years. It is a crime to
knowingly participate in, contribute to or facilitate the activities of a terrorist
group. Participation or contribution could include knowingly recruiting into the
group new individuals for the purpose of enhancing the ability of the terrorist
group to aid, abet, or commit indictable offences. The maximum sentence for
the offense of participating or contributing would be ten years of imprisonment.
The maximum sentence for facilitating would be fourteen years of
imprisonment. Anyone who instructs another to carry out a terrorist act or an
activity on behalf of a terrorist group ("leadership" offense) carries a maximum
life sentence. Anyone knowingly harboring or concealing a terrorist would
receive a maximum sentence of ten years.
A careful analysis of the Canadian definition of terrorism with respect to
the five necessary elements shows that the definition is not as "clear" as the
Canadian Department of Justice would have us believe. It is, however, more
specific than United States law which does not list with particularity any acts of
terrorism.
F. United Nations' Definitions of Terrorism
The United Nations and other international organizations have failed for
decades to agree on a common universal definition of terrorism. United Nations
General Assembly and Security Council resolutions repeatedly affimn their
determination to combat terrorism in all its forms "irrespective of motive,
whenever and by whomever committed. 79
79.
G.A. Res. 1269, U.N. GAOR Security Council, 4053rd mtg. at 1,U.N. Doc. S/RES/1269 (1999).
See G.A. Res. 1373, U.N. GAOR Security Council, 4385th mtg. at I 7,8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001),
which mandates that U.N. member states take measures to combat terrorism, and it creates a Counter
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The United Nations' definition of terrorism contained in a critical 1991
General Assembly Resolution reflects the consensus of the General Assembly
and resolves the issue of whether terrorism constitutes a legal response by a
state to safeguard its undeniable right to self-determination and self-defense.
The General Assembly Resolution "unequivocally condemns, as criminal and
unjustifiable, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism, wherever and by
whoever committed." 80
The United Nations General Assembly's definition contained in its
Resolution of 1991 has reappeared in several subsequent resolutions. This
definition makes it clear that even though all people have certain rights-the
right under racist regimes or alien domination to self-determination, the right to
freedom and independence, and the right to struggle legitimately to achieve this
end-notwithstanding these rights, peoples fighting against colonial domination
may not resort to the acts proscribed in the antiterrorism conventions. 8'
In December 1999 the United Nations General Assembly Resolution
54/10982 defined terrorism as:
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the
general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political
purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or other nature, that may be invoked to justify them. 83
Kofi Annan further reinforced the United Nations' blanket prohibition of
terrorism: "Terrorism strikes at the very heart of everything the United Nations
stands for. It presents a global threat to democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and stability ...the methods and practices of terrorism [are] criminal and
unjustifiable-whoever commits them and wherever they occur. '
The coexistence of a proliferation of anti-terrorism conventions and the
recent increase of terrorist acts in 2001 and 2002 indicates the legislative failure
by the United Nations to deter acts of terrorism. The international community
has been trying to define terrorism since 1937 when the League of Nations first

Terrorism Committee to monitor the implementation of that resolution. See Jennifer Trahan, Terrorism
Conventions: Existing Gaps and Different Approaches, 8 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 215, 239

(2002).
80. Michael P. Scharf, Book Review: Rebels With a Cause: The Minds and Morality of Political
Offenders, 96, A.J.I.L. 276, 278 (Jan. 2002).
Id. at 278.
81.
82.
UN GAOR, 54th Sess., 76th mtg. at art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (1999).
83.
Id.
"International Instruments Related to the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism,
84.
(United Nations 2001), in Preface.
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drafted the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism85 that
was signed by twenty-four nations but ratified ultimately only by one nation ,
India. The United Nations began drafting anti-terrorism conventions in the
1960s because of a high incidence of aircraft hijackings. The United Nations has
continued to draft specific anti-terrorism conventions for the past sixty-two
years to respond to different kinds of terrorist attacks against civilians,
diplomats, civilian aircrafts, commercial maritime navigation and sea-based
platforms involving the use of explosives and weapons of mass destruction.86
There are currently seventeen specialized international United Nations
conventions on terrorism,87 three international conventions on the control of

85.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS, Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, O.J. 19 at

23 (1938), League of Nations Doc. C. 546 (1). M.383 (1),1937,V(1938).
86.
87.

BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 1.
The U.N. Conventions on Terrorism, and one Draft Convention on the Suppression of Acts of

Nuclear Terrorism are as follows:
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312;
United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261;
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, Mar..10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668;
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf, IMO. Doc. Sua/Con/16/ Rev. 1; 27 I.L.M. 685 (10
Mar. 1988);

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept.
14, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 1042;
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircrafts (Hijacking
Convention), Dec. 16, 1970, 18 I.L.M. 1419;
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC Convention], Jan. 13, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 800;
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism [Terrorism Financing
Convention]; U.N. Doc. a/54/109 (9 Dec. 1999)133 (16 Dec. 1970);
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation,
Jan. 26, 1973, 10 I.L.M. 1151;
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving Civil
Aviation [Montreal Protocol], Jan. 12, 1988, 27 1.L.M. 627;
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents [Diplomats Convention], Dec. 14,
1973, 13 I.L.M. 41;
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages [Hostage-Taking Convention], Dec. 17,
1979, 18I.L.M. 1456;
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel [U.N. Personnel
Convention], available at http://www.un.org/law/cod/safety.htm (last visited Feb. 1,
2003);
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar.
I, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 721;
Convention

for

the Suppression of Terrorist

Bombings [Terrorist Bombing
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weapons of mass destruction, two international conventions containing general
United Nations provisions; two United Nations' Draft Comprehensive
Conventions on terrorism; eight regional conventions against terrorism that have
been developed by the Organization of American States, the Council of Europe,
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, the League of Arab
States, the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth of Independent
States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference.88 There are also
international humanitarian law conventions on the prevention and punishment
of torture which is related to terrorist acts. In addition, there are twenty-one
international crimes conventions whose commission involves terrorism. Thus,
terrorism is included in many different laws prohibiting crimes and human
rights violations and covered under international humanitarian law conventions.
Nevertheless, the increase in international terrorism and the magnitude of the
tragic events that have occurred in the years 2001 and 2002 bear witness to the
failure of these international conventions to deter the crime.
What is needed is not more laws but better enforcement of existing norms.
Due to the political nature of terrorism, states have not been able to reach an
agreement on a comprehensive convention that would include all types of
terrorist acts and that would be applicable to state-sponsored terrorism.89
Moreover, since terrorism has been committed in the past by many state actors
during the time of war or revolution, many states prefer to leave the definition
of terrorism as vague as possible. More conventions will have to be adopted in
the future to prevent against the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction,
cyber-terrorism, and other new forms of terrorism. 90 The many existing terrorist
laws would be more efficiently collected in one comprehensive multilateral
convention. Nevertheless, the protections that are needed against terrorism will
not be adequately provided simply by the creation of new norms. What is
needed is the effective enforcement of existing laws, the adoption of one
universally-accepted definition of terrorism, the agreement by all nations that
Convention], U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/164 (9 Jan. 1998);
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [BWC
Convention], Apr. 10, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 309;
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, IAEA Doc. C/225;1456
U.N.T.S. 101; 18I.L.M. 1419 (3 Mar. 1980)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC Convention], U.N. Doc.
A/Res/47/39; 1974 U.N.T.S. 3; 32 I.L.M. 800 (13Jan. 1993)
Draft Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism [Nuclear Terrorism
Convention], U.N. Doc. A/AC.252/L.3 (28 Jan. 1997).
88.
BASSIOUNI, supra note I, at xxviii.
89.
Id. at xxv.
90.
Id. at xxvi-xxvii.
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terrorism must be prohibited irrespective of its motivation, and the application
of the existing laws to state-sponsored terrorist acts.9'
In December 1999, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by
consensus the text of a draft of the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism in which terrorism was indirectly defined in the
same terms as the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 54/109 above:
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the
general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political
purposes are in any circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious, or other nature, that may be invoked to justify them.92
This definition in the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism does not specifically refer to acts of violence but refers,
instead, to "criminal acts." The definition arguably includes the element of
targeting innocent civilians in the term "general public." It includes the element
of intent by the words "intended or calculated to provoke." The requirement of
coercion or intimidation is included in the term "terror." However, this
definition does not include state-sponsored actors. Moreover, the definition
expands the motivation of terrorism to almost any possible cause, other than
military. The definition does convey very clearly that the root cause or
motivation of the terrorist act does not provide any justification whatsoever for
terrorism. In other words, according to the United Nations, the ends do not
justify the means.
G. Scholars' Attempts at Definition of Terrorism:
One terrorism expert has produced a working definition of terrorism that
still falls short of including all five elements: "Terrorism is defined as the
calculated employment or the threat of violence by individuals, sub-national
groups, and state actors to attain political, social, and economic objectives in the
violation of law, intended to create an overwhelming fear in a target area greater
than the victims attacked or threatened. 93
This definition does not specifically include the targeting of innocent
civilians and limits the perpetrator's motivations to illegal political, social, and

91.
WILKINSON, supra note 76, at 13: "The difference between state and factional terrorism is that
the former is more lethal and may be antecedent to, and a contributory cause of, factional terrorism....
States conduct "terror" and substate organizations conduct
Guerrilla insurgents often use terrorism ...
'terrorism." Id. at 19.
92.
UN GAOR, 54th Sess., 76th mtg. at art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (1999).
TERRORISM AND THE LAW, supra note 29, at 7.
93.
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economic purposes. This definition opens the door for states to engage in
terrorism by simply declaring that the purpose of the terrorist activity is justified
by a legal political, social or economic goal.
Cherif Bassiouni, who is one of the world's leading experts in the field of
international criminal law, has also proposed a definition of terrorism that
specifically includes state-sponsored terrorism, which is conceived of not
explicitly as a crime but rather as a "strategy," and which specifically excludes
the intent of the perpetrator and the targeting of innocent civilians:
Terrorism is an ideologically-motivated strategy of internationally
proscribed violence designed to inspire terror within a particular
segment of a given society in order to achieve a power-outcome or to
propagandize a claim or grievance, irrespective of whether its
perpetrators are acting for and on behalf of themselves, or on behalf
of a state.94

By referring to the "ends" as a "power outcome," a "claim" or a
"grievance," Bassiouni's definition cleverly eliminates the consideration of the
worthiness of the goals or the claimed justifications for terrorist acts. Arguably,
the definition does not specifically include the element of intent. However,
since the act is conceived of as a "strategy," which requires a mental process,
the intent element is presumed. Moreover, the term "designed to inspire terror"
evokes the pre-meditated intent of the actor. If the element of intent were absent
from this definition, one could presumably be condemned as a "terrorist" if, in
the course of a carefully conducted attack not specifically intended to produce
fear and not specifically targeted at innocent civilians, the bomb blast did, in
fact, cause fear in the population and cause the accidental injury of one or two
civilians. The element of intent should be a necessary requirement in the
definition of terrorism in order to permit justifiable attempts at self-defense not
involving intentional terrorist acts.
Bassiouni's definition also does not include the targeting of "innocent
civilians" but refers, instead, to "a particular segment of a given society." This
broad designation of a particular segment of the population could include the
military, especially if acts of "international terrorism" are claimed to arise in the
context of a conventional war or armed conflict of an international or of a noninternational character. Bassiouni specifically states that international terrorism
arises in the following contexts:
1. Armed conflicts of an international character or of a noninternational character:

94.

BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 16-17.
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a) conventional wars;
b) wars of national liberation;
c) against settler regimes, the intended power outcome is either
the removal of the settlers or transfer of power from settler group to
indigenous population;
d) against foreign occupation and/or colonial regimes.
2. International political conflicts, which may or may not involve
armed conflict or non-international character.9"

By excluding the "innocent civilian" element, Bassiouni's definition of
international terrorism would include an attack on combatants as well as noncombatants during an armed conflict. Arguably, an intentional attack on
combatants during an armed conflict with the aim of inspiring fear (or terror)
within the population of combatants should not be deemed "terrorism." It is
war, pure and simple. Bassiouni's definition of international terrorism is
brilliantly articulated, and would be enhanced if it included the element of
"innocent civilians"96 in peacetime as well as wartime. Bassiouni uses the word
"terror" rather than fear to define "international terrorism," thereby preserving
the original denotation of the Latin word "terrore" (fear producing).

95.
96.

Id. at 18.
Many scholars and journalists include "innocent civilians" in their definition of terrorism. See
CALEB CARR, THE LESSONS OF TERROR (2002). Can- is a military historian who defines terrorism as "the
contemporary name given to, and the modem permutation of, warfare, deliberately waged against civilians
with the purpose of destroying their will to support either leaders or policies that the agents of such violence
find objectionable."(cited in Stephen Yagman, Defining the Weapon of Terrorism: Frustrated People Without
Another Method Resort to 'Politico-Military' Violence Instead, L.A. DAILY J. 6 (Mar. 12, 2002). See also
William Pfaff, The Politicsof Terrorism,or Civilians vs. Civilians, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE 8, (Jan. 10, 2002),
at op ed page. Pfaff defines as "a form of politico-military combat that attacks civilians ...
because terrorists
can't get at the political and military figures they really want to kill. Terrorism is the weapon that oppressed
populations have always employed against those they consider their oppressors, usually because it is the only
weapon available." Note that Yagman objects to Carr's insistence on "civilians:"
There have been numerous attacks on the military that surely can be
characterized as terrorism: Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, attack on American
garrison at Kobat Towers in Saudi Arabia, the terrorist attack on the U.S.S. Cole, while
it was moored in Yemen ...during France's horrific repression in Algeria, France
regularly and openly employed military terrorism against innocent civilians to make
concessions to France. American military bombing of a mental hospital in Grenada in
...
1984 was allegedly fought to free American medical students studying in Grenada.
America's bdmbing with Thatcher's assistance, of Libyan Col Muammar Al al
Qaddafi's family's home in Tripoli to get even for what Reagan claimed was Qaddafi's
terrorism in which one of Qaddafi's small children was murdered; President Clinton's
bombing of a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan, where innocent night watchman was
murdered.
These are all military terrorist acts conducted upon innocent civilians.
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Bassiouni's definition of terrorism requires the act of violence to be
"internationally proscribed." He carefully lists fourteen specific acts of
terrorism (including, aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, apartheid, unlawful human experimentation; torture, slavery and
slave-related practices; piracy, and unlawful acts against the safety of maritime
navigation; kidnapping of diplomats and other internationally protected persons;
taking civilian hostages; serious environmental damage; or serious violation of
fundamental human rights.)97 The advantage of this specific listing is the
establishment of clarity and certainty in the law. However, the disadvantages
are important to recognize. New forms of terrorist acts that develop with the
advancement of technology, such as computer hacking, are not specifically
included and may fall afoul of the definition. However, this list is very broad
and seems to cover the unanticipated act of terrorism under such umbrella
categories as "aggression," or "serious violation of fundamental human rights."
Absent from this list, however, is "the use of weapons of mass destruction"
which will necessarily, if not intentionally, inflict harm on "innocent civilians."
Does that mean that the use of the A bomb during war time is a "terrorist" act
because it necessarily resulted in the killing of innocent civilians? There may
be a political reason to exclude the Use of weapons of mass destruction from the
list of proscribed terrorist acts.
IV. WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC
TERRORISM?

International terrorism is covered under the seventeen United Nations
multilateral anti-terrorism conventions that provide legal measures, in a
piecemeal and ad hoc fashion, against different manifestations of international
terrorist conduct like hijacking, hostage-taking, and violence against diplomats
or internationally protected persons. For a terrorist act to be deemed
"international," the act of violence must also contain an international element,
be directed against an internationally protected target or violate an international
norm. 98 Internationally proscribed conduct that is applicable to terrorist
violence includes aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide,
apartheid, unlawful human experimentation, torture, slavery, piracy,99 hijacking
and sabotage of aircraft, kidnapping of diplomats, taking civilian hostages,
serious environmental damage or serious violations of fundamental human
rights. "
97.
98.

BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 18.
Id. at 17.

99.

MARITIME TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (Natalino Ronzitti, ed., Martinus Nijhoff

Publishers 1990) (discussing the legal relationship between piracy and maritime terrorism).
100. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at 18.
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Domestic terrorism is harder to define than international terrorism because
domestic terrorism is usually included in state criminal statutes under acts
committed by common criminals.'' Some states define terrorism as a crime,
others define it as an "act of war,"'' 12 and most states consider terrorism to be a
method used to commit other more specifically defined crimes against the
person or against property.
International terrorism, like domestic terrorism, is a method used to
perpetrate other crimes, and as such international terrorism is arguably included
under the category of other international crimes but only if the five necessary
structural elements of terrorism are present. Typical tools of modem
international terrorism are explosive and incendiary bombings, shooting attacks
03
and assassinations, hostage-taking and kidnapping, hijacking, narco-terrorism, 1
cyber-terrorism information warfare,' ° and the use of nuclear, chemical, or
bacteriological weapons.' 15 Terrorists can be convicted of committing war
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, and even piracy (i.e. the
Achille Lauro incident), if they committed these crimes by using terrorist
methods. Thus, international terrorism is an elusive concept that overlaps with
other international crimes but which can be included in the definitions of these
other crimes, if the five necessary elements are present, like the intentional use
or threat of violence for political, religious or ideological purposes resulting in
the harm of innocent civilians.
V. TERRORISM ISNOT ONLY ACRIME BUT AMETHOD TO ACHIEVE SELFDETERMINATION

One of the underlying causes of the resurgence of terrorism in the 1960s
and 1970s is the development of social movements dedicated to achieving selfdetermination or the revolutionary transformation of the socio-economic order
and the concomitant belief by these groups that terrorism is an effective and
legitimate weapon to realize their goals. 106 In the 1990s in the course of tragic
ethnic wars in the Balkans and in Rwanda, mass terror was used as a weapon on
both sides of the respective conflicts, requiring the establishment of ad hoc

101. Id. at 19.
102. Raimo, supra note 31, at 1481 (discussing the shift in US away from reactive counter-terrorism
law enforcement methods and towards more pro-active techniques to fight international terrorism because the
US now perceives of terrorist acts as acts of war).
103. DAVIDS, supra note 6, at 2.
104.

See CYBER TERRORISM AND INFORMATION WARFARE: THREATS AND RESPONSES (Yonah

Alexander and Michael S.Swetnam, eds., Transnational Publishers, Inc. 2001).
105. WILKINSON, supra note 76, at 13. See also SUPERTERRORISM: BIOLOGICAL,
NUCLEAR (Yonah Alexander and Milton Hoenig, eds. 2001).
106. WILKINSON, supra note 76, at 13.
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international tribunals, 10 7 and later an international criminal court,0 8 to bring to
'
justice the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. 09
Terrorism per se is not listed as a crime under the subject matter
jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals." ° In the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Article 5 defines crimes
against humanity and includes in this category "crimes committed in armed
conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any
civilian population, including murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial and religious
grounds and other inhumane acts." Even though this description of crimes
against humanity contains all five elements of the definition of terrorism, it fails
to name or include "terrorism" as a "crime against humanity."
Similarly, the Statute of the ICTY at Art. 3 defines war crimes or
"violations of laws or customs of war," but it does not include the term terrorism
per se. Nevertheless, under the definition of war crimes, the Statute of the ICTY
proscribes the "employment of poisonous weapons, the wanton destruction of
cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; an
attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages,
dwellings, or buildings; and the seizure or destruction or willful damage done
to institutions dedicated to religions, charity, and education, the arts and
sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science." This definition of
war crimes also contains most of the elements of terrorism (use of violence,
with intent, to harm innocent civilians (i.e. "undefended towns"), but does not
include the necessary elements of fear, intimidation and coercion for the
purpose of accomplishing a political (military, ethnic, ideological or religious
goal). Moreover, in order for terrorism to be a war crime, the terrorist act has
to be perpetrated during an armed conflict. If these last two elements plus the
requirement of an armed conflict were included in the act constituting a war
crime, that war crime as defined above could also be deemed a terrorist act.
The Statute of the ICTY at Art. 4 defines "Genocide" as "acts committed
with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group." The definition of genocide does not specifically include "terrorism" per
se. Nevertheless, if a genocidal act were perpetrated with the intent of
furthering a cause by intentionally inspiring fear through violence committed
107. Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, May 3, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1159; Establishing the International Tribunal
for Rowanda, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598.
108. Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, art.
1, available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corrll.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
109. WILKINSON, supra note 76, at 48.
110. See Statute of the ICTY, supra note 107, at Art. 5 defining "Crimes Against Humanity."
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on an innocent civilian population, such a genocidal act would necessarily be
a terrorist act.
Similarly, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.' has long
lists of elements of different crimes such as crimes of aggression, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide, but terrorism per se is not specifically
listed as a crime. Nevertheless, many of the criminal acts listed that can cause
terror among the civilian population could arguably be included under the
categories of aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide,
such as enforced disappearance of persons, rape, the crime of apartheid, and
other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering,
or serious injury to the body or to mental or physical health." 2
The implication of conceiving terrorism as a method (strategy, tool) rather
than as a crime is that terrorism can be included in other international crimes of
aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and piracy, or
torture, if the acts of terror and violence also fulfill the five structural elements
of the definition of terrorism.
VI. INTERNATIONAL CRIMES ARE ALSO METHODS
OF COMMITTING TERRORISM

Just as terrorism is both a crime and a method to perpetrate other crimes,
the reverse is true--international crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity can, under the right circumstances, also be considered
methods of terrorism intentionally designed to intimidate and cause fear in a
given civilian population.' The right circumstances constitute the presence of
111. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 108, and Preparatory Commission
on the International Criminal Court, Finalized Draft of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc
PCNICC/2000/l/Add.2 (2000), available athttp://www I.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/iccelementsof crimes.html
(last visited Feb. 1, 2003).
112. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 108, at Article 7.
113. BASSIOUNI, supra note 1, at xxvi.:
International crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
torture are strategies of terror violence designed to instill terror within a given civilian
population. How else could one describe the policies and practices carried out in
Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone, to name only a few of
the most egregious examples. However, these international crimes are a result of state
policy and which are committed by state officials, i.e. the military, the police, other
forces under the command of public officials. The commission of these crimes depend
on the availability of state resources, financial and otherwise. Yet, these crimes are not
considered part of what is commonly referred to as "terrorism" by the international
community. The reason, as mentioned above, is that states, which are the regulators,
have seen fit to not include themselves in the context of "terrorism." Nevertheless,
international crimes committed by states which constitute terror-violence should be
deemed part of that category. Id.
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the five structural elements of terrorism. Unless a genocidal act includes acts
of violence, the intent to inspire fear in the civilian population for the purpose
of accomplishing a political cause, the genocidal act will not be a terrorist act.
Similarly, rape,' 14 torture, piracy, and other crimes can also be deemed methods
of accomplishing terrorism only if the five elements of terrorism are present.
Arguably, even if the subject matter jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals does not
specifically cover "terrorism" under the list of triable crimes, terrorism as a
method may, nevertheless, be included under the subject matter jurisdiction of
the tribunal because it provides the means to perpetrate the specifically
delineated crimes.' '5 This is also true of the International Criminal Court. But
without a consensus about what terrorism means and without a commonality of
values, some states prefer to keep the definition of terrorism in multilateral and
domestic legislation as vague and ambiguous as possible. 116 This will not prove
to be an effective legal response to terrorism. Indeterminacy in the law, brought
about by a vague or nonexistent definition of terrorism, can result in the
multiplicity of interpretation and the instability of the legal system.
VII. IF TERRORISM IS NOT ONLY A CRIME BUT A METHOD OR AN ACT OF
WAR, THEN WHAT COURT SHOULD TRY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS?

Should international terrorists be tried in a military court, a United States
District Court, an ad hoc international tribunal or a permanent international
criminal court?" 7 These questions are left open by the failure of the
international community to define terrorism or to include it as a crime in the
jurisdiction of existing international courts. If terrorism is not listed specifically
as a crime in the statutes of either of the two ad hoc tribunals (ICTY and ICTR)
or in the statute of the new International Criminal Court, the question remains
as to where international terrorists can be tried.
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CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY: RAPE LAW 906 (Foundation Press 2001): "Rape

in conflict is also used s a weapon to terrorize and degrade a particular community and to achieve a specific
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115.
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In order to try terrorists in either of the two ad hoc international tribunals,
the temporal and geographic limitations imposed on the subject matter
jurisdiction of these tribunals would have to be expanded by amendment, and
terrorism would have to be presumptively included under the definitions of
crimes.
Even if the International Criminal Court included terrorist acts as crimes,
the terrorist act of September 11, 2001 committed in the United States could not
be adjudicated there for at least two good reasons. The United States has not
ratified the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, and the
terrorist act occurred before the actual establishment of the International
Criminal Court.
Trying terrorists in the United States District Courts may be a viable
solution, but this solution is not without problems including the potential for
undesirable disclosure of sensitive evidence that might endanger national
security; the security of judges and witnesses; and the fairness of trying
foreigners in an American court where a heinous terrorist act is committed on
United States soil.
It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the relative merits of
adjudicating international terrorist suits in each of these tribunals, but it is
noteworthy to recognize that the problem of where to try terrorists has arisen
primarily because of the failure of the international community to establish a
universally-accepted definition of terrorism and the failure of the courts to
recognize that terrorism is actually included in other defined international
crimes.
VIII. THE PARADOXES INHERENT IN THE MEANING OF TERRORISM

The main problem in defining the term "terrorism" is not its overlap with
other crimes but the paradox inherent in the meaning of the word. President
Ronald Reagan has coined this paradox in the proverbial statement: "One
man's terrorism is another man's freedom fighter" or the poetic parallelism
articulated by the international law scholar Cherif Bassiouni: "What is terrorism
to some is heroism to others." ' 1 8 The paradox is related to the distinction
between illegal terrorism and legal revolutionary violence. The antinomy in the
term "terrorism" is based on the coexistence of conflicting rights of self-defense
and self-determination, on the one hand, and the fundamental right to the
protection of human rights, on the other hand. Another manifestation of this
paradox is the state's obligation to protect the national security of its people,
which, if zealously enforced through overly broad legislation, may be in direct
conflict with the state's obligation to protect its citizens' civil liberties.
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Bassiouni, supra note I, at 15.
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Article 51 of the United Nations Charter provides the right to individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United
Nations. Moreover, every nation has a right to self-determination. In 1979
Algeria, Libya and a few other countries wanted the United Nations to make an
exception in one of its multilateral conventions" 9 against hostage taking for
national liberation movements 2 ° in which peoples arefighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of
their right of self-determination. However, the Western countries rejected this
demand on the grounds that even armies may not take civilian hostages because
such an act would violate the Geneva Convention. There must be a balance
established between the right of a democracy to defend itself against terrorism
and the preservation of civil liberties and human rights.' 2 ' The difficulty to
achieve this delicate balance has resulted in the proliferation of global treaties
and declarations aimed at combating international terrorism and the abysmal
failure by the international community to define terrorism and to prohibit statesponsored terrorist acts. The time has come to take a more active approach to
defining the term terrorism.
IX. CONCLUSION

The semiotic approach to defining terrorism has uncovered five basic
structural elements which must be present in order to identify a violent act as
terrorism. The paradoxical nature of the concept of terrorism renders the
establishment of an acceptable definition difficult but not much different from
the work that judges must do in the typical "hard case," as defined by Ronald
Dworkin."22 Balance is the essence of the law iconographically represented by
the scales of justice. Judges understand the'sensitive nature of prioritizing two
conflicting rights of equal importance. Who is to say that the right of selfdetermination or the right of self-defense against an armed attack is more
important than the right of civilians to live in a safe environment, to enjoy their
own fundamental human rights and basic civil liberties?
It is possible to de-center this paradox and to reduce the definitional
difficulty by proposing a categorical prohibition on the use of terrorism, no
matter how lofty the purpose may be, no matter how worthy the political or

119. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. Doc. A/Res/34/146(1979),
Article 12.
120. See Malvina Halberstam, How Serious Are We About ProhibitingInternationalTerrorism and
Punishing Terrorists? 11, 1 THE JEWISH LAW (1996) (discussing the exception for national liberation
movements in Article 12 of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/34/146 (1979)).
121. See Gross, supra note I1, at 89.
122.

RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977).
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ideological cause may seem to those oppressed by tyrannical regimes. There is
no justification for terrorism. It is not defensible to argue that terrorism needs
to be viewed from a political context and that the "motivation" of the actor and
the sociological context in which the act occurs must be taken into
consideration. Such an approach would legitimize terrorist acts by claiming that
the ends justify the means. The Macchiavelian principle that the ends justify the
means simply does not comport with the generally accepted principles of the
rule of law.

TAXONOMIES OF INTERNATIONAL
PEACEKEEPING: AN ALTERNATIVE NARRATIVE
Ralph Wilde*
The taxonomies of "peacekeeping" utilized within academic and policy
discourse provide a framework for comparison across (usually United Nations
-conducted) peace operations. One point of distinction often made between
different operations is the level of complexity.' Whether operations are "basic"
or "complex," "simple" or "multifunctional" is usually determined according
to size, scope of mandate, and the presence or absence of a civilian component
in addition to a military component. Many commentators adopt "generational"
language to denote these different levels of complexity. In this short article, I
consider the particular narrative device of peacekeeping "generations" in the
light of the long history of one particular type of international peace operation:
granting administrative prerogatives over territory to international organizations,
what I term "international territorial administration."2 I argue that the
generational taxonomy is unhelpful in its own terms, and problematic on a
normative level.
The dichotomy between simple and complex peace operations is often
described in terms of old versus new3 or first generation versus second
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generation, 4 suggesting that changes in the complexity of peace missions have
occurred in a linear fashion, with missions becoming progressively more
complex. Such a suggestion is no accident. For many commentators, there was
a sea change in the nature of peacekeeping from the late 1980s onwards; a
"turning point," in the words of Jarat Chopra.5 With the backdrop of the
supposed post-cold war internationalist revival, and the emergence of "new"
types of conflict that were both international and internal in character, there was
a dramatic growth in complex United Nations peace operations starting with
UNTAG in Namibia in 1989.6 Accordingly, there was a paradigm shift from7
"first generation" to "second generation," from "old" to "new" peacekeeping.
With the Kosovo and East Timor administration projects-Kosovo has been
administered by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) since 1999, and East Timor was administered by the United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) from the end of 1999
until May 2002-it has been suggested that complexity has reached such a level
that we can now talk about a further "generation" of peacekeeping. Christine
Gray remarks that these two projects could be described as "third generation"
peacekeeping.8 Boris Kondoch, citing W. Kuhn, considers "peace enforcement"
missions such as UNOSOM II in Somalia "third generation" peacekeeping and
UNTAET and UNMIK, because of their complexity, examples of "fourth
generation" peacekeeping. 9 Thus, the language of "generations" and the
4.

See, e.g., Yasusi Akashi, The Politics of UN Peackeeping from Cambodia to Yugoslavia, in

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: AD HOC MISSIONS, PERMANENT ENGAGEMENT 149 (Ramesh
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Early Reckoning of the Second Generation, 89 AM. SOC'L INT'L L. PROC. 275, 280 (1995); Michael Doyle,
Remarks at the American Soc'y of Int'l L. Proc. (Apr. 5-8, 1995), in UN Peacekeeping: An Early Reckoning
of the Second Generation, 89 AM. SOC'L INT'L L. PROC. 275 (1995); Christine Gray, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE 159 (2000); Margaret P. Karns & Karen A. Mingst, Peacekeeping and the Changing
Role of the United Nations: Four Dilemmas, in UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: AD HOC
MISSIONS, PERMANENT ENGAGEMENT 215, 230 (Ramesh Thakur & Albrecht Schnabel eds., 2001);
RAMSBOTHAM & WOODHOUSE, supra note 3, at 93, 218-19; RATNER, supra note 3; Boris Kondoch, The

United Nations Admin. of East Timor, 6 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 245, 246 (2001).
5.

Chopra, supra note 4, at 280.

6.
On the supposed change in the nature of conflict since 1988, see, for example, Mary Kaldor,
NEW & OLD WARS (1999) On UN peace operations since 1988, and the increase in them, see, for example,
THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING, supra note 3, at 9-12; Ramsbotham & Woodhouse, supra note 3 at
xiii-xix. Many scholars assert a causal relationship between the post-1988 upsurge in peacekeeping and the
end of the cold war. See, for example, Ratner, supra note 3 at 14-16. For a critique of this thesis, see, for
example, ALAN JAMES, PEACEKEEPING ININTERNATIONAL POLITICS, 362 - 66 (1990).
7.
In a complementary development in academic discourse, Mary Kaldor describes a paradigmatic
shift in the nature of armed conflict, from "old wars" to "new wars." Kaldor, supra note 6.
8.

Gray, supra note 4.

9.

Kondoch, supra note 4. Most scholars consider "peace enforcement" missions as a special type

2003]

Wilde

"old/new" dichotomy presents the history of international peace operations as
a progressive evolution through successive generations of ever-increasing
complexity. How does this presentation stand up to scrutiny?
In the first place, the history of international territorial administration
suggests that describing the relative complexity of peace operations so as to
denote a progressive increase in complexity over time as between individual
missions is in its own terms mistaken. Elsewhere, I have described this history
in the following terms:
International organizations first exercised territorial
administration in the Free City of Danzig, where the League of
Nations enjoyed certain governmental prerogatives from 1920 to
1939. In addition, the League administered the German Saar Basin
(the Saar) between 1920 and 1935, and the Colombian town and
district of Leticia (Leticia) from 1933 to 1934. It also appointed the
president of the Upper Silesia Mixed Commission in 1922 and the
chair of the Memel Harbor board in Lithuania in 1924. Immediately
after the Second World War, Germany and Austria were administered
by the Allies. With the creation of the United Nations, the new
international organization was authorized in 1947 to exercise certain
governmental powers in what would have become the Free Territory
of Trieste, but the free territory plan was never realized.
The United Nations first exercised territorial administration in
the 1960s, asserting various administrative prerogatives in the Congo
between 1960 and 1964, and administering West Irian for seven
months between 1962 and 1963. In 1967, the United Nations Council
for what was then South West Africa (later Namibia) was established
to administer the territory, but South Africa prevented the council
from taking up this role. Over twenty years later, in 1991 the United
Nations was authorized to perform administrative functions in
Western Sahara and Cambodia; although these functions were
exercised in Cambodia from 1991 to 1992, they are yet to be fully
performed in Western Sahara. From 1994 to 1996, a different
institution-the EUAM [the European Union Administration in
Mostar]-administered the city of Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Then, as part of the Dayton process, the territory of Eastern Slavonia,
Baranja, and Western Sirmium (Eastern Slavonia) in Croatia was
placed under UN administration from 1996 to 1998. In some of the
aforementioned missions, and in others as well, the mandates of
international organizations have called for the performance of two
particular administrative functions: controlling or conducting some
form of territory-wide popular consultation and/or 'community
of "second generation" peacekeeping, rather than a separate "generation" of the peacekeeping paradigm. See,
e.g., UN Peacekeeping: An Early Reckoning of the Second Generation, supra note 4.
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building' through the creation of local institutions. In addition to the
authorized projects, other ITA projects were proposed but never
agreed upon for Fiume in Dalmatia (in 1919), Memel (between 1921
and 1923), Alexandretta in Syria (in 1937), Jerusalem (since 1947)
and Sarajevo (in 1994).0

In addition to the plenary administration project in Kosovo, another
mission, involving partial administration by the Office of the High
Representative, has taken place in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the start of
1996."
Whether one is focusing on plenary administration or partial
administration, international organizations generally or the United Nations in
particular, the above history suggests that the complex international peace
operations from 1988 onwards are, in terms of their complexity, nothing new.
The first complex peace operations involving plenary international territorial
administration were the Saar in 1920 (in the League era) and West Irian in 1962
- 63 (in the United Nations era). 2 The first such missions involving partial
administration were Danzig in 1920 (in the League era) and the Congo in 1960
- 64 (in the United Nations era).' 3 Insofar as the Kosovo and East Timor
missions involve plenary administration exercised by the United Nations, they
are not unprecedented but follow on from the West Irian and Eastern Slavonia
missions. If the focus is broadened to international organizations generally, the
precedents run back even further to the start of the League of Nations in 1920.
Some of the "generational" commentators focus on the "state building"
aspect of "post conflict" peace operations. Exercising territorial prerogatives
is one thing, but the use of such prerogatives with a "nation building" purpose
is a relatively new phenomenon. As far as the "nation building" purpose is
concerned, the United Nations mission in the Congo (ONUC) in the 1960s is
widely regarded as the first United Nations operation to engage in "peace
enforcement."' 4 The equally pioneering "nation building" administrative
activities of that same mission, exercising administration to enable the operation
of certain government institutions, are rarely acknowledged. 5 Yet once the full
scope of ONUC's operation is borne in mind, it becomes just as difficult to see
a clear distinction between post-and pre-1998 operations on "state building"

10.

Wilde, supra note 2, at 586 (footnote omitted).

I.

Id. at 584.

12.

Id. at 583.

13.

Id.

14.

E.g., Roy S. Lee, United Nations Peacekeeping: Developments and Prospects, 28 Cornell Int'l

L. S. 619, 624 (1995); THE EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING, supra note 3, at 8.
15.

See RATNER, supra note 3, at 105-09.

Wilde

20031

grounds as it is on "enforcement" grounds. 6 Certainly, the next operations of
these types did not take place until the post-1998 era (Namibia in 1989 for "state
building" and UNOSOM II in 1991 for "peace enforcement"). The point is that
the enterprise that lay behind these later operations was not unprecedented.
"Nation building" is not, then, an exclusively post-1998 phenomenon. But
a qualitative distinction can perhaps be made between UNMIK and UNTAET,
on the one hand, and the "nation building" missions that came before them, on
the other. Arguably, the degree to which these two missions have engaged in
the reconstruction of infrastructure and governmental institutions is
unprecedented at least if one discounts the Allied administration in Germany
after the Second World War.'7 A question remains, however, whether the scope
of a "state building" mandate should be the primary indicator, in addition to the
breadth of the administrative prerogatives exercised, by which complexity and
distinctiveness are measured. For example, what of plenary administration
concerned with territorial disposition? Is the United Nations administration in
Eastern Slavonia, from 1996-98, which necessitated the eventual transfer of a
population to authorities from whom local militias had hitherto sought
independence, necessarily less complex than the two and a half-year East Timor
mission, where, infrastructural problems notwithstanding, the eventual outcome
for the territory was overwhelmingly supported? 8 Similarly, what of
administration missions aimed at facilitating a particularly controversial policy?
Stepping back to the League-era, can it really be said that the three-year long
mission in East Timor is more complex than the fifteen-year mission in the
Saar? The League was involved in administering a territory bitterly contested
between France and Germany, enabling a key component of Germany's muchresented reparations program to proceed, before organizing what was in effect
a self-determination referendum and then implementing the result of that
referendum. '9
To be fair, neither Agenda for Peace, nor Agenda for Peace Supplement,2"
nor the Brahimi Report seem particularly interested in a progressivist
presentation of the complexity of international peace operations, even though,
16.

Like "state building," "peace enforcement" is often presented as a "new" phenomenon through

the use of generational language, whether second or third.
17.
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by virtue of their remit, they are able to discount the League-era projects that so
obviously undermine such a presentation. In Agenda for Peace, the terms
"new" and "second-generation peacekeeping are conspicuous by their absence. 2'
Only one, passing reference (in a table) is made to "classical" and
"multifunctional" peacekeeping in Agenda for Peace Supplement.22 Similarly,
Brahimi makes the odd reference to "newer generations" of peacekeeping
without defining this term or drawing any conclusions from its use.23
Nonetheless, the language of "generations" has come to play a central role in
academic discourse on peace operations since the early 1990s. So we have, on
the one hand, a set of historical circumstances placing into question the notion
that complex international peace operations are an exclusively late twentieth
century phenomenon and, on the other hand, an established academic discourse
predicated on this notion.
One of the few scholars writing in the "new" era to acknowledge the longstanding existence of complex international peace operations is Steven Ratner
in The New UN Peacekeeping.24 However, as his title suggests, Ratner
nonetheless adopts the language of "generations" and the "new/old" dichotomy
in his study of such operations, perhaps because of the widespread currency
such an approach now enjoys. One quarter of his book concerns operations, the
League projects and ONUC, for example, that take place before the "new" era,
in some cases seventy years before.25 Ratner must describe these projects as
examples of the "new peacekeeping," and in an effort to accommodate the
obvious problem this raises with the new/old dichotomy, the presence of these
projects in the "old" era is explained in terms of "earlier efforts" at the "new"
paradigm. 26 For example, the League administration in the Saar is "second
generation peacekeeping before its time."27 When there are so many earlier
efforts, stretching back over such a long period, of a supposedly "new"
phenomenon, one should surely ask whether or not the dichotomies of new/old
and first generation/second generation are helpful. Why insist that 1989 is the
"time" of complex peace operations, and not also 1919?
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Clearly some peace operations are more complex than others. Moreover,
some projects have a "state building" purpose; others do not. The point is that
the complexity of peace operations has waxed and waned since the start of the
League. Similarly, the involvement of such operations in "nation building" has
been present since at least the 1960s and much earlier if one includes the Allies
in post-war Germany and Austria. The "time" of complexity and civilian
involvement in international peace operations has been the entire twentieth
century. To be sure, with the administration projects in Cambodia, Mostar,
Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, and United
Nations -run refugee camps,2" and the other complex peace missions without an
administration component, the final decade of that century witnessed a marked
upsurge in the use of peace operations that are both complex and engaged in a
"nation building" enterprise. However, an upsurge in and intensification of an
activity with a long-standing pedigree (with the possible exception of the
ambitious scope of state building in Kosovo and East Timor) is not the same as
the emergence of a "new" type of peace operation. The year 1988, then, marks
a particular moment of renewal, not a qualitative (rather than quantitative)
"turning point." Also, it is perhaps worth pointing out that the increase in peace
operatiohs since 1988 has covered both "complex" and relatively
straightforward operations. Just as the "old" era contains several important
examples of the "new peacekeeping," so the "new" era is replete with "old"
style peacekeeping operations.29
Adopting a progressivist narrative to denote changes in complexity may in
any case be problematic because of the way it can serve as a legitimizing device.
As "third" or "fourth" generation missions, the projects in East Timor and
Kosovo are positioned as the culmination of a historical process. They represent
progress in the development of peace operations from the "old" or "traditional"
days. Not only does relative complexity mean "newness," then, suggesting a
break from the past. The language of generations, with its evolutionary
connotations of progressive improvement, has a normative import. By ascribing
differences in complexity through the use of this language, therefore, peace
operations are classified normatively simply according to the changes in their
complexity. Thus, UNMIK and UNTAET merely by virtue of their
comparatively complex nature are presented in terms that suggest relative
legitimacy.

28.
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Of course, the adoption of relative complexity as the benchmark of
legitimacy seems absurd. The point is not that scholars who use the language
of "generations" necessarily wish to make such a suggestion, but rather that the
language used has this effect. Indeed, some commentators do seem to suggest
that increased complexity is somehow inherently superior. John Sanderson, for
example, although not using the generational language, focuses exclusively on
the degree of powers exercised by the East Timor mission and proclaims this to
be a "step forward of millenial proportions" in United Nations peace operations
with the mission being of a "high-quality." 3 Furthermore, the progressivist
nature of the "generations" language rationalizes international territorial
administration, by constructing a chain of reasoning that presents this activity
as the logical conclusion.
The language of "generations" and "old" versus "new" peace operations
(or peacekeeping) should perhaps be substituted with a taxonomy that does not
connote a linear process of historical evolution, for example "basic" versus
"complex" or "multifunctional." Otherwise, we risk misunderstanding the
history of international peace operations, and ascribing normative value to
certain operations on spurious grounds.

30.
John Sanderson, The Cambodian experience: a success story still?, in UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AD HOC MISSIONS, PERMENANT ENGAGEMENT 155,159 (Ramesh Thakur &
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Robinson, who assert that smaller-scale missions "hold a greater possibility for success" than their larger
counterparts. Id. at 26.
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(prepared for the IA conference, November 2002)
... we have about 50% of the world's wealth but only 6.3% of its
population. This disparity is particularly great as between ourselves
and the peoples of Asia. In this situation, we cannot fail to be the
object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is
to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain
this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national

security.
I. INTRODUCTION

National Security has been defined in a variety of ways. According to
some scientists, the prevention of AIDS is a matter of national security.2
According to American steel industry, protecting this industry is a matter of
national security. Roy D. Follendore thinks national security is a matter of
putting science over religion The United States' Joint Forces Command thinks
national security is a matter of "Full Spectrum Dominance" that means almost
total control of the lives of people in strategic areas including rural areas on this

I.
George Kennan, United States State Dept., Policy Planning Study 23 (24 February 1948).
2.
David F. Gordon, National Intelligence Officer at the National Intelligence Council, speaking
in a Panel "Comparative Perspectives on the Stability Implications of AIDS inAfrica" at a conference entitled
"France and the United States: Strengthening Collaboration on HIV/AIDS inAfrica" organized by The Center
for Strategic and International Studies, incollaboration with The Brookings Institution's Center on the United
States and France (3 December 2001).
3.

AMERICAN IRON & STEEL INST., SPECIALTY STEEL INDUS. OF NORTH AMERICA, STEEL MFR.

ASS'N & THE UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, A STRONG U.S. STEEL INDUSTRY: CRITICAL TO NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC SECURITY (2001).

4.
Roy D. Follendore, Science a Matter of National Security (July 5, 2002) at
http://www.noisetoknowledge.com/a_matter_of_national_security.httm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
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planet as well as outer space.5 And according to American President Bush,
"confronting Iraq is a matter of national security." 6
In recent times, national security has been used to justify the direct and
indirect projection of American military force around the world. Thus, for
example, American's invasion of Afghanistan was justified as an obscure form
self-defense premised on a broad understanding of national security. And
America's unyielding support of the Israeli regime, despite its massive
violations of human rights and the often heard claim that this support is a partial
cause of terrorist attacks against Americans, has been justified as in the interest
of American's national security. To many these examples make it appear that
just as beauty is often said to be in the eye of the beholder, national security
appears to depend on one's perspective rather than on empirical evidence or a
broad consensus as to its definition.
National security appears to be a national interest that we merely know
when we see it. It is something that every American understands, if not
explicitly at least implicitly enough to be able to stand behind a foreign policy
of military excursion abroad in the name of national interests. What if we
viewed these two examples from the eyes of some of those against whom the
acts are committed in the name of national security the contradiction becomes
even more pronounced?
An Afghan soldier, for example, defending his country as he has done
under successive regimes and because it the only work available, has a different
perspective of the bombs that fall out of the sky from unseen planes cruising at
unimaginable heights. He might not understand the need for America to
promote its national security by destroying his country. He might not
understand why he, like the young American soldiers who attack him, should
not patriotically defend his family and country from attack. And he may not be
able to accept in peace the bomb that falls on his village while he is out trying
to defend his country and kills all eleven members of his extended family. This
ordinary Afghan might well be driven to devoting the rest of his life to
extracting retribution from a foreign government that destroyed all he held dear
and those whom he had protected even through the country's protracted civil
war. He might even be willing to give his life to extract revenge on those who
hurt so many he loved.

5.

Jim Garamone, Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-spectrum Dominance, AMERICAN FORCES

PRESS SERVICE (2002).

6.
George W. Bush, Bush Says Confronting Iraq Is "Matter of National Security, Radio address
to the Nation" (Oct. 12, 2002).
7.

Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, & James B. Steinberg, The Bush National Security Strategy:

An Evaluation, Brookings Institution Policy Brief (Oct. 4, 2002).
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Similarly a young Palestinian woman who has witnessed the oppression of
her people all her life and who suffered repeated indignations as she tries to
finish her university degree might not understand American's support for the
government that oppresses her people. After she has seen her friends killed by
Israeli soldiers shooting American bullets or been harassed countless times at
ad hoc check points she might not be able to accept how American interests
require causing her and her people this suffering. Finally, when she graduates
and the only perspective for her life appears to be a harrowing existence under
an oppressive regime, she might also be willing to sacrifice her life to strike out
against the oppressor by all means at her disposal.
To the Afghan and the Palestinian, and to most people in the world, the
American's national interests, particularly the national security, are not as easy
to understand as we may think. Furthermore, perhaps our failure to understand
how people understand us is actually undermining our own national security.
To many people around the world America's national interests may seem more
like the version of national interests described by noted British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill who referred to
[A] party of great vested interests, banded together in a formidable
confederation, corruption at home, aggression to cover it up abroad
...
sentiment by the bucketful, patriotism by the imperial pint, the
open hand at the public exchequer, the open door at the public-house,
dear food for the millions, cheap labour for the millionaire.8
II. How WE PROTECT AMERICAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY RIGHT Now
The way we understand national security has of course influenced how we
protect it. Thus when we defer to the President's understanding of national
security-as both Congress and the American people appear to have done-we
also defer to his means of protecting it. To date these means have meant
reliance on he analysis of friendly private bodies and our own government's
intelligence agencies, which are part of the executive. The former have been
more involved in macro policy issues. For example, the National Heritage
Foundation has studied terrorism and claims to know that the goal of terrorists
are "first to change United States policy, and ultimately to destroy American
and Western civilization."9 While this might be true this superficial insight adds
little to efforts to end terrorism, however, this vague term may be defined.
The government's own intelligence agencies are the bodies we really count
on to protect national security. These bodies appear to view national security
8.
Winston Churchill quoted in Lapham, L., "Spoils of war. (Notebook). (reflecting on whether
or not 9/11 attacks have really changed the world)," Harper's (March 2002).
9.

Heritage Foundation National Security Task Force Defending the National Homelandix (2002).
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as a function of their own capacity building and the projection of force around
the world. This means surveillance, law enforcement and analysis of
information within the United States and, as the Joint Forces' Vision 2020
report cited above ensures us, the projection of military force abroad.
Furthermore, since 7 October 2001 the United States government has been more
than ready to use force abroad. Its attack on Afghanistan, launched less than a
month after the 11 September tragedies in New York and Washington are
confirmation. As it is the use of force abroad that is the means of protecting
national security that perhaps more than any other influences how people abroad
view our security, let me concentrate on a few points related to this policy.
First, it is important to understand that the decision to use force is almost
exclusively made by the executive branch of government. This is not only the
case when Congress has granted the American President broad powers as it has
recently concerning Iraq,' ° but also in broader area of national security policy.
Although popular sentiments and country or region specific analysis may play
a role, they are digested inside the White House like hors d'oeuvres before the
entr6e of discussions start within the National Security Council. From the first
ever use of a nuclear weapon by the United States in 1945 to the decision to
invade Afghanistan decisions to use force abroad to protect national security
ultimately rest with the President of the United States. " And the primary advice
to the President is given by the National Security Council (NSC). This body
advises "the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and
military policies relating to the national security."12
Second, the NSC, established in 1947 and moved to the White House in
1949,'" is concerned first and foremost with protecting America's national
interests as viewed internally. This might not be surprising except that its
mandate includes national security and foreign policy, in other words, how
America behaves towards the rest of the world as well. In recent years it has
become increasingly clear that the NSC has the upper hand in foreign policy.
Thus even if the country or region specialists in the Department of State suggest
a particular course of action in a crisis situation, it will only be the chosen policy
path when the NSC agrees with it. And while the Secretary of State is one
member of the NSC he is outnumbered by other members whose understanding
10.

"Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq," H.R.J. Res. 114, 2nd Sess. (2002).

11. See LOUIS MORTON, THE DECISION To USE THE ATOMIC BOMB 493-518 in K.R. Greenfield,
COMMAND DECISIONS (1960) and Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the
United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc.
S/2001/946 (7 October 2001 ).
US Commission on National Security/21st Century, Organizational Description: The National
12.
Security Council 2 (21 April 2001).
13.
See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 235, 61 Stat. 496, 50 U.S.C. 402, amended by
the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, 63 Stat. 579, 50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.
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of international society is often much more limited and often partisan to narrow
American national interests. As a result, much of American's national security
policy-especially that part which concerns the international community-is
based on what is best for America. President Bush expressed this basis best
when he threaten the rest of the world stating that "You're either with us or
' 4
against us in the fight against terror."'
Third, our national security system, in part because it has become so
centralized in the Executive branch of government, is also increasingly opaque.
Thus when the United States decided to assassinate suspected terrorist in Yemen
on 3 November 2002 hardly anyone new that such an action was even possible
under US law. Or rather hardly anyone knew that the President had reversed a
previous moratorium on overseas assassinations by a secret decision. Thus
National Security Advisory Condoleezza Rice, could describe the killing as
"well within the bounds of accepted practice" in an interview in which she
further assured her audience "that no constitutional questions are raised here." 5
What else the government can do? Americans may never know as interests of
national security trump their right to know. More and more Americans right to
participate in their own government is being restricted.
And finally, because American is willing to use unilateral means to protect
its national security-including the use of force abroad-there are more
frequent opportunities for clashes with international law. The attack on
Afghanistan is an example of the use of force in clear violation of international
law. It was not under United Nations auspices, although it could have been if
the United States had cared to ask. And it was not self-defense because the
United States itself admitted that it had not been attacked by the government of
Afghanistan. The only possible legal qualification of American action is as the
use of force against another sovereign country's territorial integrity and political
independence-a clear violation of international law. This is at least what most
legal observers outside the United States believe, but American jurists have
often voiced less certainty. They do this by stretching the definition of armed
attack beyond its breaking point or by claiming the law has changed, which is
just another way of saying that the law can be ignored when the primary basis
for the alleged change is merely what the American government thinks.
An observer is bound to conclude that United States people today allow
national security to protected by the Executive branch without little control, on
the basis of narrow national interests, with little transparency of process, and
often in violation of international law.
14.
CNN, You are either with us or against us (Nov. 6, 2001),
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/Il 1/06/gen.attack.on.terror/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).

available at,

15.
Bill Vann, White House Defends CIA Killing of US Citizen in Yemen (Nov. 12, 2002) at,
http://www.wsws.org (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
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Ill. WHAT OTHERS THINK AND WHY IT IS IMPORTANT

Colin Powell's words that the 11 September 2001 attack was not merely
an assault on America, but was "an assault on civilization, it was an assault on
democracy, it was an assault on the right of innocent people to live their lives," 6
could just as well be uttered by any of the than three billion people around the
world commenting on how the United States' world dominance has left them
impoverished, living on less than $2 USD per day. These people will be
unlikely to sympathize with the national security interests that allow the United
States to use force in their country in the ways described above. Some of them,
not an insignificant number, are likely to be sympathetic to anyone who offers
them as chance to revenge attacks that have harmed them, their families or their
country.
President Bush has suggested that the war on terrorism is merely "good
against evil."' 7 Observers, and the American government's own actions, have
extended this understanding to mean that terrorism has no cause.' 8 Such
understandings, however, fly in the face of the facts and the clear words of
terrorist themselves. The facts indicate that American enjoys some immense
advantages in the world. It has the world's strongest military and it is the
world's largest per capita consumer of goods and energy. In fact, if every other
country consumed the world's resources at the wide pace that America is doing
so, we would have, since the middle of the last century, already exhausted the
earth's habitable environment. 9
As individual Americans we may wish for the basic values of respect for
international law, human rights, human freedoms, the equal value of human life,
and a life of plenty, but as a group of people we have been unable to admit that
to achieve these at the level which we desire them, we have to exploit and even
harm others around the world. Even after 11 September 2001 and in light of
polls that declare that more people hate America today then did fourteen months
ago, Americans refuse to believe that this might be they do not practice what
they breach.

16.
Paula J. Dobriansky, The Diplomatic Front of the War on Terrorism: Can the Promotion of
Democracy and Human Rights Tip the Scales?, Address to the Heritage Foundation (Dec. 21, 2001) (quoting
Collin Powell), availableat, http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/HL724.cfm (last visited Mar.
12, 2003).
17.
See, e.g., President George W. Bush, & Japan Prime Minister Koizumi "Remarks at Press Photo
Opportunity in front of the White House Colonnade" (Sept. 25, 2001).
Michael Radu, E-Notes: The Futile Search for "Root Causes" of Terrorism, available at,
18.
http://www.fpri.org/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
19.

WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, LIVING PLANET REPORT (2002).
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If America were to accept that terrorism is "a political act, a response to
United States foreign policy"2 then perhaps they could understand how those
who are exploited could view terrorism it as "an act of war waged by people too
weak to have a conventional army or one large enough to take on the United
States."'" If terrorism is understood in this way then it is not difficult to
understand the response of national security in terms of peace making whereby
concessions might have to be made to preserve our way of life. These
concessions might require a depreciation of our standard of living in order to
increase the standard of living of others around the world whose resources we
exploit. But this is perhaps the price why must pay for national security. This
is perhaps what we do not want to accept. But America were to think in terms
of adding to what it gives the world instead of limiting what it takes from the
world, then perhaps we could live in peaceful co-existence.

20.
Charley Reese, Face It: United States Foreign Policy Contribute to Acts of Terrorism,
ORLANDO SENT., Aug. 18 1998. Reese is a former soldier in the United States military.
21.

Id.

THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,
NATIONAL SECURITY, AND COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW
James C. Kraska*
Thank you, Mark, for your kind introduction.
The question before the panel today is whether the United States, actions
regarding national security over the last year or so are in harmony with
international law, or, in the alternative, are the United States, policies on a
collision course with international law. The panel introduction mentioned
several issues that can be examined in this light in the wake of 9-11, including
the United States military and intelligence activities in the global war on terror,
indefinite detention of suspected foreign terrorists and the renunciation of the
International Criminal Court ("ICC"). These remarks focus on the latter
issue-United States involvement with the ICC, and we will examine why the
United States, actions toward the ICC have been in compliance with
international law. First, we will begin with a brief background of the history of
the ICC, then we'll identify and discuss the major flaws of the treaty, and then
examine the United States, efforts to deal with the existence of the treaty and its
entry into force.
The ICC was created through the Rome Treaty on July 17th, 1998, and it
entered into force on July 1st of 2002. To date, the treaty has 139 signatories
and 81 state parties. The court is located in the Hague, The Netherlands.
Jurisdiction of the court began on July 1st, 2002, and jurisdiction is not
retroactive. The court is now being constituted and should be operational in the
spring of 2003.
The ICC claims jurisdiction to try war crimes, genocide and crimes against
humanity. The court also claims jurisdiction to try the "crime of aggression,"
which the treaty has not yet defined. In this regard, one may view the ICC as
related to the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of the General Assembly, and as
an effort by the General Assembly to seize a more active role in dealing with
threats to peace and security.
The United States signed the ICC on December 31st, 2000. At the time,
President Clinton said the treaty was "fundamentally flawed," and the President
*
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would not forward the treaty to the Senate for ratification. President Clinton
also recommended that his successor not do so as well. President G. W. Bush
has acknowledged the same flaws that President Clinton identified, and he also
has not forwarded the treaty to the Senate for advice and consent. On May 6th,
2002, the United States notified the United Nations, and virtually every nation
on the planet by demarche that the United States did not intend to be bound by
the treaty. This "unsigning" of the treaty was consistent with United States
obligations under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
which states that a state is obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the
object and purpose of the treaty "until it shall have made its intentions clear not
to become a party to the treaty."
Why did President Clinton announce the treaty was "fundamentally
flawed?" We will introduce some of the major provisions of the treaty that
serve to highlight flaws in the convention.
First, the treaty is a threat to the sovereignty of states. The treaty claims
jurisdiction over nationals of non-parties without their state's consent. This
leads to the problem that Ambassador David Scheffer identified with
jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction of the court is both too broad and too
narrow. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 23
July 1998, Ambassador David Scheffer set forth one of the United States'
fundamental disagreements with the parameters of the ICC's jurisdiction.
Article 12 of the Statute establishes jurisdiction, absent a Security Council
referral, when either the state on whose territory the crime was committed is a
party or when the accused person's state of nationality is a party. This
jurisdiction is both too broad and too narrow. The jurisdiction is far too narrow
because under Article 12 construction a state could simply stay a n6n-party and
remain outside the reach of the ICC. Thus, the ICC fails to capture perhaps the
leading cause of genocide and mass murder in modem history-governments
killing their own citizens. On this subject, it is useful to make reference to the
work of Professor Rudy Rummel at the University of Hawaii. His research,
which was funded by the United States Institute of Peace, indicates that the
greatest numbers of mass murders in the modem era have been committed by
governments against their own people. His findings indicate that 170 million
people have been murdered by their own governments, aside from war, in recent
memory. Because the ICC purportedly does not apply to non-parties, it
potentially cannot establish jurisdiction over governments that reject the
treaty-potentially leaving the mass human rights crimes of the world's more
heinous leaders untouched by the jurisdiction of the court.
While ICC jurisdiction is too narrow, failing to be able to assert
jurisdiction over the worse genocide and human rights offenders, the
jurisdiction is also overly broad. A non-party, e.g., the United States,
participating in a peacekeeping operation in a state party's territory, could be
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subject to ICC jurisdiction. Moreover, because a non-party cannot opt out of
war crimes jurisdiction for the permitted seven years, its exposure may be even
greater than that of state parties.
Second, serious defects in the treaty threaten United States freedom of
action and expose United States civilian and military leaders, as well as military
servicemen and women, to politically motivated prosecution.
The ICC
prosecutors are self-initiating and largely unaccountable. The ICC establishes
an independent prosecutor that has the power to initiate investigations either
referral from either a state party or the United Nations Security Council. There
are inadequate checks and balances on powers of prosecutors and judges to the
ICC. The judges and prosecutors are not responsible to the UN or elected
officials, and a consensus of 2 out of 3 judges can decide to go forward on a
case.
Related to the issue of inadequate checks and balances on the ICC is that
it does not provide the extensive criminal procedure rights and protections
guaranteed in the United States Constitution, such as the right to a trial by jury
and high standards of evidence. As a result, the ICC might fail to recognize a
United States prosecution that ends in an acquittal because of a constitutional
technicality or the requirement that all elements be proved "beyond a reasonable
doubt." The ICC prosecutor is self-initiating, tantamount to a global version of
the domestic independent prosecutor, which has been charged by both
Republicans and Democrats as operating from a politically motivated bias.
Without internal checks and balances on the prosecutor, there is no protection
against politicized prosecutions.
This makes the relationship between the ICC and national judicial
processes uncertain. Under the Rome Statute, the ICC claims the authority to
second guess the actions taken and the results reached by sovereign states with
respect to the investigation and prosecution of crimes. Even in cases in which
the United States has appropriately exercised its responsibilities to investigate
and/or prosecute in a particular case, the ICC prosecutor, with the approval from
a three-judge panel, could still decide to initiate an ICC investigation or
prosecution. Such a decision by the ICC prosecutor is not inconceivable. Many
of the features of the United States common law system diverge from the
European continental approach and other legal systems throughout the world.
An ICC prosecutor may not understand, or may disagree with the operation of
the common law system, including the jury system, constitutional protections
for criminal defendants, and rights of appeal, that are fundamental aspects of the
American system. Reservations to the statute might have been able to address
these issues, but the treaty prohibits state reservations to the treaty. Lacking
important reservations, the treaty is inconsistent with United States law and
establishes a dangerous precedent. Thus, the court's claimed jurisdiction over
nonparties encroaches on United States constitutional safeguards.
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This leads to the fourth problem with the ICC, which is that it dilutes the
role of the United Nations Security Council ("UNSC"), as set forth in the United
Nations Charter. Text excludes a proper and adequate role for the UNSCdegree of UNSC control over prosecutions. In contrast to the ad hoc tribunals
for Rwanda and Yugoslavia which worked in conjunction with and under the
authorization of the UNSC, the ICC is independent of the UNSC. As an
independent body, it usurps the authority of the Security Council. I would add
that the United States has been a major proponent of these proper international
tribunals. Slobodan Milosevic is on trial for his crimes because a coalition of
nations led by the United States, gave political support and funding to the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The United States has also
provided practical cooperation and assistance to the new leadership in Belgrade
in this regard. The United States also supported the International Criminal
Tribunal in Rwanda, and the American government recently announced a
"Rewards for Justice" program on Central Africa with the goal of bringing to
Arusha the authors of the Rwandan genocide who are still at large.
The vague and ambiguous definitions of crimes are especially susceptible
to abuse. In particular, the undefined "crime of aggression" could extend to
some United States troop deployments, and the alleged crime of "settlement in
an occupied territory", arguably implicates Israeli leaders for activities in the
West Bank and Gaza strip. Traditionally, a crime of aggression is what the
Security Council determines it to be. The current text usurps the UNSC's
authority to define aggression, but paradoxically, the court establishes ICC
jurisdiction over crimes of aggression-all while leaving the definition of
aggression to subsequent amendment.
The current system-based upon the UNSC -- delivers accountability. The
global community is best served by relying on national judicial systems and
international tribunals established where appropriate by the Security Council
within the framework of the United Nations Charter. If someone disagrees with
this arrangement and the involvement of the UNSC, then the solution is not to
create a new mechanism that is at odds with the existing security architecture,
as the ICC is, but to amend the present United Nations Charter.
The United States approach to the ICC has been to seek agreements with
other nations that exempt United States nationals from the jurisdiction of the
treaty. These agreements, authorized by Article 98 of the Rome Treaty, are
fully consistent with and contemplated by the treaty framework. In fact, during
the UNSC debate on protection for peacekeepers from the ICC, countries that
are leading proponents fo the court urged the United States to make use of
Article 98 agreements as a means of addressing American concerns about the
court. It is, then, a bit disingenuous; to now argue that proposing Article 98
agreements somehow undermines the treaty. One more note with regard
specifically to the military. Some proponents of the treaty maintain that the
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existence of bilateral or regional Status of Forces Agreements ("SOFAs")
already provide protection for United States service men and women, and
should be sufficient to address United States concerns. SOFAs typically govern
the status of military forces in a particular partner nation. While criminal
jurisdiction issues within the context of the host nation's laws are dealt with in
SOFAs, there is no inherent conflict in signing an Article 98 agreement.
Moreover, the Article 98 agreements sought by the United States are not limited
to protecting only military and civilian employees of the Department of
Defense, as most SOFAs are, but will protect all United States nationals.
In these few minutes, I have set forth why President Clinton termed the
Rome Treaty "fundamentally flawed," as well as the major reasons why the
United States and other nations have departed from cooperation with the court.
By utilizing the United Nations Charter framework, which has taken fifty years
to evolve and gain acceptance as a mechanism for stabilizing global order, the
United States is preserving national security while strengthening international
legal regimes.

ICC PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS: AVOIDING
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I. INTRODUCTION

Millions of people have extraordinary hopes for the new International
Criminal Court ("ICC"), the world's first permanent tribunal for genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity. As the most highly visible and ambitious
permanent institution in furtherance of international justice ever created, the
ICC simply cannot fail. These lofty expectations, however, should be tempered
by a number of factors. Some are obvious, such as whether the ICC will be
given adequate financial and logistical support and whether the ICC's initial
Prosecutor and judges will perform their duties capably and responsibly. Other
factors, while less obvious, are no less important in determining how the ICC
will operate and how it will be perceived. Chief among these are concerns
relating to the ICC's pretrial procedures, which are unusual and largely untested.
Indeed, the principles that guide these procedures-"admissibility,"
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"complementarity" and "State consent"-are not concepts that any national or
international court has extensive experience in adjudicating.
Designed to give effect to the fundamental principle that the ICC must be
a court of last resort, these procedures also involve weighty political issues
regarding the genuineness of a government's representation that it will (or will
not) prosecute an accused. The stakes in every case before the ICC, moreover,
will be enormous: not only will the ICC determine an individual's culpability
for the most serious crimes but such determinations are inherently imbued with
political conflicts and sensitivities. The consequence is that counsel will likely
take full advantage of these pretrial procedures which, in practical terms, may
mean that the first cases before the ICC may be consumed by months or even
years of pretrial motion practice.
These motions will pose an enormous challenge for the ICC's judges
because, although they will certainly need to act expeditiously, they will also
have to get it right. The first pretrial motions to be decided will shape initial
perceptions of the ICC and largely determine the new institution's credibility.
Any decisions that are perceived as politically motivated or legally unprincipled
could have lasting repercussions. These extraordinary pressures on the ICC's
judges must be handled in the context of resolving the numerous pretrial
motions that are permitted by the Rome Statute's cumbersome pretrial
framework, which results from a confluence of the following factors.
First, the system of complementarity between the ICC and national courts,
designed to permit national courts to take precedence, will require significant
pretrial motions if it is to work as anticipated. The ICC is only supposed to
prosecute when a national court with jurisdiction is unable or unwilling to
legitimately proceed, and this principle is given effect through procedures
governing "admissibility." In large part, these procedures are due to the fact
that the Rome Statute was written during political negotiations between
governments, and some governments were uncomfortable with untethered
prosecutorial power. The United States negotiators in the 1998 Rome
Diplomatic Conference, in particular, ensured that the ICC's jurisdiction would
be narrow, that cases could only proceed in circumstances when a national court
could not do the job, and that the Prosecutor's discretion would be
circumscribed. These issues will be teed up by pretrial motions arguing a
government's genuine willingness or ability to investigate.
Second, the unusual State consent requirements that apply in cases not
initiated by the Security Council require the consent of either the terroritorial
State or the State of the nationality of the accused. Consent is given by the act
of ratification or (for non-State parties) by a special declaration. While this may
seem straightforward, ambiguities regarding cross-border conduct and even a
person's nationality may lead parties to make motions arguing that a State's
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consent is inadequate because the conduct "occurred" outside its territory or
because the accused is a "national" of another State.
Third, safeguards designed to prevent politically motivated prosecutions
mean that the Prosecutor will have to seek and obtain authorization from the
Pre-Trial Chamber to proceed.
Fourth, the fact that victims are permitted to have representation before the
ICC, even in the pretrial investigatory stages, may complicate pretrial
proceedings. Thousand of victims may mean thousands of lawyers with the
right under the Rome Statute to make submissions at certain stages.
Finally, the omnipresent right to appeal may serve to derail investigations
as multiple parties exercise rights of appeal that exist even regarding
interlocutory admissibility and jurisdictional issues.
The question that should be asked is whether-apart from serving the political
purposes of the Rome Statute's creators-these procedures will advance the
goals of ending impunity for international crimes and contributing to the
prevention of such crimes. Only time will tell, of course, and almost everything
about the ICC's pretrial procedure is a venture into uncharted territory. The
ICC's system of State consent, admissibility and complementarity differs
significantly from previous international criminal tribunals; indeed, it is largely
sui generis. Because of the nature of the ICC's subject matter jurisdiction,
every decision of the ICC will have political overtones, especially ones deciding
the question of whether a national government has engaged in an "unjustified
delay"' .in bringing a person to justice. These pretrial decisions also invite
motions and submissions by States and other entities and persons.
There is another risk resulting from protracted pretrial proceedings: persons
may be identified as targets of the ICC long before trial. An accused, of course,
can object to the charges and challenge evidence at a confirmation hearing
under Article 61, which requires the Pre-Trial Chamber to determine whether
"substantial grounds" exist to believe the person committed the crimes.
However, to the extent that pretrial proceedings unduly lengthen the time when
a target of an investigation has been named and the resolution of that person's
trial, the rights of persons accused of crimes by the ICC may be adversely
affected. The eighteen judges of the ICC will have to resolve these challenges
and administer the Rome Statute in a fair, impartial and decisive manner.

1.
United Nations, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 2(b), 37
I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter "Rome Statute"].
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II. GETTING OFF THE GROUND: REFERRALS BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND
STATE PARTIES

Three entities may initiate investigations: the Security Council, State
Parties or the Prosecutor. Cases referred by the Security Council will likely
proceed quicker through the pretrial stages than cases referred by State Parties
or initiated by the Prosecutor. Security Council referrals, which are made
pursuant to the Security Council's universally binding powers under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter,' .are not subject to the State consent requirements. In
addition, preliminary rulings regarding admissibility are not permitted. And, of
course, there would be no threat of a Security Council deferral.
The best hope for avoiding ICC pretrial gridlock, then, is for cases to
originate with Security Council referrals. This avenue, however, at least for the
foreseeable future, is unrealistic. The United States, with its veto over any
Security Council action, remains steadfastly opposed to the ICC. It is highly
unlikely, therefore, that the United States will permit any Security Council
referrals to the ICC. It remains to be seen whether this will change when the
Security Council attempts to refer a matter that does not infringe on United
States interests. For example, in October 2002, President Bush signed the
Sudan Peace Act, which accused the Sudanese government of genocide. Would
the United States use its veto to prevent the Security Council from referring a
genocide prosecution of Sudan to the ICC?
Referrals by State Parties offer a slightly more streamlined alternative to
investigations by the Prosecutor because the investigation can commence
without the necessity of a determination by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Under
Article 14, any State Party is entitled to refer to the Prosecutor a "situation in
which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court appear to have
been committed."3 State referrals must be "in writing.",4 Following such a
referral, the Prosecutor investigates the situation and determines whether any
"specific persons should be charged."5
The Statute provides little guidance on the content of referrals except that
the submission "shall specify the relevant circumstances" and must "be
accompanied by such supporting documentation as is available to the State
referring the situation." 6 There is no requirement that a referral be made public.
The Prosecutor does have discretion to decline to investigate a State Party's
referral if "there is no reasonable basis to proceed," taking into consideration:

2.

Id. at art. 12(3)(b).

3.

Id. at art. 14(I).

4.

Rule of Procedure and Evidence 45.

5.

Rome Statute, supra note I, at art. 14(l).

6.

Id. at art. 14(2).
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(1) whether there is no legal or factual basis to seek a warrant or a summons; (2)
whether the case is inadmissible because a national court has exercised
jurisdiction; or (3) whether prosecution is "not in the interests of justice."7 The
Pre-Trial Chamber may, at the request of the referring State or the Security
Council, review the Prosecutor's decision not to proceed. 8 The Pre-Trial
Chamber also may act "on its own initiative" to review decisions of the
Prosecutor not to proceed based on the "interests of justice" criteria. 9 This
presents yet another avenue for pretrial proceedings: disputes between the PreTrial Chamber (acting on its own or at the behest of a State or the Security
Council) and the Prosecutor regarding the propriety of the Prosecutor's decision
not to proceed.
111. FIRST HURDLE: REQUEST FOR AUTHORIZATION

Due to Security Council paralysis, the Prosecutor probably will originate
most investigations. In investigations initiated by the Prosecutor, however, the
potential for gridlock arises early because although the Prosecutor can "initiate"
an investigation he or she cannot "commence" an investigation without
authorization. This authorization comes from the Pre-Trial Chamber, which at
several critical stages is given oversight when the Prosecutor acts independently.
In contrast, the Prosecutor needs no such authorization to commence an
investigation when the referral comes from the Security Council or a State
Party.
There are no limits on the sources from which the Prosecutor can receive
information.'0 Following receipt of such information, the Prosecutor "may
initiate investigations." At this early stage, before the necessity of requesting
authorization, the Prosecutor is given leeway to look into a situation and to
conduct a preliminary investigation unfettered by outside limitations. Thus, the
Prosecutor may "analyze the seriousness of the information received," and may
even "seek additional information" from states, nongovernmental organizations,
international organizations or any "other reliable sources."" Even at this
preliminary stage, State Parties are obliged to "cooperate fully" with any
requests for information.' 2

7.

Id. at art. 53(2).

8.

Id. at art. 53(3)(a).

9.

Id. at art. 53(3)(b).

10.

Id. at art. 15(2).

11.

Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art 15(2).

12.

Id. at art. 86.
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The Prosecutor is also permitted to "receive written or oral testimony at the
seat of the Court."' 3 This testimony may be recorded or videotaped, 14 .and
presumably may later be admissible at trial. This geographical limitation,
permitting testimony only "at the seat of the Court" in The Hague, seems
designed to limit the Prosecutor's fact-finding capabilities by curtailing on-site
investigatory capacity before the Pre-Trial Chamber has given authorization.
Once this preliminary investigation is concluded, the Prosecutor will either
determine that further proceedings are not required or that there is "a reasonable
basis to proceed with an investigation."'" If the latter, 6 .then the Prosecutor
"shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an
investigation."' 7 Requests for authorization under Article 15(4) seem to be
essentially ex parte, with no allowance made for submissions in opposition,
although victims are permitted to "make representations" to the Pre-Trial
Chamber.
The criterion to be applied by the three-judge Pre-Trial Chamber is
somewhat vague: it need only determine whether "there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with an investigation and that the case appears to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court."' 8 If so, then the Pre-Trial Chamber "shall authorize
the commencement of an investigation."' 9 It remains to be seen whether Article
15(4) authorizations will be a significant roadblock for investigations initiated
by the Prosecutor or merely a rubber stamp. This is one-sided request, with
potential targets not permitted to make submissions. As a result, this stage may
be more mechanical than substantive. The Pre-Trial Chamber, however, has a
strong interest in ensuring that the jurisdictional basis of an Article 15(4)
authorization is proper and therefore will have compelling reasons making
sound Article 15(4) determinations.
The request-for-authorization stage will also serve to publicize an
investigation because the Prosecutor is required to notify victims. The means
of notification may be through the Victims and Witnesses Unit or "by general
means" consistently with the integrity of the investigation and the safety of

13.

Id. at art. 15(2).

14.

Rule of Procedure and Evidence 112.

15.

Rome Statute, supra note 1,at art. 18(1).

16.
Somewhat conversely, art. 53(1) of the Rome Statute states that "the Prosecutor shall initiate
an investigation unless he or she determines there is no reasonable basis to proceed." In referrals by the
Security Council or a State, this seems to create a presumption that an investigation will be initiated unless
the Prosecutor determines otherwise.
17.

Rome Statute, supra note 1,at art. 15(3).

18.

Id. at art. 15(4).

19.

Id.
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victims and witnesses.2" Although the notice is of a general "investigation," it
is possible that the notification process may have unintended consequences by
identifying targets at a preliminary stage and by impacting the presumption of
innocence or by triggering actions by persons subject to the investigation.
However, this should be viewed as an acceptable trade-off because the notice
provision advances the legitimate goals of minimizing frivolous prosecutions
and maintaining transparency.
IV. SECOND HURDLE: NOTIFICATION AND POSSIBLE STATE DEFERRAL

The next threshold involves notification of certain States not only of a
generalized investigation but of an intention to investigate and prosecute
persons alleged to have committed crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction. This
notification process begins once the Pre-Trial Chamber authorizes the
"commencement" of an investigation under Article 15 or once a State Party
makes a referral and the Prosecutor determines that there is "a reasonable basis
to proceed."'"
At this stage, the Prosecutor must issue a written notice to all States,
including States not party to the Rome Statute, that "would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crimes concerned." The notice may be "on a confidential
basis" if necessary "to protect persons, prevent destruction of evidence or
prevent the absconding of persons. 22
A State receiving notice has one month from receipt to inform the Court
"that it is investigating or has investigated" persons within its jurisdiction. 23 If
requested, the Prosecutor "shall defer to the State's investigation." State
deferrals have no time limit and may permanently stop an investigation. The
purpose is to give teeth to the premise of the Rome Statute that national courts
have primacy. All a national government has to do is make a request and the
ICC must defer-although, as discussed in Part V infra, such deferral may be
reviewed in six months "based on the State's unwillingness or inability
genuinely to carry out the investigation. ''24
The mandatory nature of Article 18(2) deferrals-the Prosecutor "shall
defer to the State's investigation" upon receipt of a request to do so-may prove
difficult to overcome. If multiple states assert jurisdiction, there may be
multiple States making Article 18(2) requests. The result could be years of
delay.

20.

Rule of Procedure and Evidence 50(l).

21.

Rome Statute, supra note I, at art. 18(l).

22.

Id. at art. 18(1).

23.

Id. at art. 18(2).

24.

Id.at art. 18(3).
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V. THIRD HURDLE: PRELIMINARY RULING ON ADMISSIBILITY AND APPEAL
Although the Prosecutor must stop the investigation upon receipt of a
request,25 .the mandatory cessation can be circumvented if the Prosecutor makes
an application to the Pre-Trial Chamber to "authorize the investigation"
notwithstanding a State's request for a deferral.26 Upon such application, the
Pre-Trial Chamber can nonetheless "decide[] to authorize the investigation. 27
It appears that only the Prosecutor can make such an application, and that State
Parties do not have standing to do so. The standards to be applied by the PreTrial Chamber, as well as the timing, are somewhat elastic. The Prosecutor can
seek review in six months, presumably on any basis, or "at any time when there
has been a significant change of circumstances based on the State's
unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out the investigation."
The "preliminary" ruling is also the first opportunity for a trip to the
Appellate Chamber. In one of the more open-ended articles of the Rome
Statute, either the Prosecutor or the State concerned may appeal any decision
"with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility" within five days of an adverse
decision. 28 The likely effect of an appeal will be to suspend proceedings for
many months because, even though the Article 82(3) of the Rome Statute states
that an appeal "shall not of itself have suspensive effect," the Rules permit the
appellant to request, in effect, a stay pending appeal.29 Certainly a State that has
previously served a deferral request under Article 18(2) would demand a stay
pending an appeal of a decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber vacating a deferral.
Even an adverse decision of a preliminary ruling at this stage, however,
does not prevent a State from challenging admissibility at later stages of the
proceedings. Indeed, in an apparent recipe for gridlock, Article 18(7)
guarantees the right of a State which has failed in a preliminary motion on
admissibility to make a separate motion on admissibility at a later stage. While
Article 18(7) requires a change in facts and circumstances, this should not be a
burdensome hurdle to overcome. As a result, in cases where the crimes in
question occurred in several States or involve persons of different nationalities,
there may be multiple motions and appeals on the same admissibility issue
under both Article 17 and Article 19.

In "exceptional" cases, the Prosecutor can continue to collect evidence in spite of a State request
25.
if necessary to preserve evidence. Rome Statute, supra note I, at art. 18(6).
26.

Authorizations under article 18(2) must be made by a majority of the three judges of the Pre-

Trial Chamber. Rome Statute, supra note I, at art. 57(2)(a).
27.

Rome Statute, supra note I, at art. 18(2).

28.

Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 82(l)(a); Rule of Procedure and Evidence 154(1).

29.

Rule of Procedure and Evidence 156(5).
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VI. FOURTH HURDLE: JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY
CHALLENGES AND APPEALS

As noted, the most active areas for pretrial motion practice relate to issues
of jurisdiction and admissibility. These issues relate to the Court's basic
competence to hear a case, and can be raised at any time before or at the
commencement of trial (or after, if the basis is that the person has already been
tried). Indeed, it is likely that a new area of legal expertise will evolve
pertaining to admissibility challenges under Articles 17 and 19 focusing on
whether a national court is able or willing to prosecute. The area demands the
creation of uniform standards so that the adjudication of these issues will appear
objective. National court judges and other international legal scholars may offer
the equivalent of expert testimony regarding the legitimacy of a government's
investigation.
Procedurally, the Rome Statute treats jurisdictional and admissibility
similarly. The Court's "jurisdiction" encompasses both the substantive crimes
to be prosecuted by the ICC, and the system of State consent. Thus, a
jurisdictional challenge could argue that the actions of the accused do not
constitute crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. In addition, jurisdictional
challenges could argue that (assuming no Security Council referral), either the
territorial State or the State of nationality of the accused has not consented
because, for example, there are questions about the citizenship of the defendant
or, in crimes that occur in several countries, the State in which the conduct
occurred.
The potential for lengthy delays resulting from Article 19 challenges to
admissibility and jurisdiction arises from the fact that the Rome Statute places
no clear limits on the number of these motions that can be made and on the
parties that can make them. Consider, for example, the list of entities eligible
to bring motions challenging admissibility and jurisdiction:
1)

An accused;

2)

A person for whom a warrant or summons has been issued
based on a finding of the Pre-Trial Chamber that reasonable
grounds exist to believe the person committed a crime within
the jurisdiction of the ICC;
A State which has jurisdiction over a case and has investigated
or prosecuted;
The State of nationality of the accused;
The territorial State; and
The Prosecutor or the Court.:

3)
4)
5)
6)

30.

Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 19(2), (3).
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Each of these entities appears to have the ability to bring motions regarding
jurisdiction and admissibility; and each motion may suspend the investigation
and then be appealed. It is not too far-fetched to imagine multiple motions
brought seriatim on essentially the same area.
There is a textual argument for strictly limiting motion practice. Article
19(4) states that jurisdiction and admissibility challenges can be brought "only
once by any person or State." This would have to be interpreted literally "only once" means "only once." However, because each moving party would
have different circumstances and arguments, it seems improbable this literal
approach would be adopted because it could lead to unfairness in many cases.
The more likely interpretation is that each person or State is limited to one bite
at the apple, and not that all States and persons collectively are limited to a
single challenge. Moreover, Article 19(6) refers to "challenges" to admissibility
and to jurisdiction, suggesting multiple opportunities.
Article 19 challenges are unlikely to be expeditious. The issue of the
adequacy of a State's investigation may require significant testimony and
evidence to the extent the inquiry goes to the merits. When brought by a State,
moreover, Article 19(7) requires the Prosecutor to suspend the investigation.
"Observations" from other interested States, the Security Council and from
victims must be solicited, and the Pre-Trial Chamber may hold a hearing. These
hearings will probably be mini-trials, especially if a State is attempting to prove
the genuineness of its investigation. Article 19 challenges conceivably could
tie up the ICC for years if there are serial motions with suspensive effect that are
subject to appeal.
VII. FIFTH HURDLE: SECURITY COUNCIL DEFERRAL
Functioning as a kind of sword of Damocles over the ICC, the Security
Council has the power to intervene under Article 16 to stop any investigation
or prosecution for renewable twelve-month periods. The mechanism in Article
16 is a resolution adopted under the Security Council's enforcement powers in
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The ICC has no authority to circumvent such
a Security Council resolution.
The purpose of Article 16 was to permit the Security Council to prevent the
ICC from proceeding when an ICC prosecution might interfere with ongoing
diplomatic negotiations necessary to maintain international security. An open
question is whether the Security Council would permit Article 16 to be used not
because of ongoing diplomatic negotiations but rather because of a Security
Council member's ideological bias against any ICC investigation or
prosecution.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Pretrial proceedings before the International Criminal Court present
unusual and unprecedented challenges. The Rome Statute requires that national
courts be given every opportunity to prosecute the crimes within the ICC's
jurisdiction, and that the Prosecutor's independence be limited. The only way
to make these requirements real is to permit challenges to be made to the ICC's
ability to exercise its jurisdiction. The Rome Statute, however, creates a recipe
for lengthy delays by permitting multiple challenges and appeals in the same
areas.
The judges of the ICC face a daunting task in effectuating these principles
of the Rome Statute while at the same time protecting the rights of defenilants
to a swift and fair trial and ensuring that the victims of the world's worst crimes
receive redress. They will have to decide many thorny questions, such as how
to limit admissibility motions and whether a government is unable or unwilling
to prosecute. These are largely issues that no judges in any national or
international court have had to deal with in such a systematic fashion. The
discretion and wisdom with which the ICC's initial judges and Prosecutor deal
with these issues will largely determine the ultimate success of the International
Criminal Court in achieving its critically important purpose.

THE SKEWED RESPONSIBILITY NARRATIVE OF
THE "FAILED STATES" CONCEPT
Ralph Wilde*
The "failed state" concept, which came to prominence in academic and
policy discourse in the early 1990's with the publication of David Helman and
Steven Ratner's 1991 article Saving Failed States,' continues to enjoy
widespread currency as a way of denoting situations where the governmental
infrastructure in a state has broken down to a considerable degree. It can be
criticized on a number of levels, from its essentialist use of language to the
particularist basis for defining "failure," and the manner in which it sets up a
dichotomous opposition within international relations between "successful" and
"failed" states.3 In this brief article, I discuss one such criticism: the way that
the term "failure" suggests exclusive responsibility on the part of the state and
its people for the breakdown in governance. I consider the problematic aspects
of this suggestion with reference to one of the key policy prescriptions that are
associated with the failed states paradigm:
granting administrative
responsibilities over the territory concerned to international organizations,
which in the context of governmental collapse can be used to fill the
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2.
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governmental vacuum and/or to construct, or reconstruct, essential state
institutions.4 This policy institution, currently underway in Kosovo and
conducted in East Timor from the end of 1999 to May 2002, was proposed by
Helman and Ratner as a mechanism (termed "United Nations Conservatorship")
for "saving" failed states. It is invariably considered when the different policy
options available as responses to particular situations of governmental collapse
are being reviewed, as in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban at the end of
2001. Although in practice plenary international territorial administration is
often ultimately rejected in this context (Cf., Afghanistan). Moreover, it is
sometimes used to pursue entirely different objectives (e.g. enabling the transfer
of territory from one actor to another, as in West Irian in 1963-64 and Eastern
Slavonia in 1996-98).
The "failed state" label arguably suggests that when governmental
infrastructure collapses, the state, its people, and its leaders are solely
responsible; it is the "state" that has "failed." Henry Richardson highlights this
feature of the "failed state" concept, and criticizes it as simplistic. 6 Of course
state collapse is often due, to a considerable degree, to indigenous factors,
whether civil conflict or corrupt leadership. At the same time, clearly the
involvement of foreign states, international financial institutions such as the
IMF and the World Bank, multinational corporations, and the like often plays
a major role in mediating the state of local conditions, thereby affecting the
viability of the economy and governmental infrastructure. For example, should
exclusive responsibility for the governmental breakdown in the Congo in the
1960's lie at the door of the Congolese people and their leaders?7 To make this
assertion, one should somehow discount the role of Belgium, for example, who
"failed" to prepare local people for government before independence, and then
intervened militarily in the country afterwards to support certain factions during
the civil war.' East Timor became a state in May 2002. If, in two years time,
the government there collapses, would it really be appropriate to conceive
responsibility for that solely in terms of the local population? Clearly, one
cannot look only at the behavior of local actors in seeking to appraise a
particular national economy and political system. Regrettably, this is exactly
what the "failed state" concept does.
The skewed notion of responsibility arguably suggested by the failed state
idea is not only misconceived; it also leads to policy prescriptions that, by
4.

On this use of international territorial administration, see Ralph Wilde From Danzig to East

Timor and Beyond. the Role ofInternationalTerritorialAdministration,95 AM. J. INT'L L. 583,592-93 (2001).

5.

Id. at 588-89.

6.

Richardson, supra note 3.

7.

On this period in the Congo's history, see Wilde, supra note 4, at 592 and sources cited therein.

8.

Id. at 592.
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themselves, may ignore the structural causes of the problems they seek to
address. The use of international territorial administration to respond to
situations of infrastructural collapse is a case in point. Necessarily, international
territorial administration is concerned exclusively with the local causes of this
situation, seeking, for example, to improve local capacities for governance.
Clearly, it has no remit with respect to, for example, the foreign states,
international financial institutions and multinational corporations that will play
as important a role in shaping the future of the territory's economy as local
people and their leaders. I am not suggesting that international territorial
administration should somehow be able to perform that second role. My point
is that as a policy device, it is necessarily limited to addressing the local causes
of whatever problem it is concerned with.
Considering the remarkably intrusive nature of this policy device, there is
no comparable device that intervenes within other states and international
institutions, to try to prevent, as international territorial administration does on
the national level, these states and institutions from making decisions that
contribute to the factors that hamper a recovery from governmental collapse, or
precipitate such a collapse in the first place. So when Helman and Ratner
discuss the "saving" of failed states, their prescription - foreign administration
- is necessarily limited to the indigenous governmental structure. 9 They do not
concern themselves with proposing other, similarly intrusive mechanisms with
respect to, say, rich countries and multinational corporations. Necessarily, the
proscription is reactive, in that it is concerned with responding to state collapse
when it has happened, thereby focusing exclusively on indigenous factors,
rather than seeking to prevent it in the first place, which would require a focus
on both indigenous and exogenous factors.
The result is a somewhat naive and simplistic proposal that fits well with
the narrow notion of responsibility of the "failed state" paradigm. So when
Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst state that the key question for the
international community is what are the responsibilities of states, the United
Nations (or regional IGOs), and other actors when states fail, the responsibilities
in question concern remedial measures of intervention "post-failure" in the
territory concerned, not prophylactic measures concerning the behavior of these
actors that might lead to state collapse in the first place.' Moreover, the
"responsibilities" are conceived in terms suggestive of the charity of innocent
bystanders, not the liability of those who are partially complicit. The sub-title
to Karns and Mingst's question about the international community's

9.

See Helman & Ratner, supra note 1.

10.

Karns & Mingst, supra note 2, at 218.
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responsibilities when states fail is: [h]ow should choices be made as to where
to direct scarce resources?"
The asymmetrical conception of responsibility of the failed state concept,
then, is reflected in and supported by the regime of international policy
institutions. One might venture that this asymmetry is, of course, no accident.
One might ask who uses the language of "failed states" and what their interests
are in doing so. The "failed states" concept originated in Western scholarship,
and has been utilized in Western policy discourse. Examining this language
may be helpful, therefore, in understanding Western ideas of a "failed" other
and a "successful" self. Just as Edward Said studied "Orientalism" interalia as
a way of understanding how Western culture conceives itself through an
alienated, oriental "other," the failed state concept may be illuminating insofar
as our understandings of those who use it are concerned. 12 As a basis for policy,
however, it may be limited, precisely because it reflects the interests of those
who use it, and these interests may conflict with the interests of those in relation
to whom it is used. Indeed, exclusively locally-based connotations of
responsibility exculpate Western states and multinationals, and the international
financial institutions they control, in terms of whatever actions these actors may
have conducted that contributed to the so-called "failure" by the state
concerned. Similarly, these actors do not face the prospect of intrusive policy
institutions, like international territorial administration, that seek to prevent
whatever policies they may prosecute that lead to state collapse.
We have, therefore, a suggestion of responsibility, and an institution for
addressing this responsibility, that only takes in part of the picture. Can this not
be supported, however, as the best that can be hoped for in an unequal world?
Was Helman and Ratner's limited focus an attempt to address legitimate
concerns about state collapse, while staying within the bounds of what was
realistic in terms of the proscription put forward? In the first place, on
pragmatic grounds it may have little effect. The work done on the ground with
local people may be undermined by the absence of comparative processes
operating in those other arenas that are equally determinative of the policies
concerned. Even if this were not the case, however, there is a further problem.
The failed states concept is not only about emphasizing a certain area of
responsibility. It can also be seen as repudiating the notion that responsibility
can reside elsewhere as well. The notion of the failed state, then, and its
associated policy institutions like international territorial administration, may
reflect and constitute not good first steps, but rather the impediments that exist
to broader notions of responsibility and mechanisms for implementing that
I1.
12.
afterword).

Id. at 220.
EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM: WESTERN CONCEPTIONS OFTHE ORIENT (1995) (reissue with new
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responsibility. The failed state concept not only reflects our unequal world, but
buttresses that inequality. When international territorial administration is used
in circumstances of state collapse, it may be serving merely to distract attention
away from the structural, dxogenous factors that both contributed to the collapse
and will mediate the future economic development of the territory.
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I. Is IT TIME TO RECAST THE LIBERAL POSITION ON TRADE?

With the enactment of Trade Promotion Authority legislation in August of
2002' and a lackluster performance by Democrats in the November elections
that followed,2 a profound question looms over the left wing of the American
body politic, a question that has attracted all too little attention to date: Has the
time come for a new liberal approach to international trade and globalization?
The answer to this question in turn depends on the answer to a second, but
related question: Is the gap between the developed and developing worlds one
of, if not the, greatest economic, political, and moral issues of our time?

*
Hal S. Shapiro, former Senior Counselor to the Director and Senior Advisor for International
Economic Affairs at the National Economic Council in the Clinton White House, and a partner in the
Washington, D.C. law firm of Miller & Chevalier, is Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore
Law School and Deputy Director of that School's International Law Center.

I.
The 2001-02 battle to renew fast-track procedures, now known as Trade Promotion Authority,
in 2002 was a bitter, partisan battle in the House of Representatives. The bill first passed the House by just
one vote; see Helene Cooper, David Rogers, and Jim VandeHei, House Votes Wide Trade Powersfor Bush
- 'Fast Track' Authority Wins Passage in 215-214 Tally; Senate Passage Expected, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7,
2001, at A3; it then obtained an important procedural victory in the House by again just one vote; "see House
Passes Motion on Conference with Scant Democratic Support," see Inside U.S. TRADE, June 28, 2002; and
it gained ultimate passage in the House by of 215 to 212. In the end, the bill garnered support from 190
Republicans but only 25 Democrats.
2.
See, e.g., R.W. Apple, Jr., The 2002 Elections:News Analysis; President'sRisks Are Rewarded
at Polls, N.Y. TIMES, NOV. 6,2002, AT Al (NOTING THE SHIFT IN CONTROL FROM THE DEMOCRATS TO THE
REPUBLICANS AND THE DEMOCRATS' LOSS OF SEATS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES).
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As explained below, the answer to both questions, for progressives at least,
undoubtedly should be yes. The current liberal position on trade is internally
inconsistent and unlikely to achieve the ends that its well-intentioned advocates
hope to achieve. It is grounded in unrealistic premises that have spawned a
thousand law review articles but achieved precious little in terms of tangible
results. It is used by protectionists as an excuse to halt market liberalization
efforts,3 and it threatens to deny the people who most need economic
advancement the avenues of opportunity that would lead to better lives.4
This critique of the liberal orthodoxy is not intended to bury liberal goals
in trade policy, but to more sharply define them and hopefully start a dialogue
to find better ways to obtain them. The liberal orthodoxy has transformed the
trade debate in important and lasting ways. It has brought to the fore concern
for the habitability of the planet on which we live, the conditions in which we
toil, and the equities of how we spread the wealth we create.5 The challenge is
to advance these very same goals by unleashing, rather than harnessing, trade,
which in and of itself is an engine for attaining a more progressive, sustainable,
and humane world: economic growth.6 What follows is designed to begin a
3.

See, e.g., Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Free Trade is Not Free, in THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE,

at 65-68 reprinted in Raj Bhala, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE at 99-101 (2001)

(arguing that free trade agreements only help powerful corporations and produce a "race to the bottom" in
which countries lower environmental and labor standards to attract foreign investment). See also Herman E.
Daly, FROM ADJUSTMENT TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: THE OBSTACLE OF FREE TRADE, 15 Loy. L.A.

INT'L J. 33, 36-42 (1992) (arguing that free trade prevents countries from internalizing the external costs of
protecting the environment).
4.
See, e.g., P.T. Bauer, Equality, the Third World and Economic Delusion at 76-80, reprinted in
Raj Bhala, International Trade Law: Theory and Practice at 1417-20 (2001)
The allegations that external trade, and especially imports from the West, are damaging to the populations of
the Third World reveal a barely disguised condescension towards the ordinary people there, and even
contempt for them. The people, of course, want the imports. If they did not, the imported goods could not
be sold. Similarly, the people are prepared to produce for export to pay for these goods. To say that these
processes are damaging is to argue that people's preferences are of no account in organizing their own lives.
5.
See, e.g., Charles Tiefer, 'Alongside'the Fast Track: Environmental and Labor Issues in FTA 's,
MINN. J. OF GLOBAL TRADE 329, 331-33, 338-41 (1998) (describing the debate over environmental and labor
issues that arose in connection with efforts to renew fast track during the Clinton Administration). '
6.
According to the World Bank, "Trade is a vital engine for poverty-reducing growth. Those
countries that have intensified their links with the global economy through trade and investment have tended
to grow more rapidly over a sustained period and have experienced larger reductions in poverty. Even the prodevelopment." See, Trade, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, (Sept. 2002) available at,
http://www.worldbank.orgtwbsite/extml/news/trade/leveraging trade for development (last visited Mar. 12,
2003). Even the left leaning Oxfam has recognized the potential for trade to produce growth in the developing
world. See "Harnessing Trade for Growth," Oxfam Briefing Paper, August 2001, at 1.
International trade can be a force for poverty reduction by overcoming local, national, and regional
scarcity, and by creating livelihoods and employment opportunities. However, rich countries and powerful
corporations have captured a disproportionate share of the benefits of trade, while developing countries and
poor men and women have been left behind or made worse off.
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conversation that will hopefully better connect policy choices with these
aspirations.
H. DEFENDING THE LIBERAL POSITION
In order to fully answer whether it is time for a new liberal approach on
trade, it is necessary first to explain what that means. The liberal position on
trade - in particular, liberal from a United States political perspective - is
principally characterized by three baskets of policy initiatives. The first is the
"linkage" of trade with a host of other issues - from labor and the environment
to human rights, anti-corruption initiatives, and even anti-narcotics efforts. 7 The
second is the promotion of an array of border protection measures including, but
not necessarily limited to, the retention of ordinary tariffs and quotas, use of
escape clause or safeguard actions, and the imposition of antidumping and
countervailing duties.' And the third is a neo-mercantilist support for market
liberalization that results in an increase in the exportation of domestically-made
products, a tolerance for imports used in domestic production, but an aversion
to imports that compete directly with domestic products.
In sum, the predominant liberal position on trade is not hostile to trade per
se, but it accepts only what is often referred to as "fair" trade. In practice,
however, the distinction between the two can be difficult to see. The pursuit of
"fair" trade has led to continued use of quotas on textile and apparel products,
tariff peaks on agriculture, and an explosion of trade remedy cases, including
perhaps most famously, the recent safeguard action on steel.9
111. CONTRASTING THE CLASSICAL CONSERVATIVE

POSITION

The liberal position on trade stands in contrast to the classic conservative
position, which, at least in theory, is unabashedly pro-free trade. Just as the
liberal position is maddeningly complex - drawing fine-line distinctions
between useful and harmful imports and circumstances in which "linkage" is
appropriate - the classic conservative position is almost naive in its simplicity.
In its purest form, it ignores the extraordinary domestic pressures that can mount
7.
See, e.g., letter of Representatives Rangel, Levin, and Matsui, dated September 26, 2001,
critiquing the Trade Promotion Authority bill introduced by Republican Ways & Means Chairman Bill
Thomas for lack of language ensuring adequate labor and environmental protections in trade agreements,
reprinted in INSIDE U.S. TRADE (2001).
8.
See, e.g., More than 100 House Democrats Support Dayton-Craig in INSIDE U.S. TRADE (May
24, 2002) (noting strong Democratic support for amendment to Trade Promotion authority that would exclude
from fast-track consideration any provision in a United States trade agreement proposing to change a United
States trade remedy law).
9.
While it was President Bush who formally launched the United States safeguard action and
imposed it, liberals in Congress have been seeking such protection for steel for years.

434

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 9:431

to impose trade barriers. The reality, of course, is another matter. Leading
conservative politicians have supported protective measures when it is their
constituents whose businesses and jobs are threatened by import competition.
In practice, the differences between liberals and conservatives when it comes to
trade may be more one of degree than kind. Liberals may be more eager, or
perhaps comfortable, to impose trade protection than conservatives, but both
appear ready to do so when the circumstances in their view justify it.'0
IV. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF "LINKAGE"

In the past, the seminal distinction between the liberal and conservative
positions has been "linkage."
While liberals have pursued "linkage,"
conservatives have resisted. The enactment of Trade Promotion Authority
legislation revealed that conservative opposition to "linkage" in the United
States may be waning. Between 1994, when fast track was last in effect, and
1998, the debate turned in large part on the relationship between trade, on the
one hand, and labor and environmental standards on the other. During this time,
two fast-track bills failed to become law."
In 2001 and 2002, controversy over labor and the environment all but
disappeared, as even the main proposals from the Republican-led House of
Representatives included United States negotiating objectives that called for
trade-related labor and environmental issues to be accorded equal weight with
conventional trade issues and to be enforced in the same way as other provisions
in trade agreements - that is, through the use of trade sanctions. Instead, the key
issues were the adoption of benefits for workers who lose their jobs due to trade;
proposed reforms to investor-state dispute-resolution proceedings; and the
extent to which new trade agreements can weaken United States trade remedy
laws.12

10.
One need only look at the United States safeguard action on steel. President Bush, who
campaigned for office on a strong pro-free-trade platform, requested the United States International Trade
Commission to investigate steel imports and, as a result of that investigation, he chose to impose significant
protections for the steel industry. President Bush's action has been roundly denounced and characterized as
protectionist in many quarters. It is the subject of numerous World Trade Organization dispute-settlement
proceedings. The President, however, was not alone, on the American political right in endorsing protection
for United States steel. A number of conservative members of Congress are members of the Steel Caucus,
which generally favors greater protection from imports. And, southern Republicans and Democrats alike have
backed protection for United States textile manufacturers.
11.
See Jutta Hennig, Bipartisan Opposition Leads to 180-243 House Defeat of Fast Track, in
INSIDE U.S. TRADE (1998); Finance Aide Calls for Broad Debate in Wake of Fast track Collapse in INSIDE
U.S. TRADE (Nov. 28, 1997) (Chronicling effects of decision to withdraw fast track legislation on eve of
vote.).
12.

See, e.g., Final Trade Bill Agreement Falls Short of Senate TAA Provisions, in INSIDE U.S.

TRADE (2002).
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V. A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF

At first blush, the central pillars underlying the predominant liberal
position on trade - "linkage" between trade and other issues, comfort with
protection in certain contexts, and a degree of hostility to import competition advance classic liberal goals. They attempt to use trade policy to bolster liberal
causes such as worker rights and clean air. They also attempt to protect bluecollar workers from the vicissitudes of uncertain market forces - market forces
that not only may arguably advantage the privileged few over the ordinary
masses, but that also may be unfairly manipulated by "foreigners" who do not
live and play by the same rules as we do (however "we" may be defined).
But, in actuality, the predominant liberal trade position is a policy
argument at war with itself, or at least with core liberal values. "Linkage" in the
abstract may be laudable. It might indeed be just and wise to link trade benefits
to improved labor and environmental standards, but almost all attention
concerning "linkage" has been over how to word abstract United States
negotiating principles in fast-track bills rather than making concrete progress on
these issues in international trade agreements.
The plain truth is that United States trade partners have shown little interest
in pursuing "linkage." Developing countries in particular view "linkage," at
best, as a legitimate policy that incidentally minimizes aspects of their
comparative advantage in certain sectors. At worst, they view it as a naked
attempt to impose discriminatory and protectionist measures by
developed
3
countries against the goods and services of developing countries.
Either way, developing countries have a point. International trade rules
that would permit a measure barring the importation of a blouse made in
Bangladesh through child labor opens the door to import barriers to blouses
made by Indonesian workers who make less than a prescribed minimum wage,
or Guatemalan workers who toil in unpleasant or unsafe factories, or Chinese
workers who live in a country that doesn't have adequate pollution safeguards
or Western civil liberties. Developing countries that resist acceptance of such
measures argue, with a large degree of historical accuracy, that developed
countries attained their current level of economic advancement without such
government intervention in the marketplace, yet they now want to impose a new
set of rules on the rest of the world.
Only the coldest of hearts would want children to work instead of attend
school, or allow workers to endure the hardship of sweatshops or earn less than
a subsistence wage. But, to many in the developing world, only the coldest of
13.

See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON ET. AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INT'L ECON. RELATIONS 1 186 (4th ed.

2002) ("some developing countries have also expressed concern that some of the 'new' issues for the
GATT/WTO system - environment, human rights, labor standards - may lead to disguised protectionism").
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hearts would take jobs away from a child who must work to support her family,
or deny a job - menial though it may be - to a worker who has no better
alternative. It has yet to be proven that closing developed country borders to
developing country goods will improve the standards such policies may be
designed to achieve, but market barriers almost surely will have a painful impact
on those least able to endure further economic setbacks.
There can be little doubt that liberal acceptance of protective measures has
decidedly illiberal effects. One need not be an economist to understand that
tariffs or quotas not only harm the interests of foreign exporters, but also
domestic importing enterprises, domestic retailers that sell imported goods,
domestic manufacturers that rely on imported inputs in their products and,
perhaps most important of all, domestic consumers who pay more for whatever
products reach the shelves of their local stores. Consumer welfare is generally
the first casualty of trade protection. Consumers are forced to pay more for less
choice and, in some instances, less quality.
They
At bottom, tariffs and quotas are regressive in nature.
disproportionately affect the poor and small businesses. The notion of increased
domestic sales taxes are often anathema to liberal policymakers and politicians
because they are regressive taxes, yet tariffs are embraced because of the
charade that they are somehow borne only by foreigners. The reality is that the
cost of tariffs, at least in part, is passed on to all of us. Compounding this reality
is that trade protection often begets more trade protection. Thus, the regressive
tariffs we impose on United States consumers today may be imposed on their
German, Japanese, or Brazilian counterparts tomorrow.
While the twin-headed hydra of "linkage" and limited protectionism may
be justifiable in liberal terms by a reasonable desire to provide additional
security to domestic workers - an important concern - it does nothing to help
the billions of people around the world living in abject poverty, conditions most
of us in the United States would consider unthinkable in the 21st century. As
much American Democrats may want to preserve well-paying manufacturing
jobs for middle-class workers in Ohio and Michigan, they should not want to do
it at the expense of the four billion people in the world who survive by tilling
the soil, 14 or the three billion who have never made a phone call, 5 or the 2.8
billion who live on less than two dollars a day,' 6 or the 1.2 billion who live on
one dollar a day. 7
14.
See Ambassador Robert B. Zoellick, Commencement Address at St. Joseph's College,
Rensselaer, Indiana (May 5, 2002).
15.

Id.

16.

The World Bank Group, Twenty Questions About Poverty and Development, at I, available at

http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/quiz/whole.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
17.

The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators 2002, Economy, Growth and
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To be perfectly clear: this is not a call for the diminution of American
prosperity in order to close the North-South gap. A policy based on such a
wealth transfer is not only of questionable morality; it is politically unfeasible.
Instead, United States liberal trade policies should be retooled to promote
growth both at home and abroad in developing countries, especially for those
within and without the United States who have the least and need the most. As
Presidents Kennedy and Clinton said, two pro-free trade liberals, we need a
trade policy that creates a rising tide that lifts all boats.'8
VI. AN END TO "LINKAGE"
So, how can such an admittedly utopian vision be attained? First, it is time
to move away from "linkage." Delinking trade from labor and environmental
standards does not mean turning our backs on lifting environmental and labor
standards in nations where these standards are lacking or inadequate. It means
putting industrialized country money where our mouths are. If we are serious
about cleaning the air, purifying drinking water, ending child labor and
sweatshops, and promoting freedom and democracy, as we should be, then we
ought to enhance the international programs designed to do so. We should be
honest with ourselves and recognize that pollution in Mexico or Argentina was
not created by international trade, and it will not be cured through international
trade agreements.' 9 The same can be said for impure water or smog in Egypt or
Pakistan. International trade is for the most part a small fraction of the
economies of the countries of the developing world, and in most instances it is
but a tributary to the main rivers of problems that course through them. It thus
is at the margins of the problems that are now being linked with trade.
What we need is not defensive measures to guard against the so-called
"race to the bottom." Trade "linkage" merely locks in existing environmental
and labor standards that have proven in the United States view to be ineffective.
The labor and environmental provisions of the NAFTA and the United StatesJordan Free Trade Agreement, for example, do not lift standards, but rather fix
in place the very policies that such provisions were initially proposed to
counteract. Instead, what we need are affirmative measures to create a "race to
Development, at 2, available at http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2002/economy.pdf (last visited Mar. 12,
2003).
18. For example, President Kennedy encouraged free trade reforms by arguing, "[a]s they say on
my own Cape Cod, a rising tide lifts all the boats." President's Address in the Assembly Hall at the
Paulskirche in Frankfurt, Published Papers, 519 (June 25, 1963).
19.
See, e.g., HAKAN NORDSTROM & SCOTT VAUGHAN, WTO SECRETARIAT, Special Studies No.
4, Trade and Environment (1999) (reviewing prior studies and concluding that international as opposed to
domestic trade may exacerbate negative environmental conditions or diminish enthusiasm for environmental
reforms, but there is little evidence that it is the cause of world's major environmental problems).
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the top." If we want workers to have a right to organize, if we want the cutting
of rain forests to stop, we must put the full weight of the United States and the
developed world behind initiatives that will strive to meet these goals.
This of course also means tapping the treasuries of the United States and
developed countries to invest in these initiatives. We must offer carrots and not
just trade sanction sticks. Even if it could be shown to produce results,
threatening to cut off market access for developing country agriculture or
textiles is a rather indirect way to secure cleaner air in Peru. United States
consumers and Peruvian farmers, two groups liberals should want to help, are
asked to shoulder a considerable burden so that other liberal priorities may
advance.
Of course, a "race to the top" will not come cheap. But, the truth is
that United States foreign aid lags behind almost every other
industrialized nation as a percentage of GDP. It has stood at roughly
...
of United States GDP, and almost all of the richest countries in the
world consistently fail to meet their established goal of... We of
course cannot fund all of the initiatives that might be deserving of
funding, but we can do more.
Some might wonder where the money will come from, especially at a time
when the United States budget has slipped from surplus into deficit. The answer
to the question is too complex to go into depth here, but United States to its
credit has responded to various crises throughout its history by mobilizing
resources commensurate to quell the disturbances at hand. If United States
liberals would unify around the notion that two billion people in the world today
living without sanitation, and l\one billion people living without clean water,
is a crisis, I believe the money can be found.

VII. REDUCING CORPORATE TAXES FOR GOOD CORPORATE CITIZENS
Beyond an end to "linkage," I submit that the liberal position on trade
should begin to turn away from border measures and turn to a new approach to
the treatment of corporations and the use of subsidies.
It is remarkable that the same zeal liberals apply to curbing the "race to the
bottom" in international trade is not applied to corporate law in the United
States. Currently, we have fifty different state corporate laws that to some
extent compete with each other. It is axiomatic that Delaware is one of the best
places for businesses to incorporate because it offers executives the greatest
discretion and corporations the greatest protections. And, relaxation of local
rules and regulations to attract businesses to a region are commonplace.
A new and better approach need not punish corporations or encumber their
operations. What it should do is provide corporations with incentives to be
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better United States and global citizens and to keep good jobs in the United
States. If we want United States companies that do business overseas to pay a
living wage, or adhere to environmental practices akin to those required here,
we should give them an economic reason to do so. We could of course pass a
law that all United States businesses must pay their employees wherever located
the United States minimum wage, and require these companies to meet United
States environmental standards everywhere in the world. Doing so, however,
would likely lead to a retrenchment of United States investment in the countries
that desperately need it.
Rather, liberals should study, and perhaps seek to implement, a reduction
in United States corporate taxes conditioned on corporate behavior that
advances certain core values. A reduced tax might operate as follows:
a) The United States corporate rate could work on two tracks. The
current system could remain in effect and operate precisely as it does
now;
b) However, a second, lower United States tax rate could be
applied for income earned as a result of the production of goods in the
United States or services supplied in or from the United States. The
rate reduction should be calibrated to be at the low end of major
developing countries. It need not be the lowest rate among
industrialized nations, since the United States has sufficient
efficiencies and benefits to overcome a small tax advantage offered
by its main developed competitors;
c) This reduction likely would pay for itself in part. A large
number of companies would increase production and operations in
the United States if the United States tax rate were lower;
d) This lower rate, however, would be conditioned on companies
pledging to be good corporate citizens. These companies would have
to meet certain minimum environmental and labor standards overseas.
These companies would have to be willing to act as United States
business ambassadors, promoting improved practices around the
world. These companies would have to agree to be run for the benefit
of workers and shareholders as much as executives. In this postEnron, Arthur Andersen, and Worldcom world, there may never be
a better time to retool the United States approach to how and for
whom companies should be operated;
e) This lower tax rate also would be available for companies doing
business in least developed countries. This would avoid a lower
United States corporate tax rate steering investments away from the
countries that need it most.
Some might criticize such a dual tax system as violating the principal of tax
neutrality - that is, a tax system should not be used to affect where business
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activities take place. However, such a principal is honored mostly in the breach.
Indeed, the WTOs export subsidy rules actually are skewed to allow countries
to tax export income earned offshore less than income earned domestically.
Such a regime only fuels the fire that leads many on the left to charge that
international trade leads to an evaporation of good jobs in developed countries.
This tax proposal is intended to balance and advance several liberal goals.
It would diminish the need for border protection and hopefully pave the way to
retain and expand developing country access to the United States market. To
the extent developing country goods make inroads in the United States, the
answer would not be protection, but a reduction in taxes to make United States
companies more competitive. A tax reduction of course can affect the
conditions of competition, but unlike a tariff or quota, a tax cut would at least
give developing country goods a fighting chance. It would also energize the
private sector to improve overseas standards, rather than resorting to borderclosing sanctions to punish countries that fail to meet certain prescribed goals.
And, it would take one of the most important policy tools of the right and
convert it to progressive ends - no small political advantage.
VIII. USE OF PRINCIPLED SUBSIDIES

Finally, a new approach to the use of subsidies could advance the liberal
goals of helping United States workers and producers without unduly harming
the interests of the developing world. Unlike the recent farm bill, in which large
portions of $180 billion dollars in subsidies will in no small measure go to
parties other than family farmers or farmers in distress, new United States
subsidies should:
1) Fund research and development (which likely will have spillover effects that will offer benefits well beyond the enterprise or
product at hand);
2) Help businesses and industries that are in need of adjustment
(using subsidies rather than border-closing safeguard actions);
3) Provide aid to small businesses;
4) Cover the costs of worker training, relocation, and benefits; and
5) Aid industrial modernization.
While here too it is possible that developing country competitors may be
disadvantaged through increased United States subsidies, resort to subsidies in
general should be less harmful than tariffs or quotas. This would be especially
true if safeguards are put in effect to ensure that subsidies are not used simply
to alter the terms of competition or to help large players get an even greater
share of the market.
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IX. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it may be true, from the perspective of developing countries,
that the best United States trade policy would be the conservative trade policy.
That is, a trade policy in which markets are simply opened and products can
compete strictly on economic terms. Such a vision, though, would ignore the
fact that the conservative position is generally predicated on reciprocity, which
would mean that developing countries must abandon their often double-digit
tariffs to see an end to United States tariffs that in most cases are lower. It also
ignores the political reality that a protection-free world is simply not possible
at this time.
What is realistic is a shift away from trade-reducingpolicies that emanate
from "linkage," the exponential growth in the use of trade remedies, and
straight-out protection. Meaningful labor, environmental, and human rights
projects, reduced corporate taxes in exchange for improved corporate behavior,
and targeted use of subsidies would advance liberal ideas while enhancing the
welfare of the average consumer and the poor. It may be that such policies
would not provide the guaranteed protections the current liberal position on
trade seeks, but such policies would not harm the very people liberals in general
want to help.
Robert Bork, a well-known United States conservative jurist and legal
scholar, was once asked how he came to be such an ardent right-winger when
he was a socialist early in life. He responded by saying that "anyone who is not
a socialist at eighteen has no heart; anyone who is a socialist at fourty-eight has
no brain." Paraphrasing Bork, it may be correct to say that "any liberal who
strives to protect a small number of United States jobs at the expense of the
developing world has a heart in need of resuscitation; but a liberal who strives
to protect those most in need of protection here in the United States and in the
developing world have both a heart and a brain."

A DEEP STRUCTURE CONNECTION: CHILD
LABOR AND THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
Sara Ann Dillon*
I would like to begin my remarks by making two utterly contradictory
statements with regard to the relationship, as I see it, between the global
phenomenon of child labor, and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The first is that there is no relationship whatsoever between these two
subjects, that the WTO has no institutional capacity to respond to concerns
about even the worst forms of child labor; and indeed that much of the academic
writing on the subject of a notional relationship between these topics has been
largely wasted effort.
The other, contrasting, statement, is that attempts to imagine an effective
and enforceable global regulatory response to child labor, as well as to other
human rights abuses, is inextricably connected with the rise of World Trade
Organization law since the mid 1990s, in the sense that a set of genuine "rights
to trade" (with states acting as proxies for their most powerful transnational
economic actors) has offered an irresistible model for the achievement of other
kinds of global regulatory structures.
The idea, however, that the WTO as it is, and with the name it carries, can
or will influence the destiny of most or even many child laborers, is completely
fanciful. For one thing, there is quite literally nothing in WTO law concerning
child labor, apart from the abstract debate as to whether or not Article XX of the
GATT should allow member countries to maintain import bans on the products
of child labor. I would like to make clear that in stating that the WTO lacks
capacity to be effective in this area, I am not motivated by hostility towards
proposals for a WTO "social clause," one that might incorporate core labor
standards as part of the necessary preconditions to state participation in the
WTO system of trade rights and obligations. For the most part, advocates of a
social clause have been well intentioned, seeking to preserve labor rights in the
developed world, while assisting the workers of the developing world.2 At the
*

Professor, Suffolk University School of Law.

I.
Much has been written on the "new legalism" of the WTO, as compared with the looser and
more diplomatic structures of the former GAIT system. See, e.g, Robert L. Howse, The House That Jackson
Built: Restructuring the GA7T System, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 107 (Winter 1999).

2.

For a description of what a WTO "social clause" would look like, see, e.g., Anjli Garg, A Child

Labor Social Clause: Analysis and ProposalforAction, 31 NYU J. INT'L L. & POL. 473 (Winter/Spring 1999)
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same time, it is clear to me that a legally binding "social clause," however vital
to the creation of a fairly regulated global order, actually belongs elsewhere than
within the WTO.
It is of course significant that the WTO is the ultimate symbol of
globalization, as it is the legal mechanism for the dismantling of the national
economic impulse.3 The phenomenon of child labor, on the other hand, must
be seen as the ultimate symbol of a failure to achieve a corresponding global
protection for the vulnerable. The urgency with which the issue of child labor
should be approached has little to do with the question of whether child labor
has in fact increased specifically to service the "global economy." It would
appear that a relatively small percentage of child labor in the developing world
participates directly in the "global" or export economy, but this is beside the
point, and in no way absolves global institutions and/or developed country
governments from responsibility.4 Globalization exists; strong transnational
actors have access to global markets; and child labor of all kinds continues to
exist and dominate the lives of a significant proportion of the world's children.
Beyond this clear proposition, there is no necessity for attribution of blame;
there is only a compelling reason to seek a solution.
It is very telling that the WTO's Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 1996
stated that the International Labor Organization (ILO) alone had the
"competence" to enforce global labor standards.5 This was particularly ironic,
since the then newly minted WTO did in fact have enforcement "competence,"
albeit only as far as trade principles were concerned; whereas the ILO was well
known not to enjoy such competence. While the ILO clearly has responsibility
for generating international labor standards, it lacks the type of enforcement arm
that sets the WTO apart from other international law systems.
(arguing that a social clause would provide a mechanism to deter hazardous and exploitative international
child labor); see also, Adelle Blackett, Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty
Interpretation, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. I (Fall 1999).
3.

See Jeff Atik, Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium: Democratizing the WTO, 33 GEO.

WASH. INT'L L. REV. 451 (2001). Atik writes: "The WTO is feared as a super-government, driven by the logic
of free trade to override national preferences."
4.
For recent statistics on the scale and nature of child labor worldwide, see Every Child Counts:
New Global Estimates on Child Labour, I.L.O. (2002).
5.
Certain member delegations had argued in favor of inclusion of a commitment to a "core labor
standards" provision in the declaration, but this was ultimately defeated, mainly by the resistance of
developing countries. See James L. Kenworthy, U.S. Trade Policy and the World Trade Organization: The
Unraveling of the Seattle Conference and the Future of the WTO, 5 GEO. PUB POL'Y REV. 103 (2000).
Kenworthy writes that "during the Singapore conference, the United States.. had pushed for a significant
statement by the ministers that could lead to future negotiations in the area of core labor standards and trade
and environment. ....However, Washington was forced to give way on its demands for further work on labor
standards in the WTO as the price of bringing Pakistan, India and some other hardline developing countries
on board." Id. at 107.
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"We renew our commitment," the Singapore Declaration states, "to the
observance of internationally recognized core labor standards. The ILO is the
competent body to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm our support
for its work in promoting them."'6 The Declaration goes on to say that "We
believe that economic growth and development fostered by increased trade and
further trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of these standards." And
most significantly, reflecting the suspicions of many developing countries, "We
reject the use of labor standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the
comparative advantage of countries, particularly low wage developing
countries, must in no way be put into question."
It has baffled me, as a long-time observer of writing on the topic of "trade
and..."--trade and human rights, trade and labor, trade and the
environment-that there has been a near-obsession by many academics with the
question of what the WTO might, through the interpretation of GATT Article
XX by panels and the Appellate Body, "allow."' 7 Or what those two bodies
could be induced to "take on board" in terms of a non-economic, human
dimension. Or what the Appellate Body will "come to understand" with regard
to an ultimate synthesis of conflicting state obligations arising from different
and opposing treaties-trade versus labor, the environment, human rights. I
have no doubt that such a synthesis must be carried out, but not by any organ
of the WTO. Rather, the real and inescapable need is for another, as yet
undefined, global institution to carry out this synthesis; not a trade organization
the sole focus of which, the sole ethos and objective of which, is to facilitate
trade.8
I would term the entire "Article XX" approach, with its narrow WTO
focus, reductionist at best. At worst, it is a distraction that leads one to ignore
the actual facts of global child abuse; the reality of child trafficking for the
6.

For a complete discussion of the history and characteristics of the ILO, see HECTOR J.

BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION: THE INTERNATIONAL

STANDARDS SYSTEM AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS (Boulder, Colo. And Oxford, England: Westview Press)

(1996).
7.
Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade deals with "general exceptions" to
the substantive GATI requirements. With the caveat that trade restrictions covered by this article may not be
"applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade," GATT"parties are allowed
to maintain measures that can be justified for reasons of public morals, the protection of human, animal or
plant life, relating to the products of prison labor, or to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, and
similar public interest objectives. For a general discussion of the relationship between Article XX and human
rights issues, see Salman Bal, InternationalFree TradeAgreements and Human Rights: ReinterpretingArticle
XXofthe GATT, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL Trade 62, 72 (2001).

8.
For an exploration of the clash between trade and non-trade values, see Frank J. Garcia, The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets: Trading Away the
Human Rights Principle, 25 BROOK J. INT'L L. 51 (1999).
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purposes of work in sweatshops and in the sex industry. That is why, in my
view, the fact of a global economy leads inevitably to the need for a global
solution to such economic outrages; at the same time, I maintain that the WTO
itself, as an institution, is not the place to look for that solution.
There have been periodic bursts of academic speculation on the subject of
what the WTO's Appellate Body would now do if clearly faced with a challenge
to a national import restriction on imports of products made from child labor.
The favored hypothetical in these discussions is the case of a WTO member
country that creates an import ban on the products of child labor. (The US and
EC do, in fact, maintain certain restrictions on the import of products of child
labor, but these are far from comprehensive and of course cannot begin to
identify all incoming products that might contain elements produced through the
agency of child labor. 9)
By way of background to the "child labor hypothetical", the recent history
of conflict between national regulation in the public interest and GATT rules
probably dates most explicitly to the famous "Tuna Dolphin" (pre-WTO) cases
of the early 1990s. The upshot of these two (unadopted) panel decisions was
that (i) the US could not engage in "extraterritorial" imposition of its dolphin
conservation law, by in essence demanding these standards of its GATT trading
partners, and that (ii) under GATT principles, a party could only deal with the
end "product"; in other words, could not justify differential treatment of that
product based on the "process" through which the product was made, or in this
case, caught. Though the Tuna-Dolphin panel reports remained unadopted, and
thus without real legal effect, they caused a serious ripple of alarm across the
environmental community worldwide; the message was that hard-won
environmental regulation could be invalidated by the operation of GATT law.'°
The possible chilling effect on future environmental laws, at least those that
relied on import restrictions as a means of national enforcement, was clear.
Equally clear was that other non-trade, public interest values were also
potentially at risk."
9.
See Benjamin James Stevenson, Pursuing and End to Foreign Child Labor Through US Trade
Law: WTO Challenges and Doctrinal Solutions, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 129, 145 - 151 (2002)
(describing the US framework of laws attempting to discourage imports of goods produced through child
labor).
10.
See United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna Dolphin I), Report of the Panel,
DS2 I/R-39S/155, 3 September 1991; and United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna Dolphin II),
DS 29/R, 16 June 1994. For a complete discussion of these attempts to rely on Article XX to defend national
environmental laws, see Padideh Ala'1, Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO
Appellate Body's Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalization, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. Rev. 1129
(1999).
I1. For early reaction to the Tuna-Dolphin reasoning, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Using Trade to
Enforce International Environmental Law: Implicationsfor United States Law, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD.
273 (1994).
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Trade law specialists have made much of the fact that the more recent
Shrimp/ Turtle cases have led to national conservation laws being treated more
deferentially by the WTO's Appellate Body, and the objectives of the
Convention on Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) at least acknowledged by
the WTO bodies. 12 A supposed evolution in the thinking and sensitivity of the
Appellate Body has been pointed to; sometimes even celebrated. Although in
the Appellate Body's hands not an "Article XX" case per se, this positive
tendency has also been noted in the "Asbestos" case, wherein a French ban on
asbestos-containing products was allowed to stand, on the basis that the inherent
danger of the products concerned legitimized the French difference in treatment
of otherwise similar products--some with asbestos, some without. 13 These
developments have been hailed by some as the end of the old Tuna Dolphin
product/process line of reasoning. The logic of these discussions is that the
Appellate Body will continue to pursue a more enlightened set of principles
allowing for the happy co-existence of economic and non-economic principles,
and national governments will supposedly be free to implement other
international obligations through the device of import bans where these are felt
to be central to the attainment of non-trade goals.
My dominant impression in reading such academic discussions has been:
What on earth does this have to do with the broader effects of the momentum
of globalization? With environmental degradation, with the frantic drive to
develop, with the suffering of people caught up in these processes? And, as a
very fundamental matter, it must be asked whether developed countries do in
fact maintain import restrictions capable of dealing more than superficially with
human rights and environmental abuses, based on consideration of the
"processes" through which certain items are produced for export by trading
partners in the developing world? Isn't it true that the products likely to be
identified through such import bans represent only the tip of the iceberg, when
it comes to child labour and other abuses? Aren't many academic discussions
of Article XX wastefully theoretical, given the scale of the problem, and of the
non-trade values at stake?
12.
See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Product, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R (October 12, 1998); United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/RW
(October 22, 2001). For a complete discussion of the reasoning in both phases of the case, see Robert Howse,
The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baselinefor the Trade and Environment
Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491 (2002).

13.
See European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS 135/AB/R (March 12, 2001). See also Laura Yavitz, The World Trade
Organization Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 43 (2002) (describing the Appellate Body's decision as

"positive and important").
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Despite the fact that import restrictions on goods produced under abusive
labor conditions may do little to ameliorate these conditions on any scale, we
may nevertheless be about to see a showdown at the WTO between just such a
set of import restrictions and free trade principles. This impending dispute,
described below, is symbolic of the hostility so often expressed by developing
countries towards the prospect of "trade and" restrictions by wealthy countries
against products from the developing world that, in their production process,
have offended against non-economic principles (such as core labor standards)
derived from some other sector of international law.14 And while the true "trade
and human rights" debate goes far beyond the question of how the WTO bodies
will treat national labor-based import restrictions, we should nevertheless take
this opportunity to recognize the symbolic value of this upcoming dispute,
described below.
In a perverse way, the very narrowness of the "trade and" academic debate
to date has generated a "trade and" backlash on the part of developing countries
in the WTO, who fear that the developed world is merely seeking a new set of
excuses to deny market access to products from the developing world, where a
production process does not meet certain externally imposed standards. 5 By
way of background to the dispute alluded to above, both the US and the EC
maintain certain import restrictions as preconditions on participation in their
"generalized system of (tariff) preferences" for products from the developing
world.16 These GSP programs, dating from the early 1970s, were created under
pressure from developing countries, and enjoy a specific GATT waiver allowing
the wealthier GATT countries to offer preferential tariff terms to a wide variety
of manufactured goods from the developing world. India's principal claim in
the present dispute, still at consultation stage, is that the labor and
environmental conditions being set by the EC as the cost of participation in its
GSP program is not in accordance with the language of the original provisions
14.
Indian Minister for Commerce and Industry Murasoli Maran was reported to state that
"developing countries have long opposed the linkage of trade with labor and environmental standards on the
grounds that they might be used as an excuse to distort competition, undermine comparative advantage and
provide a 'Trojan horse' of protectionism." Maran Opposes New Non-Trade Issues at WTO Meeting, THE

HINDU, June 20, 2001.
15.

Professor Jadish Bhagwati has been quoted as saying that "The bid to bring the social clause

under the World Trade Organization must be resisted tooth and nail," and perhaps more disingenuously, that
"[if] you change the WTO to reflect the Western view that everything is right with the West and is bad with
developing countries, then you are putting a bomb under the WTO." 'Resist Bid to Bring Social Clause Under
the WTO, THE ECONOMIC TIMES OF INDIA, December 17, 2000.

16.
The US Trade and Development Act of 2000 made a grounds of ineligibility to participation in
the US GSP scheme that a country "has not implemented its commitments to eliminate the worst forms of
child labor." Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. 114 Stat. 25 1.

The same act also added to the

general prohibition against the importation into the United States of the products of "convict labor," a
prohibition against importing products made from the "forced or indentured child labor." Id. at § 411.
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enabling the EC to deviate from GATT Article I in order to grant the
preferences in question. The GATT language of the "enabling clause"
demanded that "generalized non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences"
be "beneficial to the developing countries in order to increase the export
earnings, to promote the industrialization, and to accelerate the rates of
economic growth" and that the preferences should be designed "to facilitate and
promote the trade of developing countries", and to "respond positively" to their
developmental, financial and trade needs. India argues that the EC conditions
cannot be reconciled with the original requirements, as they create "undue
difficulties for India's exports to the EC."'"
India is unlikely to prevail in this dispute, assuming it goes forward, for a
number of reasons. More cautious and politically aware these days, the WTO
bodies might well decide to interpret the GSP enabling language conservatively,
and avoid a hot-button clash between trade and non-trade principles. However,
if a violation of GATT law were to be found, the stage would be set for
arguments under Article XX, to the effect that national concern for labor
standards justifies the trade restriction-the very stuff of the academic
hypotheticals! Whatever happens, it is significant that, just as the Indian
Pharmaceuticals cases made us realize that the developed world was going to
use TRIPS aggressively whatever the ultimate effects, 8 this current action by
India demonstrates the level of hostility to the idea of "linage"-linking
international trade law, and WTO law in particular, to non-trade values,
resulting in import restrictions. This hostility obtains even where violation of
core labor standards plainly amounts to violation of international human rights
law, and can have little to do with anyone's traditional notion of "comparative
advantage."
Interestingly, this hostility of developing world governments is aimed at
a relatively modest attempt to influence labor standards extraterritorially:
17.
See European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing
Countries, Request for Consultations by India, WT/DS246/l/G/I.521-, (March 12, 2002). For a discussion
of the EU's approach to GSP, see William H. Meyer & Boyka Stefanova, Human rights, the UN Global
Compact and Global Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 501 (2001). They write: "The key features of the
EU's GSP include tariff modulation, country-sector graduation, and special incentive arrangements. The
special incentive arrangements, operational as of 1998, refer to labor rights and environmental protection.
Special trade provisions are given to countries that comply with ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 concerning
the rights to organize and bargain collectively, and No. 138 with respect to the minimum age for
employment." The more recent version of the EU scheme makes even stronger demands on developing
countries, in terms of application of the ILO "core labor standards." Id. at 508.
18.
See India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Agricultural Chemical Products, Report
of the Appellate Body, WT/DS50/AB/R (December 19, 1997). In this case and a similar complaint was
brought by the EC against India. India was required to create a legally sound transitional "mailbox" system
for the filing of patents; and in more general terms, to confront, soon after the coming into effect of the TRIPS
Agreement, the deficiencies, from a developed country point of view, in its national patent law.
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conditions on participation in a GSP program. We are not even in the realm of
the "social clause" here-the social clause being a far more ambitious idea, one
that would impose actual core standards on WTO members. We are not even
near the possibility of making widespread reliance on child labor part of an
accepted theory of unfair trade in the form of "social dumping."
We are probably now far enough removed from November/December 1999
that we can bear to think about the ministerial debacle of "Seattle." At the time,
President Clinton made these famous remarks: "I believe the W.T.O. should
make sure that open trade does indeed lift living standards, respect core labor
standards that are essential not only to workers' rights, but to human rights.
That's why this year the United States has proposed that the W.T.O. create a
working group on trade and labor."' 9 The rest is, of course, history. There was
fierce resistance to Clinton's proposals from some of the most powerful of the
developing countries, with India in the lead. Certain popular intellectuals,
foremost among these Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University, were scathing
in their criticism of the "pro labor standards"--and decidedly anti-WTO--street
demonstrators who came to prominence at Seattle. Disorganized and divided
as they were, the demonstrators had come to see the WTO as a main contributor
to the death of national regulation in the public interest.
Oddly, depending on the issue, I both strongly agree and strongly disagree
with Professor Bhagwati. On the one hand, he has come out in favor of a World
Bank sponsored program of wealth transfers to deal with problems caused by
adjustments to economic globalization in the developing world. 0 (It is, in my
view, often this wealth transfer dimension that eludes the "pro-social clause"
progressives who critique the WTO.) Bhagwati has also made the point, over
and again, that trade sanctions and import restrictions will not "make a dent" in
the problem of child labor. I believe he is correct in this. He cites to the
frequently mentioned example of female children in the Bangladeshi textile
industry who, having been let go under the threat of the Child Labor Deterrence

19. See Clyde Summers, The Battle In Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal Values, 22
U. PA.J, INT'L ECON. L. 61 (2001) [hereinafter Summers]. Summers writes: " [Clinton] further inflamed the
issue by making an unplanned statement to a newspaper that the trade group should at some point use
sanctions to enforce core labor rights around the world. Clinton's statement provoked an adamant response
from developing countries, which saw any tying of trade to labor or environmental rights as disguised
protectionism by developed countries to keep out exports from developing countries and stymie their
development." Id. at 62.
20.
"I have therefore argued that the Bretton Woods institutions must be geared to providing
compensation or adjustment assistance to poor countries harmed by the freeing of trade at the WTO.... It is
time toput the president of the World Bank to work systematically to buttress the world trading system and
the helpful freeing of trade that the WTO oversees and encourages, by aiding the poor as necessitated by those
WTO actions." Jagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question ofLinkage, 96:1 AM. J. INT'L L. 126-127 (2002).
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(Harkin) Act of 1995 (unenacted), soon found themselves in far worse
circumstances, particularly in the sex trade.2'
His continued attacks on concerned young people in the West, however,
fail to make sense, as most of these protestors are attempting to bring a human
dimension to a globalizing world, an agenda that in itself can hardly be seen as
anything but positive. In a recent article, Bhagwati decries the fact that many
of these are young people trained in comparative literature, rather than
economic, leading them into delusions about the nature of "global capitalism."
"Capitalism," Bhagwati writes, "should be defended against ignorant,
ideological, or strategic assaults. 2
Who could seriously argue that there is in fact no gross disproportion
between the laws favoring transnational economic activity on the one hand, and
those devoted to human rights and labor concerns on the other? And who would
advocate that this discrepancy continue as is into the indefinite future? To the
extent that reliance on child labor, especially in its worst forms, is indicative of
societal failure and economic breakdown, a quantitative assessment of the
relationship between globalization and child labor is unnecessary. What matters
is that the two phenomena co-exist. Whether or not there are certain elements
in the United States motivated by job protectionism when they denounce
reliance on child labor is equally irrelevant. Social dumping may well be a fact;
there is no shame is wishing to preserve one's job; and the labor movement in
the developed world does have important principles to preserve.23
It is important to recognize that denunciation of those who are advocating
some version of good global governance and a fairer world trading order leaves
us no nearer to solving the most pernicious forms of abuse, including child
labor. At its most virulent, this sort of denunciation creates a false dichotomy
between the interests of concerned citizens in the developed world and people
in the developing world, who suffer the most from the gross disparities
discussed above. One UPI correspondent goes so far as to say that many NGOs
involved in the anti-globalization movement are peopled by "busybodies,
preachers, critics, do-gooders, and professional altruists," encroaching "on state
24
sovereignty in the name of international law.
However, as Professor Clyde Summers asked in a recent article, we need
to question how far some are willing to take the idea of comparative advantage.

21.

See Jagdish Bhagwati, Coping with Antiglobalization; A Trilogy of Discontents, FOREIGN

AFFAIR,S January/February 2002-, at 2.

22.

Id.

23.
See George Ross, Labor versus Globalization, 570 ANNALS Am. ACAD.POL.& SOC. SC. 78
(2000) (describing the empirical difficulties faced by the "international" labor movement in an age of
globalization).
24.

See Sam Vaknin, Commentary: The Self-Appointed Altruists, UPI, October 9, 2002.
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He points out that it is not even an option for us to include within the stock of
a nation's comparative advantage violations of ILO Convention 182 on the
Worst Forms of Child Labor, since to say that such violations are merely the
sovereign business of a particular state is to countenance human rights
violations in the name of free trade-a plainly irrational position.25 Summers
also makes the point that many of the countries most adamantly opposed to
using any trade-related device to enforce core labor standards have themselves
ratified the relevant conventions and are bound by their (admittedly more or less
unenforceable) obligations.26
Naturally enough, there is a fear that the wealthy developed countries
might hide behind these standards to engage in some form of insidious
protectionism. However, as Robert Howse has suggested, this need not be the
case at all. As far as the "import restriction and Article XX" issue is concerned,
even the WTO would at least carry out a review of the exact nature of the
import restriction concerned.27 If claims for the effectiveness of import
restrictions in dealing with such abuses as the worst forms of child labor have
been fanciful, then certainly the claims made regarding the protectionist dangers
inherent in allowing such restrictions have also been wildly exaggerated.
But I have already made clear that my own focus is not the narrow question
of whether or not national import restrictions may be maintained, within the
terms of GATT Article XX. The WTO has no interpretive capacity to deal with
larger human rights issues; no mandate; no substance. No national import
restriction can in fact greatly influence the empirical fact of widespread labor
abuses, such as the worst forms of child labor.
In the concluding section of this paper, I will suggest my own approach to
the problem of "trade and child labor." My vision is not one of a new and more
enlightened WTO; nor do I subscribe to the doctrine that "time alone" will bring
about development that will of itself eliminate child labor and other
economically-based human rights abuses.28

25.

See Summers, supra note 19, at 65-68, 86, 90.

26.

Summers at 67.

For a positive view of the possibility of synthesizing core ILO principles and WTO obligations,
27.
see Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers' Rights, 3 J. SMALL &
EMERGING Bus. L. 131 (1999). (Howse writes of the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental principles and Rights
at work, adopted by the ILO membership, as a "watershed," in that "the Declaration makes achievement of
compliance with fundamental labor rights an obligation arising from the very status of membership in the ILO.
When the issue is egregious violations of these rights-such as violent suppression of collective bargaining,
gender discrimination, forced or slave labor, or exploitative child labor-trade measures are not necessarily
a protectionist attempt to level the playing field. Instead they may resemble the kinds of sanctions against
gross human rights violations that have been imposed by many members of the world community against
South Africa under apartheid and, more recently, against Serbia." Id. at 133.
28.

[Malaysian Prime Minister] Mahathir criticized some of the new WTO proposals, that link and
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As far as methodology is concerned, there has been far too much attention
paid to the study of the WTO in isolation from other global institutions, and
indeed from empirical phenomena generally. Joseph Stiglitz has clearly
identified the deeply flawed and ideologically based functioning of the IMF and
World Bank, and it is plain that the WTO cannot serve as an instrument for
development in the absence of a genuine "linkage" among all three of these
institutions.29 It is almost unthinkable that, in the absence of targeted
investment mediated by a global finance body, there could be adequate levels
"spontaneous" development attained in much of the developing world.
It could be said that the creation of the WTO, with its mechanisms of
enforcement, highly unusual in the context of "international law," has generated
a collective imagination in the direction of a more structured set of global
institutions. This in turn must lead to a recognition of the need for a court-like
body capable of synthesizing conflicting international obligations, including
conflicts between trade rights and labor standards. Key to the success of such
a global system is a redistributive body to fund programs proven effective in
eliminating abuses like the worst forms of child labor.
I understand it when Professor Summers laments that "There is no
international agency other than the WTO able to effectively exert pressure for
observance of rights on a global basis."3 But this absence of an alternative
body is not adequate reason for allowing or expecting the WTO to do that which
it does not know how to do. Summers is surely right, though, when he states
that "freedom of international trade is subject to observance of internationally
recognized basic human rights."'" The concept of "subject to," however, is both
mysterious and deeply ambiguous. How can we make countries "subject to"
that which they insist they cannot afford? But how, on the other hand, can we
countenance transnational corporations, many based in the developed world,
continuing to profit from their access to resources and markets in the developing
world, where widespread abuses against children proliferate?
condition trade and investment to non-trade issues, such as labor standards, human rights, democracy, child
labor. Making those conditional will retard the growth of many developing countries, he warned. He noted
rich countries had taken more than a century to teach their present status of social and economic
sophistication. 'It is unrealistic to expect developing countries to achieve such levels of sophistication
overnight," he said. Sonia Jessup, Malaysia PM decries globalization, WTO, UPI, September 10, 2001.
29.
See JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 12 - 13 (2002). As for the IMF,
Stiglitz writes "[o]ver the years, since its inception the IMF has changed markedly. Founded on the belief that
markets often worked badly, it now champions market supremacy with ideological fervor." And of the handin-glove activities of the IMF and World Bank during the 1980s, he writes that "[tihe IMF and World Bank
became the new missionary institutions, through which these ideas [free market ideology] were pushed on the
reluctant poor countries that often badly needed their loans and grants."

30.

Summers, supra note 19, at 89.

31.

Id. at 90.
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A significant amount of attention has been paid to attempts to take action
in US courts against US multinational corporations involved in serious
labor/human rights abuses; as well as to the production of corporate "codes of
32
conduct" meant to govern the conduct of developed world multinationals.
There have been a number of actions brought against US corporations under the
Alien Tort Claims Act, a statute that allows alien plaintiffs to seek a remedy in
US courts where another party has acted "in violation of the law of nations or
treaty of the United States. 33 While such actions are very important devices for
drawing attention to abusive conduct by US corporations, the statute is quite
difficult to use, in that it applies to only a small band of corporate acts. One
must link the conduct to international law principles; normally by demonstrating
that a US corporation has been complicit in the abusive conduct of a repressive
foreign regime. This kind of legal action bears little relationship with the mass
phenomenon of child labor, though it is conceivable that certain particularly
egregious corporate conduct could fall within the net of the statute. As for selfregulatory codes, these too are potentially significant, but are unlikely to have
any generalized effects on the general problem of child labor. Although one
might argue over the precise figures, it should be recalled that only a certain,
perhaps small, proportion of labor abuses against children involve Western
multinationals.
Without either fetishizing or ignoring the connection between international
trade law and child labor, I would propose a multifaceted approach to
eliminating the worst forms of child labor, a task which must be seen as an
international obligation falling on all parties having any degree of influence
over the process of globalization. First of all, the reality of the contentious
divide between the views of the developed and developing worlds with regard
to the fairness of relying on import restrictions as a device to promote higher
labor standards must be recognized. Penalizing countries with the most
vulnerable economic profiles actually makes little sense, and cannot have the
desired global effect, despite the reams of academic writing on the subject of
"trade and labor, and the role of GATT Article XX".
Where OECD-based multinationals are involved in the exploitation of
children for economic gain, any sanctions should be against the corporations in
question. This would involve the creation of a far more effective set of OECD
32.
On actions brought in US courts, see Andrew Ridenour, Doe v. Unocal Corp., Apples and
Oranges: Why Courts Should Use International Standards to Determine Liability for Violation of the Law of
Nations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 9 Tul. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 581 (2001) (discussing reliance on the

Alien Tort Claims Act in US courts); and on voluntary international codes of conduct for MNEs, see Meaghan
Shaughnessy, The United Nations Global Compact and the Continuing Debate About the Effectiveness of

Corporate Voluntary Codes of Conduct, 2000 COLO. J. INT'L ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 159 (2000).
33.
28 USC § 1350 (1993), stating that "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien in tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or treaty of the United States."
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rules, with mandatory national implementation, than anything that exists to
date. 4 I could not in good conscience state that such a development is
politically likely. Nevertheless, it is clear that where developed world MNEs
are directly involved in labor/human rights abuses, regardless of the minimal or
nonexistent labor standards of the host country, the proper target of sanctions
in most cases is the MNE, not the host country. 35 (I make the point below that
sanctions against the host country could become appropriate, but only after a
transition period during which significant investment had been made in
programs to eliminate the worst forms of child labor and other abusive labor
practices.)
As has been pointed out, most child labor is tied to a given national
economy, and does not bear any direct relationship to MNEs. Nor is most child
labor related to export trade, although clearly some is. Relying on GATT
Article XX to justify import bans in such cases is certain to generate more
hostility, and have little effect on the underlying problem. Where there is no
relationship of the labor exploitation to exports, GATT Article XX is essentially
irrelevant in any case.
I would like to posit a "deep structure linkage," in which the very fact of
globalization means that the global economic institutions should be required to
act in a concerted manner to invest in the elimination of particular abuses. This
would necessitate a reorientation of the agendas of the IMF and World Bank in
particular. Whether seen in the context of human rights or long term economic
development, the elimination of the worst forms of child labor would be a
starting point for such targeted investment. While far too small in scale, there
are model programs, such as the ILO' s International program on the Elimination
of Child Labour (IPEC), designed to allow countries to eliminate child labor, by
giving children access to school and replacing child labor with adult labor--a far
more certain route to development than waiting for market liberalization to work
its magic. 36 The IMF and World Bank should be held to the achievement of
specific, empirically based goals, derived from the principles contained in
international conventions, including those of the ILO.

34.
See for instance, the OECD's aspirational Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises of 1976. The OECD emphasis in that document and its annexes was to ensure that
MNEs should meet the employment standards of the host country.
35.
I use the phrase "in most cases" to distinguish between general sanctions brought to bear against
a generally repressive and illegitimate regime; and the situation where a poor country lacks the resources to
eliminate the exploitation of child labor in its less virulent forms.
36.
See Mary Gray Davidson, The International Labour Organization's Latest Campaign to End
Child Labor: Will It Succeed Where Others Have Failed? I I TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (200 1)
(describing the IPEC campaign, which is based on assistance for a phased elimination of the worst forms of
child labor).

456

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 9:443

My own perspective on the WTO is that it provides a model of
international regulation; not in its substance so much as in its "nonvoluntariness". Assuming that there was an international fund to assist in the
elimination of child labor, at that point developing countries and developed
countries should indeed have their participation in bodies like the WTO
conditioned on their good faith efforts to bring about results. The expansion of
global economic activity does bear a logical relationship to the impulse towards
global regulation. The WTO is possessed of an unusual and even exciting nonvoluntary quality, contributing to the prospect that non-trade law, including
labor and human rights law, might share that same non-voluntariness. How one
counters the economic forces that created the WTO with non-trade values, such
that a similar urgency could inform a project to eliminate the worst forms of
child labor, is a difficult political problem. For a start, there should be a
redirection of the content of anti-globalization protests, through the creation of
a list of firm "trade and" demands. The message of the global dissidents should
be more focused, centered on the principle that the right of developed countries
to profit from global business activity should depend on the contribution of
those same countries to high levels of targeted investment in a global regime to
protect core labor standards.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On September 11, 2001, a network of terrorists hijacked four commercial
airliners and crashed them into the World Trade Center and Pentagon, killing
and injuring thousands of Americans, as the world watched in shock and
disbelief.' In a perfect biblical setting, the government of the United States
would invoke the "eye for an eye" doctrine and retaliate with lethal force,
seeking justice for the thousands of men, women, and children that our country
lost in the blink of an eye. However, when the United States signed the United
Nations Charter on June 26, 1945, it became bound by international law and the
2
limits of warfare that accompany it.
I.
Frank Hyland, Terrorism Hits Home: Hundreds Feared Dead as Planes Hit World Trade
Center; Pentagon also Hit by Suicide Attack from the Air; All Airline Flights Nationwide are Canceled,
ATLANTA J.&CONST., Sept. 11,2001, at IA; Michael Grunwald, TerroristsHijack 4Airliners,Destroy World
Trade Center, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
2.
U.N. CHARTER, pmbl., http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/preamble.html. Provides that
"[a]ccordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco,
... have agreed to the present charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international
organization to be known as the United Nations."
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At the time the charter was ratified, the purpose of the United Nations was
to promote harmony and peace around the world and to save future generations
from the horrors of war.3 Although the United Nations and its charter have
signified a noble and important idealism, much debate has occurred over recent
years concerning the limitations of a state's right to defend itself. In the wake
of September 11, the argument more specifically involves whether a State can
invoke Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in the event of a terrorist attack
and subsequently attack the state that harbors those terrorists.' The United
States emphatically, and without hesitation, has responded to this issue.5
On October 7, 2001, the permanent representative of the United States sent
a letter to the United Nations, addressed to the President of the Security
Council, claiming the United States has an inherent right of individual and
collective self-defense, and reporting it had initiated actions designed to prevent
and deter further attacks on the United States.6 Since then, the United States has
taken direct military action in Afghanistan, leading and partnering with
governments from around the world to form a coalition whose purpose is to do
everything possible to eliminate the threat posed by international terrorism, and
to deter states form supporting, harboring, or acting complicity with
international terrorist groups.7

3.
Id. Provides that "[wie the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
for these needs to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security."
4.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 51, http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapter7.html [hereinafter U.N.
CHARTER] (reference is made to a states inherent right to self defense and allows for a state to take measures
in the event of an armed attack).
5.
A Nation Challenged; Bush's Remarks on U.S Military Strikes in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 2001, at B6. In a presidential announcement, President Bush announced "[o]n my orders the United States
military has begun strikes against Al Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan."
6.
Letter dated October 7, 2001, from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess. at
1,U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (2001), http://www.un.int/usa/s-2001-946.htm ("In accordance with Article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations, I wish ...
to report that the United States of America ...
has initiated actions
in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defense following the armed attacks that
were carried out against the United States."); See also Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed
Attack" in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 41,42 (2002). On the same day in which the
letter was sent, the United State and the United Kingdom launched cruise missiles and long-range bombers
against Al Qaeda and Taliban targets in Afghanistan" Id..; See Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. and Britain Strikes
Afghanistan, Aiming at Bases and Terrorist Camps: Bush Warns "Taliban Will Pay a Price," N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2001, at Al.
7.
Campaigning
Against
Terrorism:
A
Coalition
Update,
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/marchl l/coalition/military.html (Mar. 11,2002) ("To date, 17 nations have
deployed to the US Central Command's area of responsibility with over 16,500 troops.").
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This article will consist of two main parts. First, this paper will provide an
overview and breakdown of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, including
the settings and circumstances in which a state can invoke the article and
retaliate against another state in self-defense. Then, this paper will provide an
analysis of the United States war in Afghanistan, focusing on the war's legality
under the United Nations Charter and Article 51, in an objective format that will
provide both narrow and broad interpretations of the controversial legal
concepts embedded within Article 51.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER AND ARTICLE 51
When the United Nations Charter was signed following World War II, the
basic premise of the treaty was to outlaw war.8 This principal is inferred from
the general provisions of the Charter. Article 2(3) requires that all members are
to settle their disputes in a peaceful manner, 9 while Article 2(4) goes on to say
that all members, in their international relations, shall refrain from using force
against any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.' ° According to the International Court of Justice, these provisions
regarding the restraint of force are not just United Nations Charter provisions,
but are now regarded as a rule of customary international law." Accordingly,
peace and tranquility have become the customary rule of international law with
few exceptions.12
Although peace and security was the ultimate objective of the United
Nations Charter, the framers still understood the long-established right of a state
to defend itself. 13 Therefore, as an exception to the general rules regarding the
Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984)
8.
[hereinafter Schachter].
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, http://www.un.org/Overview/Charter/chapterl.htm Provides that "[aill
9.
members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and security, and justice, are not endangered."
10.
Id. Provides that "[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."
11. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
100 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicar v. U.S. ]; Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Casefor SelfDefense under InternationalLaw, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559 (Spring 2002) [herinafter Beard].
12. Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 11;. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE,72
(2nd ed.) (1994). -Distinguishing from the modem limits on warfare that accompany treaties and agreements,
Dinstein points out that the predominant conviction of the 19th and early 20th centuries was that every state
had a right to embark upon war whenever the state pleased. With all the discretion they need, states could
"resort to war for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all".; See also H.W. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF
NATIONS 976 (2nd ed, 1952).
13.
Nicar. V. U.S., supra note 11,at 94 ("On one essential point, this treaty itself refers to preexisting customary international law; this reference to customary law is contained in the actual text of Article
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use of force, the framers drew up Article 51.14 According to Article 51,
"Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self defense if an armed attack against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security...""
As international conflicts have grown prevalent in today's society, the text
of Article 51 has drawn much debate over how the Article should be interpreted
and, in particular, what circumstances must be present for a state to legally
defend itself.16 The inconsistency and incoherence surrounding Article 51 is
due primarily to the lack of definitions and references given to certain terms in
the text of the Article.' 7 For instance, before Article 51 can be invoked, there
must have been an "armed attack" on a nation.' 8 However, nowhere in the
provision does it say what constitutes an "armed attack". 9 Can an armed attack
be a terrorist attack? What about the assassination of a government leader?
Then there is the controversial issue as to what the framers of the article meant
by the expression "self-defense."2 What degree of self-defense is allowed?
Should the term "self-defense" be interpreted the same way that "self-defense"
is interpreted under certain state statutes? Under Florida law, the use of deadly
force would be justifiable if a person reasonable believes that such force is
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.2' Should the same
standards be used in the case of an attack on a country? Here lies the confusion
that surrounds Article 51 and scratches the head of legal scholars around the
globe.

51, which mentions the 'inherent right' of individual or collective self-defence."); Schachter, supra note 8, at
259-60.
14.

U.N. CHARTER, supra note 4.

15.
U.N. CHARTER, supra note 4. The article goes on to say that "[m]easures taken by Members in
the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
16.
Micheal J. Glennon, The Fog ofLaw: Self Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51
of the United Nations Charter,25 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 539,540 (2002) [hereinafter Glennon] ("Between
1945 and 1999, two-thirds of the members of the United Nations - 126 states out of 189 - fought 291
interstate conflicts in which over 22 million people were killed.").
17.
U.N. CHARTER, supra note 4. There are no definitions in Article 51 to any of the broad terms
used in the charter.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20. Id.
21.
FLA. STAT. §.776.012 (2002) (Use of Force in Defense of Others).
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III. ARMED ATTACK
A. FramersIntent
The lack of authority as to what constitutes an "armed attack" has
promulgated a heated debate among legal scholars. There are many who believe
that it was the United Nations intent to apply a narrow definition to the term
"armed attack" under Article 5 1.22 Under such a view, the term "armed attack"
would not include attacks from terrorist organizations. 23 This rationale could
be reasoned to be accurate and consistent with traditional views considering, at
the time the charter was signed, military attacks, not terrorist attacks, occupied
the minds of world leaders.24 Furthermore, these same scholars have argued that
if it were the framers intent to apply a broad interpretation rather then a narrow
interpretation, then there would be no limitation as to whether an armed attack
has occurred. 25 An e-mail threat from abroad could be argued to constitute an
"armed attack" under such a broad view. However, a narrow interpretation
would allow many acts of war to easily take place without any legal resistance.
"Interpreting the concept of 'armed attack' restrictively, where the underlying
attack is terrorist in nature would merely serve to transform a necessary state
26
response into an 'unlawful' response under the United Nations Charter."
States that utilize terrorists to carry out acts of war on other nations would
essentially be protected under the United Nations Charter.2 The expression
"armed attack" should therefore be construed using a broad view, ensuring that
the September 11 attacks constituted an "armed attack" under Article 5 1.
B. Nicaraguav. United States of America
It also has been argued that a situation in which a country harbors a
terrorist organization does not come within the meaning of the term "armed
attack" as interpreted by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v.
United States of America.28 In this infamous case, Nicaragua had claimed that
22. Glennon, supra note 16, at 542.
23.
Id. Ian Brownlie, writing as early as 1963, opined that "sporadic operations by armed bands also
would seem to fall outside the concept of armed attack."
24.
Id. at 546 ("The intent of the Charter's framers was to make acceptable uses of force readily
distinguishable form unacceptable uses of force.").
25.
David Tumdorf, The U.S. Raid on Libya: A Forceful Response to Terrorism, 14 BROOK. J.
INT'L. L. 187, 218 (1988).
26.
Id.
27.
Id. ("Under a restrictive interpretation, states which sponsor terrorists are essentially permitted
to utilize surrogates to carry out acts which might otherwise lead to war had those acts been carried out
overtly.").
28.
Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 11.
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the United States had violated Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, "to
refrain from the threat or the use of force," by conducting military actions
against them. 29 The United States argued that Nicaragua had been providing
weapons and other support to rebels in order to help them overthrow the
government of El Salvador, and the fact that Nicaragua had provided these
weapons and support to the rebels was evidence of an "armed attack" against El
Salvador. 0 It was the court's opinion that the conduct of the United States
towards Nicaragua could not be justified by the right of collective self-defense
in response to an alleged armed attack on one of Nicaragua's neighbors. 3' The
court went on to say "while the concept of an armed attack includes the dispatch
by one State of armed bands into the territory of another State, the supply of
32
arms and other support to such bands cannot be equated with armed attack.
Although this type of activity may constitute a breach of Article 2(4) and the
principles of peace and international harmony, it is "of lesser gravity than an
armed attack."33 While this decision has been noted for setting a standard in
which the term "armed attack" is analyzed under Article 51, other
interpretations have recently emerged and been used to determine what
34
constitutes an "armed attack.
C. TerroristAttacks
When analyzing the expression "armed attack" from a literal standpoint,
terrorist acts taken out by armed bands with the support and encouragement of
a foreign state should be considered an "armed attack., 3' There is no language
in Article 51 that states an "armed attack" is limited to an attack by another
state. 6 This leads open the possibility that the article can be read broadly
enough to include the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.
"Armed attacks by non-State armed bands are still armed attacks, even if
commenced only from- and not by- another State."37 However, because a state

29.
Id. at 18.
30.
Id. at 126-27.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 11, at 127.
34.
Mark M. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article 51
of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 25, 38-39 (1987) [hereinafter Baker].
35.
Baker, supra note 34, at 38-39; See also Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The
Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YALE. J. INT'L. L. 559, 563-564 (1999) ("There is nothing in the U.N. Charter
or international practice that restricts the identity of aggressors against whom states may respond - private
actors as well as governments may be the sources of catastrophic conduct.").
36.
Baker, supra note 34, at 41-42.
37.
See DINSTEIN, supra note 12 at 238. ("The crucial question is whether an armed attack actually
occurred. Thus, a hypothetical military action by the United States against drug traffickers in Columbia would

2003]

King

responding in force to an isolated act of terror would undoubtedly be
condemned for its actions, other factors should also be considered before
responding to terrorism. 38 Yehuda Blum believes that factors such as the level
of state support given to the terrorists, and whether the attack was an isolated
terrorist act, are but one link in a long chain of acts that are relevant when
considering if a terrorist act rises to the level of an "armed attack."39
Furthermore, subjective factors such as the terrorist threat to a state's safety and
the motives of the state's government where the terrorists operate have been
noted as being issues that may be considered when trying to determine whether
an attack constitutes an "armed attack."'
When considering recent terrorist activity, it seems at first glance that the
September 11 attacks were isolated from other terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda and
should therefore not rise to the level of an "armed attack."'41 However, this is
simply not the case. The sheer magnitude of crashing a commercial airliner into
the world trade center, killing thousands of people, and causing massive
destruction to a nation's most symbolic city cannot be compared to sporadic and
minor isolated attacks.42 The September 11 attacks were not the first attacks on
American targets and, according to Al Qaeda leaders, they will probably not be
the last.43 Consequently, this makes many confident that the September 11
attacks represent an on-going pattern of behavior involving terrorist activity,
raising them to the level of an "armed attack" under Article 5 1.44 In addition,
the situation here is not one in which a terrorist organization overpowered a
weak non-supportive state government. The United Nations Security Council
not be justifiable as self-defence"); See J.R. Edmunds, Nonconsensual U.S. Military Action against the
Columbian Drug Lords under the U.N. Charter, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 129, 154 (1990).
38.
Baker, supra note 34, at 42.
39.
Id.; See Yehuda Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard: A Reply to
ProfessorRichard A. Falk, 64 AM. J. INT'L. L. 80 (1970).
40.
Baker, supra note 34, at 43.
41.
Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., The Use ofArmed ForceAgainst Terrorism: American Hegemony or
Impotence?, I CHI. J. INT'L L. 37, 44 (2000). Osama Bin Laden has been either indicted or been linked to a
number of terrorist attacks against the United States, including the bombing of the United States embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the bombings of United States military facilities in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and
1996.
42.
Beard, supra note 11, at 574; Antonio Cassese, The InternationalCommunity's Legal Response
to Terrorism, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 589, 596 (1989).
43.
Beard, supra note 1I, at 587-588; Nora Boustany, Arab Newspapers Focus on Taliban's Fall,
WASH. POST., Nov. 16, 2001 at A38 ("The Taliban's leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, is quoted as saying
he had 'a grand plan to destroy America', which will begin shortly."); Responsibilityfor the Terrorist
Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001: Executive Summary, 10 DOWNING STREET NEWSROOM,
Nov. 14, 2001, at http://www.number-I0.gov.uk/output/page384.asp (Omar is also quoted in a videotaped
interview on al-Jazeera TV news broadcast saying "Here is America struck by God Almighty.. .I swear to God
that America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine.").
44.
Beard, supra note 1I, at 575.
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has on many occasions expressed its concern and condemnation in regards to
the Taliban's support of Al Qaeda 5 For example, in resolution 1333, the
Security Council "condemned the Taliban Regime for its support of
international terrorism, deplored its continuing provision of a safe haven to
Osama Bin Laden and his associates, and demanded that the Taliban swiftly
close all terrorist training camps on its territories."46 Thus, the motives of the
Taliban government, and their strong ties with the Al Qaeda terrorist
organization, help support the belief that an "armed attack" occurred on
September 11, 2001.
D. InternationalSupport
Responses from international world organizations also support the notion
that the September 11 attacks signaled an "armed attack" against the United
States.47 According to a statement made by NATO Secretary General Lord
Robertson, the NATO parties had "determined that the attack against the U.S.
on September 1 th was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as
an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty."4 Article 5 makes
direct reference to the term "armed attack" stating that an "armed attack against
one or more of them"... "shall be considered an attack against them all," and
that "if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the rights of
individual and collective self defence recognized by Article 51 of the charter of
the United Nations will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking
forthwith"... "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."49
Although nations from around the world have given their condolences and
support to the United States, the United Nations Security Council has yet to
declare that the September 11 attacks were an "armed attack" under Article 51.50
This could take to mean by many that the United Nations Security Council
believes that the September 11 attacks did not constitute an "armed attack" on
the United States and is allowing an illegal war to continue indefinitely.
However, this interpretation is not correct. The United Nations Security
45.
Id. at 583.
46.
Id.;SeeS.C. Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR., 55th Sess., 425 Ist
mtg.1 8, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1333 (2000).
47.
Beard, supra note II, at 568.
48.
NATO: Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson (October 2, 2001),
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/sOl1002a.htm.
49.
North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1959, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246,
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm.
50. Beard, supra note II, at 569; See also Actions Taken Around the World as Coalition Begins Air
Strikes in Afghanistan, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Oct. 14, 2001, WL APWIRES File (The European
Union, Pacific Allies, and numerous states throughout Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia express their support
for the United States military response to the September 1Ithterrorist attacks).
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Council has issued two resolutions that reaffirm the United State's right to selfdefense.5' By reaffirming this right, the United Nations Security Council is
implying that there was an armed attack on the United States and therefore is
recognizing the United States's inherent right of self-defense.
IV. SELF-DEFENSE

A. The Caroline Case
Like other expressions and terms stated throughout article 51, the United
Nations Security Council makes no reference as to what constitutes reasonable
and proper self-defense under the charter. Due to this lack of authority,
deference has customarily been given to traditional international law when
determining what constitutes reasonable and proper self-defense. 2
International law and the concept of self-defense have been primarily
shaped by the infamous Caroline case, which occurred during the Canadian
rebellion of 1837. 53 In that case, a British officer, believing that an American
ship named the Caroline was operating as an ammunition supply vessel for
Canadian vessels, gave orders to destroy the ship when it was docked at Fort
Schlosser in New York. 4 Consequently, British soldiers boarded the ship,
assaulted the men on board, and set the ship on fire, killing two American that
were on board.55 While the United States condemned the attack as an illegal use
of force against the United States, British officials argued that the destruction
of the Caroline was legal and justified by the necessity of self-defense.56 In
response to the British contention that the incident was a justifiable act of selfdefense, United States Secretary of State Daniel Webster sent a letter addressed
to Henry Fox, the British Minister at Washington D.C. in which he defined the
51.
Beard, supra note 11, at 568; S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at I., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1368, 12 September 2001 ("recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence
in accordance with the charter"); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess. 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373, 28 September 2001 ("reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as
recognized by the Charter of the United Nations as reiterated in Resolution 1368 (2001).")
52.
Martin A. Rogoff & Edward Collins Jr., The Caroline Incident and the Development of
InternationalLaw, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 493, 504 (1990) [hereinafter Rogoff & Collins Jr.] ("The great
significance of the Caroline doctrine in modern international law results from a radical transformation of
norms relating to resort to force, and from an acceptance of Webster's formulation on resort to force in selfdefense as authoritative customary law.").
53.
Leah H. Campbell, Defending Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the Decision to Strike
Sudan and Afghanistan, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2000) [hereinafter Campbell]; See Byard Q.
Clemmmons & Gary D. Brown, Rethinking InternationalSelf-Defense: The UnitedNations Emerging Rule,
45 NAVAL L. REV. 217, 220 (1998).

54.
55.
56.

Campbell, supra note 52, at 1077.
Id.
Rogoff & Collins Jr., supra note 51 at 496.
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circumstances and conditions upon which a state can properly use force in selfdefense." In his letter, Webster stated that in order for the British to exercise
self-defense, the British government would have to show a necessity of selfdefense which is "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation."58 In addition, Webster also defined proportionality
as actions that are not unreasonable or excessive.59 British official Lord
Ashburton later agreed with the limitations on self-defense that Webster
outlined in his letter. 60 As a result, this case essentially gave rise to the law of
self-defense.6'
It is now accepted that self-defense is permissible only if the use of force
meets the elements of necessity and proportionality. 6 The use of force by one
state against another satisfies the element of necessity only if it can be shown
that there was no other alternative means by which to remedy the situation.63
The condition of proportionality is met if the use of force in self-defense does
not exceed the severity of the attack that triggered the use of force in the first
place. 4
B. Necessity
There are some scholars who believe that the United States has not met its
burden of proof with regards to the element of necessity, as recognized under
the Caroline doctrine, customary international law, and ultimately under Article
51 of the United Nations Charter. First, these commentators have argued that
the doctrine of necessity requires "immediacy" or a close-in-time response to
the original attack that precipitated the use of force.65 This could be inferred
57.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 497-98.
58.
59.
Sage R. Knauft, Proposed Guidelines for Measuring the Propriety of Armed State Responses
to TerroristAttacks, 19 HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L. REV. 763, 774 (1996) [hereinafter Knauft]; Robert J.
Beck & Anthony C. Arend, Don't Tread on Us: InternationalLaw andForcible State Responses to Terrorism,
12 WIS. INT'L. L.J. 153, 193 (1994).
Rogoff & Collins Jr., supra note 51, at 498.
60.
61.
Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 11,at 103. The international court of justice specifically recognized
necessity and proportionality as elements of self-defense under customary international law. According to the
courts opinion, "[slince the existence of the right of collective self-defense is established in customary
international law, the Court must define the specific conditions which may have to be met for its exercise, in
addition to the conditions of necessity and proportionality to which the Parties have referred."
62.
Rogoff & Collins Jr., supra note 51, at 498.
63.
Id.
Id.
64.
Beard, supra note II at 585; Francis A Boyle, Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. SOC'Y
65.
INT'L L. PROC. 288, 294 (1987) ("This provision of the Charter [Article 51] made it quite clear that selfdefense could only be exercised in the event of an actual or perhaps at least imminent 'armed attack' against
the state itself."); Baker, supra note 34, at 34 (arguing that the "temporal element" of the requirement of
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from the expression used in Webster's letter where he states that necessity
occurs when there is "no moment of deliberation."66 Without such a need for
immediacy, it would be very easy for States to use the doctrine of self-defense
as a vehicle to retaliate for prior acts of violence and conquest.67 However, this
restrictive view, which requires an immediate threat, presents a problem in
modem warfare. When the Caroline doctrine was formulated in 1837, acts of
aggression took place on a larger scale with customary procedures that allowed
enemies to have the knowledge and time to prepare for battles. 68 Today's
landscape regarding warfare is quite different. Present day weapons such as
nuclear bombs and computer missile systems may not give a state time to
determine whether an attack is imminent. 69 Therefore, such a restrictive view
might eliminate any chance for justifiable self-defensive measures.7 °
As the problem of "immediacy" persists, there are many scholars who
argue that the right of anticipatory self-defense exists in Article 51 on the
premise that pre-charter rights inherently survive the adoption of the charter if
they are not prohibited by or inconsistent with it.7 According to this liberal
view, "because anticipatory action taken in defense of a state's territory" ...
"does not by definition involve a threat or use of force against" ... "another
state, and it is not inconsistent with the overarching purpose of the United
Nations to maintain international peace and security, it is permissible under
Article 51.',72
It appears to be more reasonable that the right to self-defense is not limited
to instances of actual attacks against the victim state, but rather extended to

necessity means that a response must be made close in time to the actual attack.").
66.
Rogoff & Collins Jr., supra note 51, at 497-98.
67.
Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An InternationalLegal Analysis, 19
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 177, 202 (1987) [hereinafter Intoccia].
68.
Knauft, supra note 58, at 777. "Given the ongoing nature of many terrorist attacks, the
circumstances are vastly different than a singular incident along the U.S.-Canadian border in 1837".; William
O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence,and Self-Defense in Counter-TerrorOperations,30 VA. J. INT'L. L. 421, 471

(1990); See also Baker, supra note 34, at 34. Aarguing for a more realistic view of necessity and
proportionality, Baker contends that the necessity requirement as applied to states affords a longer period
between attack and response because of the inherent difference between a state and an individual.
69.
Intoccia, supra note 66; See Samuel R.Maizel, Intervention in Granada,35 NAVAL L. REV. 47,
72-73 (1986).
70. Id.
71.

John Alex Ramano, Combating Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reviving the

Doctrine ofa State of Necessity, 87 GEO. L.R. 1023, 1035 (1999) [hereinafter Ramano]; See D.W. BOWETr,

SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 184-85 (1958); Myres McDougle, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantineand
Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L. L. 597, 599-600 (1963); See also ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 73 (1993) (citing additional advocates of the counter-

restrictionist position).
72.
Ramano, supra note 71, at 1035-36.
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anticipatory responses to such attacks as well." Such a view would seem to be
more appropriate when considering the present day weapons of mass
destruction, which essentially phase out the distinction between actual and
imminent attacks.74 The United States certainly agrees with this position. In a
statement to the nation, President Bush announced that new threats to the United
States have required the Untied States to adopt a new policy of pre-emptive
actions, breaking from doctrines that have governed US foreign and military
policy for more than 50 years.75 Keeping with this new policy, the United States
response to the September 11 attacks was made nearly a month after the
September 11 attacks took place.76
Under the restrictionist view, this response clearly did not meet the element
of necessity, as the counterattack did not occur until weeks after four planes
were hijacked and propelled into the World Trade Center and Pentagon.77
However, there are many in the international community who are rethinking the
need of "immediacy" as an element of necessity. When the United States
invoked anticipatory self-defense to justify missile attacks against Sudan and
Afghanistan in 1998, the majority of the international community gave little
opposition to the preemptive use of force.78 This emerging thought seems to
allow for more responsible military actions. By not "jumping to the gun" and
waiting, a state would have time to gather all the information and intelligence
needed to prepare a well-thought-out military campaign against the "true"
opposition that is responsible for the attacks.
Although there has been a shift from a restrictionist view to a more liberal
view by many in the international community, significant challenges have still
been made concerning the legality of the United States military strikes in
Afghanistan and ultimately on the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense. In
response to these challenges, the United States has argued that the September
11 attacks were not isolated attacks but rather part of an on-going terrorist attack
by Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders.79 This could be easily proved by the
intelligence organizations in numerous states having produced significant
evidence that Al Qaeda cells around the world have continued and will continue

73.
Id. at 1034.
74.
Id. at 1036.
75.
New Bush Doctrine, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), June 28, 2002, at Opinion.
76.
A Nation Challenged; Bush's Remarks on U.S Military Strikes in Afghanistan supra note 5
(military operations began on October 7, 2001, nearly a month away from the terrorist attacks on September
11,2001).
77.
Id.
78.
Ramano, supra note 70 at 1040; See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Raids Provoke Fury in Muslim World,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1998, at A6. Europe and Israel endorse the strikes as a means for preventing planned
terrorist attacks.
79.
Beard, supra note I1,at 587-88.
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to plan future attacks against the United States.8 ° Consequently, these realistic
and serious threats made against the United States must allow for the use of
preemptive force to defend against future tragedies.
C. Proportionality
Assuming the element of necessity is met, the use of force in response to
an "armed attack" still must be proportionate to the original attack.8' If taken
literally, this would mean that it would be perfectly legal to bomb the most
populous city in Afghanistan with the purpose of killing thousands of innocent
civilians. This, of course, is not the way in which proportionality should be
interpreted. Today, proportionality refers more to the balance between a
military objective and its cost in terms of lives lost or the military actions
needed to control the enemy. 2 The international community will only usually
condemn defensive military actions if the actions were overly excessive as
compared to the original attack in terms of civilian casualties or scale of
weaponry."
There are many opponents of the war who believe that the United States
military strikes in Afghanistan have not met the element of proportionality as
required by customary international law. Strong speculation has been
circulating among many scholars that the strikes against Afghanistan are not
military in nature, but rather political, with the intent to remove the Taliban
from power and establish a new government in Afghanistan.' Assuming this
proclamation has merit, the Taliban is not simply an army but a political entity,
and its members are largely civilians, not military combatants.8 5 Therefore,
many of the targets hit, such as the Taliban headquarters and other buildings in
Kabul and Kanda-har, would probably qualify as civilian targets.8 6 Reports
from the media that targets in Afghanistan have included airports,

80.
81.

Id. at 588.
Rogoff & Collins Jr., supra note 52, at 498.

82.

Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L. L. 391

(1993); See also MYRES M. McDOUGLE & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC

ORDER 241-44 (1961) (for their definition of proportionality in the jus ad bellum); WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE
CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 27-31 (1981); See alsoJAMESTURNERJOHNSONJUST WAR TRADITION

AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR 203 (1981), (defines proportionality in the jus ad bellum sense as "where the
total evil of war is compared to its total good"; or "in contemporary language, the costs of the war must not
outweigh the benefits. In the jus in bello sense, proportionality has "to do with calculations of force necessary
to subdue the enemy.").
83.
Schachter, supra note 8,at 1637.
84.
Arnold J. Chien, Why the War Against Afghanistan is Illegal, October 11,2001, at
http://www.zmag.org/civilian.htm.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
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communication facilities, electrical plants, and government buildings, has added
to the speculation of excessive civilian casualties.87 Additionally, many Afghan
civilians have reported that the United States military has not been bombing just
military targets, but rather, residential neighborhoods.88 If these proclamations
have merit, then the United States bombings in Afghanistan could essentially
be considered to be overly excessive in terms of civilian casualties.
On the other hand, the United States government strongly denies that its
military targets Afghan civilians.89 Rather, it has been argued by United States
officials that all military strikes taken in Afghanistan have been strategic.9"
According to Col. Ray Shepard, "we painstakingly assess the potential for
injuring civilians or damaging injuring civilians, and positively identify targets
before striking."'" However, the United States has undoubtedly made mistakes.
An on-site review conducted by the New York Times has revealed that over
four hundred civilians have been killed in eleven locations where there have be
United States led air strikes. 9 These mistakes evidently have come from
mistaken information given by local Afghans and reluctance by the United
States to commit itself to a much riskier ground attack.9
Whether the United States has been using excessive force in its war on
terror is clearly subjective in its analysis. Although it can be argued that the loss
of hundreds of Afghan civilians outweigh any legitimate military objective of
the United States, it can be just as effectively argued that civilian casualties are
casualties of war and, although tragic, cannot possibly measure up to the lives
that will be saved by the United States military strikes. Either way, the United
States has recognized the need to reduce civilian casualties caused by bombing
mistakes. The United States military strategy has evolved away from the use of
air strikes as the primary weapon and more to the use of ground forces.94 This
trend will likely result in fewer innocent civilians being killed; thus, reiterating
87.
Id.
88.
Id. The following art testimonials reported by the Boston Globe and New York Times:
According to Neseebullah Khan, "(ilt is not true that the Americans have only been bombing military targets.
Many bombs are dropping on residential neighborhoods." According to Mohammad Zahir, "Everyone wants
to eliminate terrorism from the face of the earth, but the way adopted by the U.S. is not fair because masses
of ordinary people also live in Afghanistan. The attack was not just on terrorist camps... I know these are
residential areas."
89.
PAUL W. LOVINGER & HARRY ScOTr,
Why Bush's War is Illegal, at
http://www.warandlaw.homestead.com/files/bushwar.htm (In his briefing on 10-11-01, Secretary of Defense
Brumsfield said the military "does not target civilians").
90.
Id.
91.
Dexter Filkins, Flaws in U.S. Air War Left Hundreds of Civilians Dead, N.Y. TIMES, July 21,
2001 at IA.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id.
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the use of military force that is proportionate to the United States objective of
eliminating international terrorism.
IV. CONCLUSION

Today, the increasing emergence of transnational terrorism has changed the
way in which international law is used and interpreted. The threat of
unimaginable attacks, such as the one witnessed by the world on September 11,
2001, has promulgated the need for a broad view of Article 51 and the
circumstances in which a state may use force to defend itself from future
attacks. The framer's intent when drafting the United Nations Charter, although
primarily to promote peace and restrain rampant exercises of power, also
included the longstanding notion that a state inherently has the right to defend
itself when under attack by another state. That being said, the United States has
been the target of ongoing and consistent attacks by a state sponsored terrorist
organization, determined to continue in its efforts to destroy the United States.
Therefore, the United States must be able to legally defend itself as an
independent sovereign state.
There are many who say that Article 51 does not apply to terrorist attacks.
However, this view has become outdated and obsolete due to the modem threats
of warfare that face the international community. Terrorism has become a
vehicle for states to wage war against their enemies and, as such, states must be
given the authority to use state sponsored force to deter such attacks.
Otherwise, states that allow or use terrorism as a mechanism to accomplish
military goals will become easily shielded under the United Nations Charter
although essentially violating international law in the first place.
This view does not mean to say that all international terrorist attacks are
severe enough to invoke Article 51. Factors such as the severity of the attack,
the amount of state involvement with the terrorist attack or terrorist
organization, and the capability of repetition all should be seriously considered
when assessing whether a terrorist attack rises to the level of an "armed attack"
under Article 51. Taking these factors into consideration, the evidence is clear
that the terrorist attacks on September 11 were armed attacks under Article 51.
The evolution of modem weapons and nature of terrorism warfare also
stresses the need for anticipatory self-defense under Article 51. However,
before a state can attack another state, there should be undeniable evidence that
leads to the conclusion that an attack is needed to protect that state. Otherwise,
states would be able to invoke Article 51 and claim anticipatory self-defense
even though the attack was clearly retaliatory. The United States certainly had
evidence that Al Qaeda carried out the attacks on September 11 and had plans
of continual attacks on the United States. Therefore, the United States military

472

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 9:457

actions following September 11 were warranted to prevent future attacks on the
United States.
Lastly, the United States has been strategic in its application of military
operations, making it a point to assess civilian casualty. Even though mistakes
have been made, as in any war, the United States has made it a mission to
reduce civilian casualties by changing strategies. As such, the United States
attacks have not been overly excessive and disproportionate when compared to
its ultimate objectives.
The United Nations needs to understand that a new type of war has
developed and, consequently, must provide new flexible guidelines for the legal
invocation of Article 51 in the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Until that time
comes, forcible state responses, such as those actions taken by the United States,
need to be considered legitimate under a broad interpretation of Article 51.
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I. INTRODUCTION

"If insurance is a small world that reflects the purposes of the larger world
outside it,"' then the events of September 11 have dealt a devastating blow to
both worlds. In the larger world, even as images of the now infamous terrorist
attacks at the World Trade Center (hereinafter WTC) linger in our minds, the
rubble is being cleared away, and life has slowly returned to a familiar
normalcy. However, in the smaller world of insurance, there is an ongoing
struggle between factions, each striving to find the best solution to a problem
whose consequences may be as dire as the events that created the controversy.
The impact of September 11 is without peer. The terrorist attacks that on
that fateful day dealt the world's insurance community its hardest blow ever.
The shock that such an event could happen was only made worse by the
*
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realization that the insurance industry's estimates for such an event fell so
short.' The previous largest worldwide-insured loss was from Hurricane
Andrew in 1992. 3 Damages in Florida resulting from the natural disaster are
now estimated to have caused $20 billion in insured losses. 4 Estimates of losses
in the WTC attacks by the insurance industry ranges between $30 and $60

billion. The National Association of Independent Insurers (hereinafter NAII)
spokesperson said, "[Liosses from the attacks are estimated at $50 billion."5
One independent financial-counseling firm estimated that on a combined basis
for property, casualty, life, and health insurance, the WTC property losses might
reach $58 billion.6 Although no one yet knows the total losses from September
11, if the losses reach $60 billion the attacks will have caused insured losses
three times greater than any previous event.7
Prior to the attacks on the WTC, the United States insurance industry
treated terrorism as little more than a footnote8, while other countries, such as
Great Britain, have repeatedly been forced to deal with the issue. Repeated
bombings and terrorist attacks by the Irish Republican Armies (hereinafter IRA)
resulted in British insurance agencies re-evaluating their insurance policies.9

While many United States insurers will not use their war exclusions (discussed
below) to avoid paying for September 11 losses, many are looking for ways to
avert payment on future losses from terrorist attacks.' 0

2.

Dr. Gordon Woo, Quantifying Insurance Terrorism Risk, 2 (prepared for the National Bureau

of Economic Research meeting, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Feb. 1,2002).
3.

TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY 9 (2001).

(Tillinghast-Towers Perrin is one of the world's largest global management consulting firms, assisting
organizations in managing people, performance and risk; HR consultants help organizations manage their
investment in people to achieve measurable performance improvements, focusing on human resource strategy
and service delivery, benefit and compensation design and implementation (including retirement, health and
welfare and executive compensation), employee and organizational communication, HR technology and
outsourced HR administration, providing actuarial and management consulting to financial services companies
worldwide; and providing reinsurance intermediary services and consulting expertise that focus on the creative
blending of traditional and nontraditional risk-transfer vehicles.).
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9.
http://www.drj.com/special/wtc/w3065.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
10.

JAMES G. RIzzO, TRAGEDY'S AFTERMATH: THE IMPACT OF 9/11 ON THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY,

46 FEB B. B.J. 10 (2002).

2003]

Neuwelt

The insurance industry, which incurred billions in losses, may not be able
to afford another enormous payout without aid. Even with federal help, another
terrorist attack would be a tremendous blow to the insurance industry." The
idea that total losses from the WTC attacks will not be known for months, if not
years, and the uncertainty of future attacks, have increased certain fears; can
reinsurers cover losses that insurance companies are now struggling to meet,
and if not, then should the federal government get involved? "While new
security measures and the war against terrorism will hopefully diminish the risk,
the probabilities of what might happen over
it is nearly impossible to quantify
'2
the next few months or years."'
The United States insurance industry must choose a course that allows
insurance rates to remain stable, while ensuring that insurers can handle the
payouts that will follow another terrorist attack. Either insurers will have to
honor terrorism insurance claims or the Federal Government will have to get
involved.
II.THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY PRE-SEPTEMBER

11

Currently, there is no Federal insurance system. '" All fifty states have
their own rules, 4 and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
guides state-by-state coverage. 5 Since September 11, there have been deep
concerns regarding the insurance industry's ability to provide coverage for
future terrorist attacks.' 6 Without aid, many primary insurance companies will

11.
Id.
12.
Stephen P. Lowe, A FederalRolefor TerrorismRisk The Last Word, TILLINGHAST-TOWERS
PERRIN 1 (2001). (While new security measures and the war against terrorism will hopefully diminish the
risk, it is nearly impossible to quantify the probabilities of what might happen over the next few months or
years.).
13.
As of June 2002, proposals are being considered by Congress to create Federal Reinsurance as
a backstop for future terrorist attacks. As of August 5, 2002, neither Chamber has passed the others proposal.
14.
Heidi A. Lawson, Insurance Regulation: The Effects of September llth, 673 PLIILIT 53, 58
2002.
In 1868 the United States Supreme Court heard Paul v. State of Virginia, and held that
insurance was a contract that was delivered locally and was, therefore, not interstate
commerce. The court held that insurance regulation by the states was constitutional.
Paul v. State of Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868), see also United States v. South-Eastern
UnderwritersAssociation, et al., 322 U.S. 533 (1944), (To the surprise of many in the
industry, the United States Supreme Court ruled that federal antitrust laws applied to
insurance.). In response to the South-Eastern ruling, Congress passed the McCarranFerguson Act which, subject to certain restrictions, allowed state regulation to preempt
federal law when it came to the "business of insurance."
15.
The NAIC works with the states to create uniformity between insurance providers.
I, 2002), available at
16.
GFOA Issue Brief, Insurance Liability, 2 (Jan.
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pull terrorism coverage, as will the reinsurance companies. Speaking on the
effects of going without terrorism insurance, President George W. Bush stated
that, "If people can't buy insurance on a ... project, they're not going to build
the project. And if they don't build the project, somebody's not working."' 7
While this may be a simplification, it is accurate. To get insurance, businesses
and individuals will have to pay high premiums, or go ahead without insurance
and pray that nothing bad happens. Neither option is favorable, and both put the
buyer at a disadvantage.
Insurance "represents the delicate balance between the uncertainty and the
predictability of future events associated with unfavorable consequences."' 8
Basically, "insurance is the sharing of risk by many parties so as not to create
a financial hardship should loss affect one of the parties."' 9 Insurance creates
a pool that allows many participants to share the risk of an event with other
purchasers. Each purchaser receives protection against substantial but uncertain
losses in exchange for making regular payments called premiums. The system
is based upon the "Law of Large Numbers" and uses statistical models based on
data gathered from past experiences.2 ° By gathering this information, the
insurance industry can forecast future losses and create resources to pay claims.

17.
Press Release, Remarks by the President to Business Leaders (Apr. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020408-17.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
18.
Jane Kendall, The Incalculable Risk: How the World Trade Center DisasterAccelerated The
Evolution of Insurance TerrorismExclusions 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 569, 572 (2002).
19.
James E. Branigan, Insuranceand Risk Management In Commercial Real Estate Transaction,
2002: A New World of Concerns, 478 PLI/REAL 495, 501 (2002).
20.
Kendall, supra note 18, at 572-73.
The 'Law of Large Numbers' is the statistical proposition that the more opportunities
exist for an event to occur, the closer the actual relationship of occurrences to
opportunities will be to the true probability. Lewis C. Workman, The Mathematical
Foundations of Life Insurance 121 (1982). Once the true probability is estimated by
observing a large sample of events, it must then be applied to a large number of
exposures before the actual occurrences will approximate the true probability. Emmett
J. Vaughan & Therese M. Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance 25 (7th ed.
1996). Extremely catastrophic events are generally considered to be uninsurable in part
because by nature they fail to conform to models based on the Law of Large Numbers.
Riegel et al., supra note 10, at 20-21. Past experience with events of such great
magnitude is usually too sparse to accurately predict how often a similar event can be
expected to occur. Id. Further, where a particular loss is grossly disproportionate to
other losses that can be anticipated to occur within the pool of policyholders, the
catastrophic loss invalidates the calculation of rates and has the potential to create
insolvency for the insurer. Id."
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While primary insurers deal with businesses and individuals,2' reinsurers
deal with primary insurers. Reinsurance companies are the "wholesalers in
risk,, 2 2 dealing only with other insurance companies. As a result, they are not
very visible, but they are vital to the industry, since without them, primary
insurers would not be able to diversify their risks properly. 23 They provide
insurance between the primary insurance company and another party, usually
when the primary insurer assumes a policy too large to handle alone.24
"A 'reinsurance' contract is an agreement where one insurance company,
the reinsurer, agrees to indemnify another insurance company, the reinsured,
either in whole or in part against loss or liability the latter may incur under a
separate and original contract of insurance with a third party, the original
' Reinsurers, like primary insurers, look to the past to set their rates.26
insured. 25
Resulting losses from the September 11 WTC attack, the 1993 WTC attack, and
the destruction of the Alfred J . Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
have proven that the insurance industry is unable accurately measure the costs
of future attacks. 27 These past attacks gave little predictability in what manner
future attacks would take, and gave even less insight into losses in life, property,
and business.28
The problem with what happened on September 11 is that it presented
a risk that no one could conceive would happen. When the buildings
were built, loss scenarios did contemplate the impact of one Boeing
707 (the largest commercial aircraft at the time), however the idea of
two, fully fueled 767s hitting both towers was unimaginable.29

21.

Wasow, supra note 8, at 3.
Primary insurers essential activities are risk assessment, estimation of expected losses
(underwriting), claims settlement, financial management of reserves against expected
future losses, and management of insured risks. Both risk management and financial
management involve the creation of a diversified portfolio of assets, liabilities, and
expected liabilities that produces good returns at low risk for the insurance companies.

22.
23.

Id. at 1.
Id.

24.
25.

Id.
Sandra Mulay Casey, J.D., Lisa Della Rocca Gregory, J.D., et al., Insurance Contracts and

Coverage, 46 TEX. JUR. 3d. Insurance Contractsand Coverage § 1155, 1 (2002).

26.
27.

Kendall, supra note 18, at 573.
Honorable Paul H. O'Neill, Testimony Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban

Affairs, United States Senate (Oct. 24, 2001).
28.

Terror Insurance Availability: Hearingon Terrorism InsuranceBefore the Senate Comm. on

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Senate Hearing] (statement of John
T. Sinnott, Chairman and CEO, Marsh, Inc.), 2001 WL 26187268. See also Blackest Day as Insurers Fear
for Staff, Ins. Day (London), Sept. 12, 2001, at 1. ("The unprecedented events of yesterday are generally not
even found in the 'worst case scenarios' run by some firms", cited in Kendall, supra note 18, note 38).

29.

Statement of John T. Sinnott, supra note 28.
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Certain situations known as clash events result in a breakdown of the
reinsurance system. "In a clash event, an occurrence, often unanticipated or
unpredictable but of catastrophic proportions, concentrates significant losses
across multiple lines of insurance simultaneously."3 The WTC disaster created
massive insurance claims in aviation, property, liability, life, workers'
compensation, and business interruption.3t When the primary insurers turned
to the reinsurance companies, many found them to be spread too thin to
adequately cover the tremendous losses.
If the WTC attacks are the worst known terrorist attack in the history of the
insurance industry,32 then the potential that reinsurers and primary insurers may
not be able to cover their policy holder's claims may be the insurance industry's
greatest failure. To combat this real possibility, many in the industry are
looking to avoid this situation when reinsurance policies come up for renewal.
When reinsurance companies who provide insurance to primary insurers began
to renew their contracts in January 2002 (reinsurance policies are annual, and
renegotiated every year), many reinsurers refused to provide coverage for losses
relating to terrorist acts.
HIL.

EXCLUSIONS - WAR

V. TERRORISM

Following the terrorist attacks, primary insurers "assured their policy
holders that they would not invoke the 'war' exclusion to deny coverage. 3 On
its face, this appeared to be a magnanimous gesture, but in actuality, these
insurance carriers had no alternative. As presently written, the standard war
exclusion does not explicitly extend to acts of terrorism."35 Congress also made
its position crystal clear when it stated that any attempts by insurance agencies
to side-step their contractual obligations would "not only be unsupportable, it
would be unpatriotic." 36

30.

Kendall, supra note 18, at 580.

31.

TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 3, at 4.

32.

Id. at 2.

33.

Nicole Belson Goluboff, Passing TerrorismInsuranceLegislation: How Telework and Flextime

Work Arrangements Can Help, FINDLAW CORPORATE COUNSEL CENTER, (May 6, 2002), available at
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/commentary/20020506-goluboff.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
34.

Rizzo, supra note 10, at 10.

35.

'Act of War' Exclusion Doesn't Apply to Attacks, Insurers Say, L.A. TIMES, (Sept. 17, 2001), at

Business, 3.
36.
Letter from the House Committee on Financial Services to the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners I (Sept. 17, 2001). ("Any attempt to evade coverage obligations by either primary insurers
or reinsurers based on such legal maneuvering would not only be unsupportable and unpatriotic - it would tear

at the faith of the American people in the insurance industry.").
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This has left many primary carries in an unpleasant situation. Primary
insurers were left with a very simple, yet unpleasant decision; cover the risk and
hope that the losses do not exceed the ability to pay.37 However, this is an
almost impossible task, considering that the market is based on predicable losses
for a certain event and there are no possible ways to accurately predict damages
from acts of terrorism. 38 Some primary insurers can try to limit or exclude
terrorism coverage completely. Many primary insurers who cannot find
reinsurance companies to cover acts of terrorism are doing just that.39
A major issue that reinsures and primary insurers face is ambiguous policy
language. The distance between "war" and "terrorism", may not seem great, but
it could be the difference in billions of dollars to insurance providers. Most
insurance policies exclude losses from declared war or losses from invasion by
a sovereign power, but lack language that would address coverage in the face
of a terrorist attack.'
"Exclusions for losses arising from acts of terrorism, although rare, are not
completely unknown in existing United States policies."' 4 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that war risk insurers already had
circulated various versions of exclusions for terrorist activities, stating,
Any of these ... clauses, if employed by the appellant all risk insurers
might well have excluded the present loss... When the all risk
insurers failed to exclude political acts in words descriptive of today's
world events, they acted at their own peril. The clear implication of
this is that it is possible to exclude coverage for damages and injuries
caused by terrorist acts with the proper policy language.42
President Bush said, "The deliberate and deadly attacks, which were
carried out yesterday against our country, were more than acts of terror. They
were acts of war. 4 3 Yet, the tragic events of September 11 are not covered
under existing "war" insurance exclusions. Therefore, insurance agencies
cannot claim the September 11 attacks were those of "war." A terrorist group,
other than a de facto government or entity acting on behalf of a government,
37.

Marjorie Segale, The Event That Changed The World of Insurance, TERRORISM REPORT,

IBA WEST, VOL. 1, NO. 1, 2, (2002).
38.

Rizzo, supra note 10, at 12.

39.
Segale, supra note 37, at 2.
40.
Rizzo, supra note 10, at 12.
41.
Sherman-Williams Co. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 863 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. Ohio 1994) ("
'[Tlerrorist' exclusion was in standard form policy at issue and coverage for losses due to terrorist acts was
restored by endorsement, for which insured paid additional premium.").
42.

Carl J. Pernicone & James T.H. Deaver, Insurance Implications of the World Trade Center

Disaster,31 -SPG BRIEF 23, 26 (2002).
43.
Quoted in Kendall, supra note 18, at 569.
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cannot commit an act of war. 4 For a terrorism exclusions to apply, the
contractual language should stipulate that a terrorist act may, but need not, be
committed by or on behalf of a group that comprises a de facto government or
a recognized government. Without this clause, small factions will not apply to
the terms of the war exclusion. 5
"The actions of a 'tiny non-governmental entity' fighting the United States
do not constitute 'war' between the United States and that entity., 46 If the
insurance industry is going to exclude terrorism coverage, insurers should make
it clear that the size of a terrorist organization is not relevant to the
determination as to whether or not its act is excluded.47 "Words describing
violent events commonly used in war-risk exclusions are construed as having
'dimensions besides the level of violence,' which may include requirements that
multiple actors be involved."" Hence, while the terrorist acts of the Al Queda
organization may demand an answer, they were not acts borne from a
recognized war.
In the days following September 11, many observed that this attack was
so well planned, so meticulously masterminded, that it had to have been the
work of an extremely well funded and organized terrorist network.49 Osama bin
Laden's terrorist network, Al Queda, is a non-governmental entity, and a selfproclaimed terrorism organization. A "war," whether declared or undeclared,
can exist only where sovereign or quasi-sovereign entities engage in hostilities.5 °
Terrorism exclusions should clearly specify that terrorist acts may be committed
on behalf of or sponsored by any sovereign or quasi-sovereign entity.5' While
some reports claim that bin Laden was a Taliban Defense Minister, the use of
extremists, rather than soldiers, to hijack and crash airplanes into the WTC
barely constitutes a foreign states involvement. 5 2 Therefore, contrary to
President Bush's statements, the horrible attacks on the WTC cannot be
3
considered acts of "war",
Acts of terrorism are not included in standard insurance policies, where
similar acts of destruction are expressly excluded from coverage in acts of war,
44.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 505 F.2d 989 at 1012; see
also Welts v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 48 N.Y. 34, 40 (1871), cited in supra note 16, at 577-78.
45.
Branigan, supra note 19, at 532.
46.
Kendall, supra note 18, at 592.
47.
Id.
48.
Kendall, supra note 18, at 592-93
49.
Woo, supra note 2, at 4.
50.
Pan American World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1005; see also New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Bennion, 158 F.2d 260,264 (10th Cir. 1946); Vanderbilt v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 184 N.Y.S. 54, 55 (1920), cited
in 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 569, 592.
51.
Pan American, 505 F.2d at 1005.
52.
Pernicone, supra note 42.
53.
Wasow, supra note 8, at 5.
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hence the "war exclusion." "Few insurance policies underwritten for domestic
risks contained exclusionary language for acts of terrorism. All, however,
excluded coverage for damages to persons or property that were the result of an
act of war."54 War, is a "hostile contention by means of armed forces, carried
on between nations, states or rulers, or between citizens in the same nation or
55
state.1
Terrorism, however, is defined as "the unlawful use of force and violence
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social
objectives."5 6 Should the United States be subjected to future acts of terrorism
as a result of its military activities, insurance carriers may be able to invoke the
war exclusion and terrorism exclusion, or the insurance agency may select to
combine war and terrorism into one exclusion policy, to preclude coverage for
resulting personal injury or property damage losses.57
IV. THE PROBLEM DEFINING "OCCURRENCE"

In the aftermath of the WTC attacks, many questions have been raised
regarding the ability of insurance companies to compensate policy holders for
losses caused by the terrorist's acts. The most costly risk facing the insurance
industry is the difference between one occurrence and multiple occurrences.
One attack may result in fifty billion dollars in insured losses. But if the events
of September 11 were defined as two attacks, the amount that can be collected
under the WTC policy would double. 58 The problem stems from an
interpretation of the term "occurrence."
"Insurers and reinsurers are familiar with disputes over situations in which
a determination as to the number of occurrences can have major financial
significance. '59 Determining the number of occurrences has drastic impacts on
54.
Rizzo, supra note 10, at 12.
55, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1093 (6th ed. 1991).
56, 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (2001), cited in Rizzo, supra note 10, at 12.
57, Id.
58.
Neil H. Wyland & Jonathan I. Katz, As the Dust Settles: Emerging Issues in the Wake of
September 11, 12 No. 17 ANDREWS INS. COVERAGE LITIG. REP. II, 1 (2002).
The largest insured losses from the events of September I I arise from the attacks on
the World Trade Center. An issue that could literally double the size of WTC-related
property losses is whether the attacks on the WTC constitute one occurrence/event or
two under the involved direct insurance policies. The issue will also arise under the
reinsurance agreements that protect those policies. Lawsuits have already been filed
on that issue in the direct insurance context.
59.
John W. Stamper, Looking at the Events ofSeptember 11: Some Effects and Implications, While
the Impact on Insurers is Large and Apparent, there are Many Other Possibilities, Even Probabilities, of
Contentions and Litigation, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 152, 159 (2002). (Environmental policies are familiar
insurance claims.).
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the ability of policyholders to collect, and affects both primary insurers and
reinsurers."0 The question that will beg this analysis is: was the occurrence
multiple hijacked aircrafts that crashed into multiple buildings, or was the
occurrence a single and unified terrorist plot that destroyed the three buildings?
"If the cause or occurrence is deemed the terrorist plot then the case in the
federal courts may call the destroyed buildings one occurrence. If each plain
crash is a separate
incident then the incidents may be ruled separate
61
occurrences."
"Given their close coordination, were all four attacks one occurrence?
Were they all separate? Were the attacks on the World Trade Center one
occurrence regardless of the others? ' 62 "If the decision is one loss, the insurers
will be liable for the occurrence limit in the policy. ' 63 Larry A. Silverstein, the
WTC leaseholder, says each airplane crash involved in the disaster constitutes
a separate "occurrence." 64 If this were true, then a finding of two "occurrences"
would double the $3.6 billion Silverstein would collect to $7.2 billion.65
Several insurance companies that cover other property damaged in the
WTC attacks believe "that because the attacks were coordinated, they qualify
as a single occurrence. ' 66 The New York Court of Appeals answered the
question of how to determining the "number of occurrences" of an event. 67 The
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Branigan, supra note 19, at 532.
Stamper, supra note 59, at 152.
Branigan, supra note 19, at 532.
Pernicone, supra note 42, at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27-8.
On October 16, 2001, the court firmly rejected a ceding company's attempt in two
separate cases to characterize underlying environmental claims arising from numerous
different sites across the country into one "disaster and/or casualty" per insured. The
two cases were resolved by the court in a single opinion, Travelers Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Certain Underwriters of Lloyd's of London, cases 123 and 124. The cases
stemmed from pollution-related claims against two separate industrial insureds, E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. and Koppers Company (n/k/a Beazer East, Inc.). Both insureds
submitted insurance claims to Travelers after incurring substantial expenses associated
with different sites across the country, where they had been held responsible for the
release of hazardous substances into the environment. Travelers ultimately settled with
each company for substantial sums. Travelers had reinsurance treaties with Lloyd's that
obligated Travelers reinsurers to cover "each and every loss" exceeding a retention
level. Travelers argued in both cases that it could aggregate the losses from multiple
environmentally contaminated sites owned by the respective insureds as one "disaster
and/or casualty" per insured under the wording of the reinsurance contracts at issue.
Under the facts of each case, that position, if upheld, would mean that Travelers could
surmount the retention limits in the treaties and thus be entitled to a recovery. Travelers
based its argument primarily on a 1996 decision by the English House of Lords, Axa

2003]

Neuwelt

court looked at the acts necessitating coverage, and the policy language, which
said, " ... all loss[es] resulting from a series of accidents, occurrences and/or
causative incidents having a common origin and/or being traceable to the same
act, omission, error and/or mistake shall be considered as having resulted from
a single accident, occurrence and/or causative event. '68 The court said "the
phrase 'series of created a requirement of a temporal and spatial relationship
among any accidents to be aggregated under the wording.... Thus, [an] attempt
to treat the ...claims ...
as one 'disaster and/or casualty' for ...
allocating
69
related costs ...was barred by the policy language.
In October of 2001, SR International Business Insurance (Swiss Re), filed
a declaratory judgment action in the Southern District of New York in order to
resolve the question: How many occurrences took place on September 11,
2001 ? Swiss Re provided the World Trade Center policyholders coverage in
excess of a $10 million. Swiss Re asserts that the policy drafted by the WTC
leaseholders' insurance broker, Willis Ltd. States that the term "occurrence,"
is defined as: "[A]ll losses or damages that are attributable directly or indirectly
to one cause or one series of similar causes. All such losses will be added
together ...
will be treated as one occurrence irrespective of the period of time
Reinsurance v. Field, 5 Re LR 184.
68.
Travelers Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwritersat Lloyd's of London, 734 N.Y.S.2d 531,
535 (N.Y. 2001).
69.
Pemicone, supra note 42, at 28.
70.
SR InternationalBusiness Insurance Co., Ltd. v. World Trade Center PropertiesLLC, 2002 WL
1163577 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
In that action, 'Plaintiff Swiss Re' seeks, inter alia, declaratory relief regarding the
insurance entitlements of Defendants. In response to the SR Int'l Complaint, the
Silverstein Properties asserted counterclaims against numerous other insurers seeking
monetary and declaratory relief in the SR Int'l action. (World Trade Center Properties
LLC, et al. Am. Answer & Countercls., filed on February 6, 2002). The extent of the
liability of the insurance carriers may ultimately depend upon resolution of the
question: Which of the two following statements best describes what caused the
destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11,
2001) In a single coordinated
attack, terrorists flew hijacked planes into the twin towers of the World Trade Center.2)
At 8:46 A.M. on the morning of September 11th, a hijacked airliner crashed into the
North Tower of the World Trade Center, and 16 minutes later a second hijacked plane
struck the South Tower. Since most property damage insurance is written on a 'per
occurrence' basis- the maximum insured amount will be paid for each covered
occurrence-the Court would normally expect to find the answer to the question
whether the events of September 1 th constituted one or two "occurrences" by looking
at how the parties to the insurance contract defined that term in the policy they
negotiated. In the case of the World Trade Center, however, with minor exceptions,
there were no insurance policies in place on September IIth, although each of the
insurers had signed binders setting forth in summary form their agreement to provide
property damage coverage. Some of these binders expressly stated that the precise
language was 'to be agreed upon.
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or the area over which such losses occur."' 71 The WTC policyholders claim,
"that Swiss Re agreed to a policy form underwritten by The Travelers Indemnity
Company and the definition of occurrence would be scrutinized under New
York law. 72 Under New York law, an "occurrence" is defined as an "event of
an unfortunate character that takes place without one's foresight or
expectation. '73 The Second Circuit has interpreted this to mean that "although
a single 'occurrence' may give rise to multiple claims ... courts should look to
the event for which the insured is held liable, not some point further back in the
causal chain."74
Many courts have created two rules for determining how to treat multiple
instances of damage stemming from more than one occurrence. "The ... most
broadly accepted rule is the so-called 'cause' test ... wherein all losses arising
from the same 'cause' are treated as one occurrence. 75 The effect test, an
earlier but now largely discredited approach, looked to the "effect of causes in
determining whether there were multiple 'occurrences.' While many courts
have adopted the cause approach, in practice, however, 'cause' may have many
different meanings. "76 However the courts decide to fall on this matter may
likely be the difference between insurers covering their policies or falling short.
V. OTHER OPTIONS: GREAT BRITAIN'S POOL RE

"A basic principle of insurance is the reduction of overall risk by pooling
or spreading individual, independent risks. 77 An insurers' inability to
accurately estimate potential losses can be detrimental, to say the least. Insurers
gauge the risk associated with an activity, and then assign an amount that they
will cover (reimburse) on the chance that the event will occur. The attacks on
the WTC shed light on the major problem the insurance agency is now facing:

71.
Swiss Re Complaint 3 1.
72.
WTC Leaseholders'Answer and Counterclaim 175, cited in Rizzo, supra note 10, at 15. ("New
York subscribes to the "unfortunate event" test to determine the number of 'occurrences' that have taken
place.").
73.
Arthur A. Johnson Corp. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 164 N.E. 2d 704, 707 (N.Y.
1959).
74.
Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 1178, 1213 (2d Cir. 1995).
75.
Michael F. Aylward, Twin Towers: The $3.6 Billion Question Arising from the World Trade
Center Attacks, 9/11 and its Aftermath, Was it One "Occurrence" or More Than One? There are Complexities
Galore that are Bound to Arise in the Insurance Context, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 169, 172 (2002).
76.
Id. at 172-73. ("For the most part, ... where two losses occur close to each other in time and
space as the result of a continuous physical cause, most courts have ruled that they should be treated as arising
out of the same occurrence.").
77.
Lowe, supra note 12, at I. ("But this principle can break down if a single event affects many
insureds simultaneously. Geographic concentration or concentration of coverage within an industry (e.g.,
asbestos manufacturers) creates the potential for contagion.").
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either no one predicted how much damage could be caused, or at the very least,
no one accurately predicted the possible scope of damage.
If the private insurance industry cannot underwrite the new risk of
terrorism, then a strong rationale exists for a federal role. In the
United States, such precedents include the federal flood insurance
program and federal riot reinsurance. A more recent example is Pool
Re, the U.K. reinsurance program covering terrorist acts.78
A.

The Evolution of Britain'sPool Re

As in the United States, British losses stemming from acts of terrorism
were covered under standard insurance policies. Like the United States, Great
Britain's insurance industry assumed that insured losses from acts of terrorism
would be minimal. 79 However, the United Kingdom suffered several terrorist
attacks, which culminated in the 1992 bombing of St. Mary Axe, London,
where the Irish Republican Army (IRA) caused damages in excess of £350
million in commercial property damages.80 After this, the British "realized that
the unlimited coverage of claims due to terrorism might turn out to be quite
81
expensive."
After the St. Mary Axe attack, the insurance and reinsurance industry
recognized that they were not able to estimate an accurate determination of
damages resulting from further terrorist attacks.82 Without having the ability to
cover losses, or to come close to predicting damages, reinsurers canceled
terrorism coverage, and the primary insurance companies followed. "The
situation soon became highly political, and enormous pressure was put on both
the insurance market and the British government to find some solution to the
83
problem.,
The Association of Insurance and Risk Managers in Industry and
Commerce (AIRMIC), the risk management community, the U.K. broker
community, the British Insurance and Investment Brokers Association (BIBA),
and the Association of British Insurers gathered to answer the dilemma they
now faced: how to insure an uninsurable act? Risks that are considered
78.
79.

Id.
Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, PropertyInsurance in Britain, University of Lausanne, at 7

(1998).
80.
Fleming, supra note 9, at 2.
81.
von Ungem-Stemberg, supra note 79, at 7.
82.
Fleming, supra note 9, at 2.
83.
Id. (Many policies, both in the United Kingdom and the United States renew on or by the first
day of the new year. "Since the time scale was so short for those who had renewals on January 1, 1993, there
was a horrified outcry from the Association of Insurance and Risk Managers in Industry and Commerce and
the risk management community.").
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uninsurable have the following characteristics: there are no "objective
probabilities that can be used to calculate premium levels; even individual
claims can cost large absolute amounts; and geographically the claims are
concentrated on a few regions."' Ultimately a scheme was devised that was
hoped "would maximize the traditional insurance market capacity while
requiring government backing.""5 This scheme became Pool Re.
Pool Re is "a government-backed insurance facility in which the
Department of Trade acts as a reinsurer of last resort to the insurance market."86
"Pool Re's reinsurance contract provides coverage only against acts of terrorism
as defined in the Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act [of] 1993."" 7 Pool Re,
which was created by "an amalgam of local British Insurers, Lloyd's syndicates,
overseas insurers and captives,"" is a "mutual insurance company, established
and regulated in the same manner as any normal insurance company."89 Each
company that agrees to take part in Pool Re agrees not to provide terrorism
coverage themselves; thereby removing competition from other privately
backed insurance companies.9"
"Pool Re is unique to the commercial property insurance market. Pool Re
does not provide reinsurance for the homes, personal property or cars of private
individuals, or ... reinsurance for terrorist losses on other policies."'"
The pool is reinsured by the British government, meaning that

insurers' liability is capped, giving them a ten percent profit or lossmaking potential. If the scheme runs badly then everyone who has
put premium into the system is obligated to fund another ten percent
of premium before the government reinsurance applies.92
"The primary insurer is responsible for the first £100,000 (about $150,000)
under each section of the policy (building, contents, business interruption, etc.),

84.

von Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 79, at 8. ("The St. Mary Axe bombing is a good illustration

of how high the claims for one individual event can be. As regards the geographic distribution, it was assumed

the IRA would concentrate its 'efforts' on the City and perhaps the business centers of other large towns.").
Fleming, supra note 9, at 2.
85.
86.
Id. at 3.
available at
PERRIN,
UPDATE
2 (2001),
87.
TILLINGHAST-TOWERS
http://www.tillinghast.com/tillinghast/publications/publications/till-update-ukUkPoolRe-andTerroris
m/20020521 I 1.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
Fleming, supra note 9, at 3.
88.
89. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 87, at 1.
90.
Fleming, supra note 9, at 3.
91.
TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 87, at 2. ([S]uch as liability, aviation, workers'
compensation and accidental death.).
Fleming, supra note 9, at 3.
92.
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with Pool Re covering the excess up to the limits of primary coverage. 93 Any
insurer in Great Britain offering commercial property insurance can be a Pool
Re member, but is not obliged to join.94 Insurers who want to refrain from
joining Pool Re, but want to continue offering terrorism insurance, "may offer
cover[age] without protection against terrorism, may try to find terrorism
reinsurance cover[age] in the private market, or may operate without
reinsurance protection."9
Insurers who want join Pool Re enter into a
membership agreement, essentially purchasing reinsurance from the Pool Re.96
Once a member, primary insurers must exclude acts of terrorism in their
standard commercial property policies, charge separate premiums for terrorism
coverage, and yield 100 percent of the premium charged for Pool Re.97
"According to its annual returns to the Financial Services Authority, at the
end of December 2000, the accumulated surplus amounted to £665 million."9 "
Pool Re pays its claims by accumulated underwriting profits. If there are no
profits, Pool Re can "call for an assessment on its members of up to 10 percent
of their current-year ceded premiums. If this is still insufficient, then Pool Re
may draw on any investment income it has accumulated to pay claims." 99 If
there are outstanding claims that cannot be covered by Pool Re, the government
will act as a last resort measure, to which there is no limit.' ° However, if the

93.

94.
95.
96.
97.

98.

TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 87, at 2.

The standard commercial property policy specifically excludes coverage for such
defined acts of terrorism above the deductible and then restores cover-age for them via
a standard endorsement. The insured can purchase coverage under this endorsement
for an earmarked additional premium. In effect, Pool Re provides an automatic
facultative excess of loss cover with retention of £100,000 per coverage section. On
the excess, Pool Re provides 100 percent quota share coverage.
von Ungem-Sternberg, supra note 79, at 9.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 1.
Pool Re sets its premium rates using nor-mal commercial considerations, and uses risk
factors of its own choosing - including the location of the insured property. Discounts
are available if the insured engages in prescribed risk management programs. Pool Re
reviews its premium rates on a regular basis with the assistance of independent
consulting actuaries.
Id. at 3.
Pool Re's capital is its own, and is built up entirely from its accumulated profits.
According to its annual returns to the Financial Services Authority, at the end of
December 2000 the accumulated surplus amounted to £665 million. Pool Re may
borrow, and the government guarantees any loans or other lines of credit, but it has
never made use of this ability.

99.

TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 87, at 3.

100.

Id. at 4.
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proceeds from member's premiums exceed £1 billion, then Pool Re must pay
a premium to the government. "'
The United Kingdom's Pool Re system was created so that the taxpayer is
insulated from immediately being hit with heightened premiums, or worse, not
being able to recoup their losses. Pool Re is actually a five-tiered program,
where different layers are set in place to meet the losses that policyholders may
receive following a terrorist attack.' 2 "Following an attack, the insurance
company pays the first £100,000 per coverage type, with no government
reimbursement. Insurers contribute premiums to fully capitalize and maintain
a national pool, paying out all claims directly from the pool once the deductible
103
is met.'
In the instance where the losses exceed the pool, the insurance agency must
pay up to an additional ten percent of that year's premium. If the damages or
claims exceed that amount, then the investment income earned by the pool is
used to cover the difference. " If these contingencies fail, then the Government
will help to cover the expenses. However, since Pool Re's inception, the United
05
Kingdom's government has not been forced to step in to bail out the system.1
Pool Re has curtailed governmental involvement to simply being there to
cover Pool Re when its coffers are too low to cover claims."'° The system
works by giving the customer insurance while allowing the provider to make
some profit. This is accomplished when the primary insurance companies
collect premiums from policyholders, of which the insurance company is paid
five percent. 0 7 While Pool Re pays coverage from it's collection of premiums
101.

Id.
In that case, the total premium payable by Pool Re over the lifetime of its agreement
with the government will be equal to the greater of: 10 percent of the sum of the net
premiums plus compound interest it has received, or the sum of the losses plus
compound interest the government has paid to Pool Re.
102. Lesley Hensell, Should the Feds Underwrite Terrorism Insurance?, Reality Times, 3, Nov. 15,
2001, available at http://realtimes.lycos.com/renews/20011115_insurance.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
The first line of responsibility must be in place on the insured company. Once that is
firmly in place, it's fair to spread the risk as widely as possible, with the insurance
industry acting as the second buffer, and the government acting strictly as an insurer
of last resort" Weiss Ratings, an independent provider of ratings of the insurance
industry.
106. von Ungern-Sternberg, supra note 79, at 10.
Pool Re is clearly a distortion of competition, since the Government provides one of
the suppliers with a stop-loss guarantee at zero cost. The Government apparently
believed that this was the best way to ensure that businesses could continue having low
cost insurance coverage against damages which could potentially be very high.
107. Id. ("If there is a broker between the insurance company and the customer, they get 2.5 percent
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and profits from investments, if it's resources exceed £1 billion the Government
has the right to recover any funds it may have provided.' °8
B. Pool Re's Flaws
Increased premiums have dogged Pool Re since its inception. "There is no
degree of price stability in the arrangements since the British government is
determined to ultimately pass costs on to the public. ... [I]f another big loss
occurs, there will be yet another public furor over the effectiveness of Pool
Re."' 0 9 While the government is borrowing money to pay for existing losses,
the debt increases and the burden is placed on the taxpayer.
Because one factor used in determining Pool Re coverage was location,
where one owned commercial property could significantly increase
policyholder's premiums. The areas found in the highest concentration of
terrorist activity originally had the highest rates. "Some property owners
experienced a three-fold increase in their total insurance premium. However,
as the funds in Pool Re have grown and the terrorist problem has subsided, rates
have been reduced."' 10
The definition of terrorism loss causes yet another concern. For example,
the Bishopsgate and St. Mary's Axe incidents were considered terrorism losses,
but the subsequent looting and thefts fell under the category of traditional
market losses."' Insurers are also having a difficult time with Pool Re." 2
While they are able to provide a degree of continued coverage where necessary
(with government support), they "have a very diversified client base and an
enormous administrative burden for which there is no reward unless they are
able to obtain specific fee increases from clients for these services."'
each.").
108. Id. (As of yet, the Government has not needed to intervene, so no monies have been provided
or returned.).
109. TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, supra note 87, at 4.
110. Id.
Pool Re discounted rates by 40 percent in 1995 and substantially reduced them in
1999. Gross premiums reached a high point in 1994, at £369 million. Since then they
have fallen substantially, particularly as rates have been cut. In 2000, Pool Re's gross
written premium was £39 million. Despite the claims that have been paid, Pool Re's
surplus has grown significantly. As mentioned earlier, at the end of 2000, surplus was
approximately £665 million.
Ill. Fleming, supra note 9, at 4. ("Problems with the definition of terrorism could also arise in other
ways. For example, consider the London Flood Barrier. Does terrorism occur if extremiz.t destroy this barrier
and London is damaged by flood?").
112. Id. at 5.
113. Id. ("One company, for example, has 30 full-time employees working solely on Pool Re issues.
When one extrapolates this burden to the many composite insurers and other firms throughout the United
Kingdom, one can appreciate the significant administration costs created by this system.")
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Another Pool Re problems lies with the policyholder's ability to get the
coverage they desire. 1 4 Policyholders must decide whether they require
terrorism insure or to continue until the inevitable happens and hope their losses
are not great. It is a whole or nothing proposal where a firm that only is
interested in covering one portion of its business, but not the others, cannot
participate." 5
The government could also fund its contingent liability to the pool in
a variety of ways. It could charge the pool a premium ....
accumulating a fund it could use to pay for losses. ... [Tihe

government could fund its losses out of tax revenues, either with or
without repayment requirements." 6 The greatest problem is simply
this: If the event that is being insured against happens before the Pool
has collected enough premiums, or the premium rate was estimate too
low, the Pool's reserves would be insufficient to adequately cover the
act." 7 If this were to occur, the insurers would be obligated to pay all
legitimate claims regardless of whether they recovered funds from the
Pool." 8
"The ... Pool Re system is not working. [T]he system is failing because
it is committed to a reinsurance obligation for which there is insufficient
premium in the system to pay claims."' '9 The government, which has proceeded
to borrow money to meet existing claims, is only adding to its debt. There is no
exit strategy that will satisfy the insurance industry, and indicators show that the
government's "objective is to pass the risk back to the commercial market at the
first opportunity.""'
VI. THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN BACKING INSURERS
Prior to September 11, states regulate insurance companies, however, after
the WTC attacks; the federal government has taken an increased interest in the
insurance industry. 2' Each state has a guaranty funds that kicks in when an act

114. Id. at 4.
115. Id. ("Unless there were totally separate policies and structures in force prior to the beginning
of 1993.").
116. Alternative Programs for Protecting Insurance Consumers, Terrorism Insurance, Before the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, (2001) [hereinafter McCool]
(testimony of Thomas J. McCool, Managing Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment) p. 10.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Fleming, supra note 9, at 4.
120.

Id.

121.

Lawson, supra note 14, at 62.
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creates losses that the insurance companies cannot cover.

22

"Guaranty funds

are not operated by state governments, nor are they funded by public money
(i.e., there is no explicit subsidy). [T]he funds were created by statute and
operate as part of the insurance regulatory system." 3 But if the system fails,
the policyholder is left without options? Who will step in and ensure business
owners that they will be reimbursed for their losses?
Many insurance industry executives have supported various
24
recommendations that would rope in the Federal Government as a last resort.
Many have suggested the creation of a Pool system similar to the UK's Pool Re.
However, Treasury Department officials have had concerns about the
government creating and regulating the system."' Even ifthe pool was
chartered by an individual state, and federal funds were deposited, there is 2a6
concern that at the very least, there would be some federal oversight involved. 1
President Bush has pushed forward his own plan, and has requested that
Congress pass legislation that would support federalizing terrorism insurance. 27
122. McCool, supra note 116, at 14.
123. Id. at 11.
124. Tom Hamburger & Christopher Oster, Insurance Industry Backs US Terrorism Fund, p. I,
available at http://www.hobbsgroup.com/newfiles/newscenter/data/terrorismarticle.doc.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Bill Sammon, Bush Says Senate Should Federalize Terror Insurance, THE WASH. TIMES, I
(Apr. 9, 2002), available at http://www.washtimes.com/national/20020409-2383974.htm (last visited Mar.
12, 2003). See also supra note 15.
And we need to do something on terrorism insurance, as well. This is an issue that I
don't think a lot of Americans understand very well, and we're going to use this
opportunity to explain it. I'm going to do my best to explain it. Tom Ridge and Larry
Lindsey will follow up. ... [Aind we have a lack of insurance coverage now as a result
of the enemy attack. I don't think they actually sat down and said, gosh, if we attack,
we'll affect the insurance industry of America. I think that was an unintended
consequence of theirs. But, nevertheless, it was a consequence. And we in Washington
must deal with it, and must deal with it in a hurry, because the pace of new
construction is dropping dramatically in America. Banks and investors, and others, will
not finance construction projects that do not have terrorism insurance. In order to build
a project, in order to employ people, you've got to borrow money, and you can't borrow
money unless there's adequate terrorism insurance. And that's not being provided
today.... And I expect the Congress to act. ... The Hyatt Corporation has acquired a
new site for a 1.5 million square foot office building in downtown Chicago. That ought
to be encouraging news. It ought to be encouraging news for my friend, the mayor. It
ought to be encouraging news for people who wear the hard hat and work, the
ironworkers and the construction workers. But they've got a problem finding terrorism
coverage, and so they're not getting financing for the project. Somebody wants to build
it; they can't get the money to do it because the insurance isn't available. This project
is valued at $400 million; will lead to the creation of 2,500 jobs, if the Hyatt
Corporation could get insurance.... We're worried about charities that may be forced
to cut back on services to the needy because of the high cost of insurance. Pension
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Without some decision, many policy-holders will feel the bite of not having the
proper coverage. Many customers have already faced this problem, including
the Miami Dolphins and the New York Giants (two professional football teams
in the National Football League) who lost terrorism coverage, and the Mall of
America in Minneapolis, "whose premiums have increased tenfold."'2 8
A December letter from the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) President, Terri Vaughan, to Senate leaders Thomas
Daschle, D-S.D., and Trent Lott, R-Miss., expressed the concerns of the
organization if legislative action is not quickly taken.
The terrorist attacks on our country have created enormous
uncertainty in our nation's commercial property and casualty
insurance markets. We continue to believe the federal government
can and should play a critical, limited role in helping this marketplace
adjust to these new market realities. We are aware of the efforts the
Senate and the House of Representatives are putting forward to
funds for teachers and other workers that hold real estate assets may experience lower
rates of return because of higher terrorism insurance costs. That affects someone's
retirement system. ... The transportation industry will face strains from the lack of
affordable terrorism insurance. Secondly, while we're doing everything we can to stop
terrorist attacks, the economy must be prepared to handle an attack if they do occur.
We spend a lot of time here in Washington sniffing down every lead, looking for every
opportunity to run down a clue - somebody might be trying to get us. And I am
confident - I know we're doing everything we can, but I can't predict with 100 percent
accuracy whether or not another attack won't occur. And, therefore, we better find
terrorism insurance because, without it, it would be a catastrophic problem if there is
another attack. It would make it really hard for our economy to recover a second time
if there's an attack without adequate terrorism insurance. I mean, on the one hand we're
talking about jobs, and on the other hand we're talking about recovery if there's an
attack. Now, we passed a bill in the House that basically put the federal government
as a stopgap for terrorism insurance. Above a certain level of claim, the federal
government would step in. And that's important. And now it's in the Senate, and the
Senate needs to respond and act. The Senate needs to get this bill done quickly. All
they've got to do is talk to people in this room, Republicans and Democrats alike. This
isn't a bill that says, gosh, if it passes it'll help somebody's political party. That's not
what this is all about. This is a bill that helps workers and helps strengthen our
economy. This is an important piece of legislation. I've heard some talk in Capitol Hill
that the facts don't justify this type of legislation, the facts don't justify the federal
government stepping in as a stopgap. They're not looking at the right set of facts, as far
as I'm concerned. And so I expect, for the good of our economy, and for the good of
the country, that the Senate act. And I want to thank you all for your interest in this bill,
and I ask you to contact members of the United States Senate. We believe there is
bipartisan support for this bill. We believe that if it ever makes it to the floor, it passes.
And I know that we can work with the House version, if it's somewhat different, to get
something done quickly.
128. Id. at 3.
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advance this legislation. However, further delay will have a negative
impact on insurers and insurance consumers who in this instance are
predominantly the nation's business community.
Absent federal assistance, many businesses will be without
coverage for future losses related to acts of terrorism. In the event
insurance is still available, the costs may be unaffordable for many.
Anticipating this possibility, many insurers have asked state
regulators to grant terrorism exclusions against future losses. Some
carriers are indicating that beginning Jan. 1 they will not renew
workers' compensation coverage, a business necessity if an employer
is to retain employees. These steps will leave consumers without
protection. State insurance regulators must act on these requests in the
coming days, and we will be hard-pressed to deny many of these
specific requests in the absence of a federal 'backstop.' Otherwise,
we would be exposing the industry to potentially unmanageable
financial risks that would have consequences industry-wide and
among all insurance consumers. For these reasons, we urge action on
terrorism insurance legislation this year.' 29

Diane Koken, NAIC Northeast Chair and Pennsylvania Insurance
Commissioner, testified before the United State Senate's Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation a month after the WTC attacks. 3 ° She
said that the NAIC believed that the federal government should work with the
states to create a federal backstop that would be limited in scope and duration
in the event of another catastrophic attack.' 3' While multiple plans are currently
being passed between Congressional committees, the NAIC recommendations
did not single out any one proposed plan. 132 However, it did provide guidelines
that the NAIC hoped would be an essential element of any plan ultimately
accepted and passed by Congress.133

129. Letter from Terri Vaughan, National Association of Insurance Commissioners President to
Congressional Members Thomas Daschle, D-S.D., and Trent Lott, R-Miss (Dec. 17, 2001), available at
http://www.naic.org/pressroom/releases/rel01/121701_terrorism.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
130. Regarding: The Role of the FederalGovernment in Assuring that Insurancefor TerroristActs
Remains Available to American Consumers, [hereinafter Koken] (October 30, 2001) (Testimony of Diane
Koken before the US Senate's Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation), p. 2.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (Diane Koken listed 19 criteria that the NAIC wished to be taken into consideration before
the federal government made a final conclusion to the federal backstop recommendation. They are:
1. Federal legislation in this area should "sunset" at a date certain of limited duration
after enactment in order to allow a reevaluation of the need for and design of the
program. 2. To take advantage of the substantial experience of state-based insurance
regulation, the expertise of the NAIC should be made available to any federal program
in this area and consideration should be given to including representatives of the NAIC
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Koken said that the insurance industry is well suited to cover the losses
incurred from the WTC attacks,'34 stating that the "industry is a $1 trillion
business with assets of more than $3 trillion."'35 Two examples of the insurance
industry's ability to react to disasters and reimburse policyholders who have
incurred losses are Hurricane Andrew and the California Northridge
Earthquake. In 1992 Andrew caused $19.7 billion in damages, and in 1994 an
as members of the governing body of such a program. 3. Federal legislation should
supplement but not replace other private and public insurance mechanisms where those
mechanisms can provide coverage more efficiently. 4. Federal legislation should
include clear and non-ambiguous definitions of terrorism to be applied to all policies
nationwide. 5. Rates should consider all reasonable factors that can be feasibly
measured and supported by theoretical and empirical analysis, including relative risk.
6. Federal legislation should encourage loss reduction and hazard mitigation efforts.
7. State residual market mechanisms and other pooling mechanisms providing
coverage should be allowed to participate in any program established by federal
legislation but in such a way as to not create incentives for business to be placed in
those residual markets. 8. Federal legislation should recognize that terrorism exposures
subject insurers to potential "adverse selection," i.e., entities with lower risk are less
likely to voluntarily purchase coverage, while those with greater risk are more likely
to purchase coverage. If possible, the federal program should encourage the inclusion
of both low-risk and high-risk entities to promote greater risk spreading in a way that
does not subject risk-bearing entities, including the federal government, to adverse
selection. 9. Federal legislation should address coverage and cost for all risks exposed
to terrorism, regardless of geographic, demographic or other classification, such as
"more-at-risk" or "less-at-risk." 10. There should be a safety net protection, within
reasonable limits, for any private program created by federal legislation in the event
of the insolvency of the program or its participants. 11.Tax law changes should be
encouraged to avoid penalties on and encourage the accumulation of reserves for the
portion of terrorism losses insurable in the private marketplace. 12. Federal legislation
should not unnecessarily preempt state authority. 13. Federal legislation should
encourage individuals and businesses to maintain private coverage for terrorism
exposure. 14. Federal legislation should promote or encourage awareness that coverage
is available for any property and/or casualty risk that meets reasonable standards of
insurability. 15. Federal legislation should encourage or mandate that eligible entities
participate in the program or run the risk of losing access to federal disaster assistance.
16. There should be an appropriate balance of the different private and public interests
in the governance of regulatory oversight over the program. 17. Federal legislation
should recognize the expertise of the states in insurance regulation with respect to such
areas as licensing insurers, solvency surveillance, oversight of rates and forms in most
jurisdictions, licensing producers, assisting policyholders and consumers during the
claim settlement process and performing market conduct examinations. 18. To more
efficiently achieve the objectives of any federal terrorism program, there should be
coordination of state and federal regulatory responsibilities. 19. Jurisdiction over
insurer claim settlement practices should remain with the states.
134. Id. at 3.
135. Koken, supra note 130, at 3. ("Preliminary loss estimates of $30 billion to $40 billion represent
just 3 to 4 percent of the premiums written in 2000.").
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earthquake cost $16.3 billion in insured losses. Insurers were able to respond
to the tragedy, and customers were reimbursed. 136
The insurance industry and federal government need to work together to
create a system that will honor all claims in the event of another terrorist attack.
However, as a result of the WTC attacks, many in the industry are concerned
about their ability to one, set an appropriate price for future terrorist acts, and
two, be able to compensate losses if the act is worse than estimated. "However,
even if we conclude that insurers cannot price and, therefore, cannot sell this
facing both the economy
kind of insurance, defining the nature of the problem
' 137
step."
first
critical
a
is
industry
insurance
and the
Recommendations for improving some of the problems insurers are facing
after the WTC attacks include establishing a uniform definition of terrorism and
creating a temporary federal financial backstop for terrorism insurance. 138 The
need to make these changes isn't one that results from the insurance industry not
being able to pay for the losses suffered in the September 11 attacks. "The
[but] if
industry is going to pay its loss in the World Trade Center events,
' 39
capital."'
finite
with
industry
an
is
this
continue,
attacks
terrorist
VII. EMERGING PLANS FOR FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT

Several plans emerged to cover losses in the event of another terrorist
attack. President Bush's administration has recommended the creation of a pool
system similar to Britain's Pool Re. 4 ° Costs, divided between the federal
136.

Id.
Following the tremendous losses from Hurricane Andrew, "commercial reinsurers
restricted their coverage for windstorms and raised prices. This caused a corresponding
reaction from primary insurers, who moved to raise prices, cancel coverage for coastal
properties, and increase deductible amounts for consumers having significant hurricane
exposure. Within a couple of years, normalcy returned to the reinsurance market, and
then to the primary market. The Florida Insurance Department assisted with the
recovery of the industry by introducing a moratorium on policy cancellations and
beginning the discussion of the need for a state catastrophe pool. The Florida
legislature later adopted a Hurricane Catastrophe Insurance Pool that provides a statebased backstop for catastrophic windstorms in Florida. These collective actions have
resulted in a robust and competitive market for homeowners insurance in the State of
Florida.
137. McCool, supra note 116, at 1,3.
138. Id. See also Koken, supra, note 130, at 2-3.
139. Hamburger, supra note 124. (Statements of Maurice Greenberg, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, American International Group, Inc.) (However, this statement seems to contradict the statements made
by NAIC N.E. Chair, Diane Koken.).
140. Federal Government, Insurers Debate Plan to Cover Future Terrorist Acts, Will Reinsurance
Rebound? 79 INSURANCE JOURNAL WEST, [hereinafter Insurers Debate] (October 29, 2001), 10,
available at http://www.insurancejoumal.com/magazines/west/2001/I 0/29/coverstory/I 8300.htm (last visited
Mar. 12, 2003). See also Peter van Aartrijk, Jr., Can Terrorism Reinsurance Pool Calm Insurers' Fears?,
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government and insurers, would be an alternative to the industry's initial
proposal. The White House's plan would require the federal government to pay
80 percent of the first $20 billion of insured losses resulting from a terrorist.
Private insurers and reinsures would cover the remaining 20 percent. If losses
the
from a terrorist event amassed more than $20 billion in insured losses,
41
percent.'
10
pay
would
insurers
and
percent,
90
pay
government would
Several of the nation's largest insurers told the state insurance
commissions that this plan would hurt smaller companies... Insurers
are ... pushing for some sort of safety net, a terrorism pool to provide
reinsurance. The White House rejected this original proposal142 as
'anticompetitive' and 'too complex' for the limited time frame.
Two prevailing bills are in Congress, each passed in their respective
chambers. The House of Representatives passed the Terrorism Risk Protection
Act (H. R. 3210) in November. House Financial Services Committee Chairman
Michael G. Oxley said, "the bill establishes a temporary risk-spreading program
to shore up the insurance market and provide it with needed confidence and
government regulation and would only
certainty. The legislation requires little
143
occurred.'
event
terrorist
a
kick in if
Passed in the House in November 2001, H.R. 3210 would provide for the
federal government to cover casualty and property damages resulting from
terrorist attacks.'" The government, over two years, would cover 90 percent of
any losses resulting from a terrorist act, and private insurers would cover the last
10 percent.

45

Federal aid would be triggered by industry-wide losses of at least $1
billion or 10 percent of the capital and surplus of any individual
a loan to be repaid by the industry
company. The aid would be ...

What Independent Agents Can Expect with the Hard Market, available at
http://www.aartrijk.com/resources/articles/terrorism.reinsurance.htm. ("A week after the suicide hijackings,
insurance carrier executives and IIAA CEO Bob Rusbuldt reassured President Bush at an Oval Office meeting
claims would be paid." ... "The CEO suggested a government-backed reinsurance pool
that the estimated ...
similar to that found in Great Britain.").
141. Federal Government, Insurers Debate Plan to Cover Future Terrorist Acts, supra note 140.
("After three years, the government would withdraw, allowing private insurers to take over.").
142. Id.
143. Press Release, House Committee on Financial, Oxley Commends AFL-CIO, Financial Services
Roundtable for Letter Urging Action on Terrorism Insurance (February 22, 2002), available at
http://financialservices.house.govlnews.asp?FormMode=release&id=77 (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
144. 144. Insurance Liability, supra note 16.
145. Id.
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through assessments
spread across the companies over an extended
46
period of time.1

The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (S. 2600), the rival bill to H.R. 3210,
was passed on the Senate floor on June 18, 2002.147 The bill, sponsored by Sen.
Chris Dodd (D-Conn.) and cosponsors Senate Majority Whip Harry Reid (DNev.), Senate Banking Committee Chairman Paul Sarbanes (D-Nev.) and Sen.
Charles Schumer (D-N.Y.), would "trigger if a terrorist attack caused at least $5
million in damages. The federal government would then pay 80 percent of
losses above each individual company's deductible for losses of up to $10
billion."' 418 The Act requires insurance companies to cover terrorist acts if the
resulting damage is up to $10 billion. "The federal government would cover 90
percent of losses greater than that amount during the first year of the possible
two-year program. If the Treasury secretary approves
the program for a second
149
year, the threshold would rise to $15 billion."'
50
These two bills are very different. The House bill is a "loan" program.
In the aftermath of a terrorist attack, the federal government would loan insurers
up to $100 billion, but only after private insurance companies paid the first $1
billion. 151 The insurers who received the federal loan monies would be required
to repay the federal government, most likely pulling from earnings and premium
increases. This will likely cause customers to pay higher premiums.'52
53
Senate 2600 is a federally funded, short-term federal backstop program,
that
[s]ubstantially increases ... deductibles ... the industry ... pay[s]

before tax dollars are used to pay for losses ... [thereby] ensur[ing]
146.

Id.

147. Press Release, IUABA Hails Senate Terrorism Insurance Vote; Calls Enactment "Necessary For
Consumers And The Economy", Senate Approves S. 2600 on 84-14 Vote, Independent Insurance Agents &
Brokers of America, Inc.,[hereinafter IIABA] (June 18, 2002), 1, available at
http://na.iiaa.org/Legislative/SenateTerrorismBillPR.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
148. Press Release, Senate Overwhelmingly Passes Terrorism Risk Insurance, Johnson Says the
Legislation Would Ensure the Availability and Affordability of Insurance Policies Throughout South Dakota
(June 18, 2002), available at http://johnson.senate.gov/-johnson/releases/200206/2002619A31.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2003).
149. IIABA, supra note 147, at 2. ("The bill also includes a per-company market share retention
formula that would enable companies to be eligible for the federal backstop even if losses do not surpass the
yearly, per-event thresholds.").
150.

Id.

151.

Id.

152.

Id.

153.

Senate

Passes

Terrorism

Insurance

Bill

http://shoppingcenterworld.com/ar/retail-senatepasses.terrorism
Mar. 12, 2003).

(June

19

2002),

available

at

(last visited Mar. 12, 2003) (last visited
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that insurance companies will do all ... they can to protect ...
taxpayers ... through careful assessment of the risks involved with
each policy54 and the promotion of risk mitigation by their
customers.

"Among other differences, S. 2600 leaves property owners susceptible to
punitive damages resulting from a terrorist attack. The ICSC and President
Bush himself have voiced opposition to placing limits on punitive damage
coverage for property owners, and Bush must sign the final bill."' 5 5 President
Bush will veto any terrorism insurance bill that "allows punitive damages to be
156
assessed against United States businesses."'
H.R. 3210 and S 2600 both require losses, either aggregate industry losses
or from individual company losses, to reach a trigger level before federal
monies will be disbursed, both of which are caped at $100 billion.'57 H.R. 3210
has two triggers; the primary trigger starts when annual insured losses resulting
from terrorist attacks reach $1 billion.
When this occurs, all participating insurers can receive disbursements. If
terrorist attacks cause damages exceeding $100 million "and losses for at least
one insurer exceed both 10 percent of surplus and 10 percent of commercial
lines net written premium, then those specific insurers who are so affected are
eligible for payments" 15 under the bill's second trigger.
Once the main trigger of $1billion is reached, insurers are reimbursed
for 90 percent of their losses above a $5 million deductible. In the
case of the secondary trigger, eligible insurers are reimbursed for 90
percent of their losses in excess of 10 percent of their net written
commercial lines premiums. 5 9
Under S. 2600, insurers are limited to what they can recover. Insurers are
limited to collecting losses, resulting from terrorist attacks, that exceed a
deductible equal to their commercial insurance market share times $10 billion,

154. Statement of United States Rep. John J. LaFalce, Ranking Member, House Financial Services
Committee, Regarding Senate Passage of S. 2600, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (June 18, 2002),
available at http://www.house.gov/banking-democrats/pr_-061802.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
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which is limited to $15 billion in the second year. 60 "In the case of S 2600, the
federal share of losses is 80 percent of losses in excess of the individual
company deductible, until losses reach $10 billion. Thereafter, the federal share
161
is 90 percent."'
Under H.R. 3210, insurers would be reimbursed $3.81 billion a year.
Under S 2600, insurers would receive $1.76 billion for the first year, program
and $1.44 billion the second year. If these plans began July 1, 2002, the
expected disbursements over five years under H.R. 3210 would be $6.6 billion
versus $2.8 billion for S 2600.162
H.R. 3210 requires ... disbursements ... be recovered via assessments
and surcharges, while S. 2600 does not. Under H.R. 3210, the first
$20 billion ... are to be recovered via assessments on commercial
insurers; ... disbursements in excess of $20 billion ... to be recouped
63
via earmarked surcharges on commercial insurance policies.
"In theory, the federal government should ultimately be able to recoup the
majority of any disbursements under H.R. 3210. Over an extended period the
only limitation on recoupment would be due to unrecoverable assessments on
insolvent insurers."' 6 Overcoming the differences between H.R. 3210 and S.
2600 will be a major hurdle that both the House and Senate may have difficulty
negotiating as the one-year anniversary of the WTC attack draws closer.
Vi.

CONCLUSION

While Great Britain's Pool Re is a valuable system to assist the insurance
industry in the event of massive damages resulting from terrorism, it is not the
best program for America.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Lowe, supra note 157, at 3.
163. Id. at 6.
164. Id.
Except for the first $5 billion of disbursements, assessments and surcharges in any
calendar year are limited to 3 percent of commercial lines net written premium, which
translates to an industry-wide overall annual dollar cap on recoveries of roughly $3.6
billion, based on our estimate of commercial lines direct written premium of $120
billion. In addition, H.R. 3210 provides the Secretary of the Treasury with considerable
latitude regarding the timing and administration of any assessments or surcharges. For
example, the Secretary may defer assessments on individual insurers to the extent that
the Secretary determines that a deferral is necessary to avoid insolvency. Similarly,
before imposing any surcharges, the Secretary is required to assess commercial
insurance market conditions and consider the impact of the surcharges on affordability
of commercial insurance.
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The United States insurance industry will survive the short-term
effects of September 11. It does not, however, have the capacity to
protect against another terrorist act of similar magnitude. ... [U]ntil
terrorism risk is eliminated or greatly reduced, United States
businesses ... will need [the federal] government to ... ensure ...
effective commerce ... continues.' 65
It will ultimately be a compromise of three principles; the willingness of
the federal government to come to the aid of the insurance industry under H.R.
3210, the guarantee of a federal backstop that will be the cornerstone of
terrorism insurance under S. 2600, and the willingness of our elected officials
to overcome political maneuvering that will ultimately decide the fate of
terrorism insurance. Between these, the ability of insurers and reinsurers to
meet the losses of their policyholders will be met. As the fall session of
Congress looms, attention from the insurance industry, policyholders, and the
media will be directed at lawmakers who struggle to find a compromise that will
ensure federal involvement and provide consumer confidence.
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